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Increasing scrutiny of the role and actions of emergency responders in the 
aftermath of mass casualty events continues to elicit the need for changes and 
advances in terms of treatment and care. Despite improvements in some areas, 
there is a growing concern relating to the identification of incapacitated patients 
who are unable to provide any identifying details. The use of visual identification 
and the reliance on personal effects within the vicinity of victims, both living and 
deceased, has resulted in mistaken identification in a number of major incidents 
internationally. There is a misguided emphasis on the identification of the 
deceased over that of the living incapacitated victim. 
 
This research examines the practicalities of using scientific methods for 
identification of the deceased, such as those used in INTERPOL’s Disaster Victim 
Identification (DVI) process, and questions whether they should be broadened to 
include those who are incapacitated and unable to confirm their own identity. 
 
The study uses qualitative ethnographic analysis, triangulating observation of two 
large mass casualty and fatality exercises, interviews with front-line responders 
and subject-matter experts and corresponding documentation and fieldnotes to 
critically examine the challenges, barriers and solutions to determining an 
unconscious patient’s identity. In addition, analysis of previous cases of 
identification errors was carried out using Turner’s Incubation Theory as a basis 
for understanding the causative factors.  
 
This thesis establishes that despite the growing number of these cases, and the 
successful implementation of DVI techniques with the incapacitated in the 
aftermath of two recent terrorist attacks, lessons are not being learned. There 
remains a resistance to organisational learning from a crisis and an unwillingness 
to change practices that are no longer sufficient or relevant.  
 
Ultimately, the application of DVI on its own to resolve identification issues is 
insufficient. The empirical evidence established as a result of this study 
 vii 
demonstrates that successful implementation of DVI requires better awareness of 
these issues, including the latent failures present in the Incubation Period. 
Perceived barriers, including questions over the legal viability of DVI when used 
with the living, will need to be overcome. This can be achieved through 
awareness, planning and training and ultimately steered by effective strategic 
leadership with a desire to improve the culture of emergency response across an 
organisation. Failure to adopt this strategy alongside the application of DVI will 
result in harms, not only to victims and their families as a result of identification 
errors, but importantly to the responders themselves. If organisations fail in their 
duty to plan for and respond to mass casualty incidents involving unidentified and 
unknown incapacitated patients, the responders themselves will become victims of 
psychosocial stress and harm. 
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Background and Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background and Rationale             
 
The necessity for rapid reunification and reconciliation of those affected by a 
disaster with their families has been an essential component of emergency 
planning for many years (Black et al, 2010; Black et al, 2011; International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 2010; Richardson et al, 2017). Correct 
identification of the deceased to enable their remains to be reunited with the right 
relatives has been at the forefront of forensic and emergency response in the 
wake of disasters (Black et al., 2011; Black and Hackman, 2013; College of 
Policing, 2018a, Ellis, 2019). Narratives of mistakes in identifying the deceased 
are routinely included in training events and procedurally managed through a 
series of international INTERPOL guidance documents (INTERPOL, 2018a). 
However, there is growing concern regarding identification errors associated with 
living incapacitated victims (Black and Bikker, 2016; Quatrehomme, 2018). As 
Black and Bikker (2016, 2) attest, “misidentification…is not a single event, it 
exhibits multiplicity”. Simply, where one error exists with the identification of an 
individual, there will inevitably be a mistake in the identification of another person 
or body. This research scrutinises the immediate aftermath of disasters to 
understand the issues associated with unidentified critically ill patients and 
whether the Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) procedure can and should be used 
as an alternative to the current practice of using visual identification techniques 
such as photographs.  
 
DVI is an internationally recognised and agreed process used by specially trained 
staff to accurately determine the identities of the deceased. According to 
INTERPOL the process of DVI establishes that:  
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The primary and most reliable means of identification are fingerprint 
analysis, comparative dental analysis and DNA analysis. Secondary means 
of identification include personal description, medical findings as well as 
evidence found on the body. These means of identification serve to support 
identification by other means and are not sufficient as sole means of 
identification (INTERPOL, 2018b, 39).  
 
At present the identification of a living unknown patient relies on an accepted yet 
inaccurate use of visual identification. This may be in the form of confirmation by a 
family member viewing the critically injured patient or hospital staff using a 
photograph which bears a resemblance to the patient. Unfortunately, this 
technique can result in the families being alongside the wrong patient and in some 
cases, families being misinformed of their loved one’s death. Recent examples 
such as the misidentification of two young team players in the Humboldt Broncos 
incident in Canada and of Justine Moulin in the Paris terrorist attacks in 2016 offer 
instances of impact and consequences of identification errors. Both these 
situations occurred due to a reliance on an unscientific and outdated practice of 
visual identification. Ascertaining exact numbers of incapacitated and unknown 
patients is immensely difficult. A lack of awareness of the impact of 
misidentification and/or un-identification exists, which means that there are no 
known formal records of these individuals and their circumstances. However, 
given the numbers of media reported cases (approximately two reported per year), 
the impact to those affected is significant enough to warrant scrutiny into how and 
why such failings could and do occur. As the number of mass casualty and fatality 
events continues to increase, so too will the errors and consequences of 
misidentification of the survivors.  
 
This study uses a qualitative quasi-ethnographic approach of observations of 
emergency responders in the wake of mass casualty and fatality incidents. The 
findings are triangulated using interviews and document analysis alongside 
contextual examples to understand how identification errors occur. The study 
seeks to understand the implications of such errors, specifically the psychosocial 
repercussions to all those affected, including responders. This research 
demonstrates that fundamental issues remain in organisational learning across the 
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mass casualty and fatality response effort (Easthope, 2007; Coles, 2014, Norton 
and Gibson, 2019), specifically concerning the identification of critically injured 
unidentified persons. Barriers to implementing a solution are being justified by a 
misunderstanding of the applicable laws and an inability and unwillingness to 
adopt positive examples of best practice. Although there are recent international 
examples of implementation of DVI to successfully identify a number of living 
individuals, these remain isolated cases. The mindset that DVI can only be 
effectively and legally used for deceased victims is incorrect and needs to be 
dispelled. There is a requirement to rethink how incapacitated individuals can also 
be identified. Families desperately searching for information regarding their loved 
ones require authorities to have clear protocols for accurately identifying the 
deceased and those who remain unidentified in hospitals. As the INTERPOL 
Guidance clearly states:  
 
As far as INTERPOL is concerned, one of the most important requirements 
for victim identification is the application of international standards, which 
aims to promote a consistent and widely understood approach, especially in 
multinational DVI operations (INTERPOL, 2018a, 6). 
Furthermore, there is a need for responders to be trained and exercised effectively 
in the appropriate techniques and processes for identifying all victims of a disaster, 
both the living and deceased (Pan American Health Organisation, 2016). 
Ultimately, the justice afforded to the deceased, in terms of determining their 
identities using DVI scientific techniques, should be extended to those 
incapacitated and unknown in hospital. As mass casualty and fatality events are 
likely to continue (Goh, 2017; LaFree, 2019), there exists an increasing need for 
an organisational culture shift across the multi-agency arena (Wankhade et al., 
2018), and a requirement for this to be duly considered amongst academics and 
practitioners.  
 
The present study originated with a brief internet investigation which suggested 
the use of visual identification as the principal identification tool. Therefore, in early 
2014, at an Emergency Planning Society Conference, a poster raising the issue of 
the use of DVI to identify the living. The presenters were the Author and Professor 
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Lucy Easthope, a subject-matter expert in the field of disaster recovery, 
specialising in the return of personal effects, the human aspects of mass fatality 
events and the effectiveness of emergency response legislation. A UK DVI trained 
policeman queried whether samples could be taken for the purpose of 
identification from an incapacitated individual. It was argued by the same DVI team 
member that it would be illegal under the Offences Against the Persons Act 1861 
to obtain a sample without consent and doing so would amount to battery (the 
term ‘assault’ was used, yet this was part of the misunderstanding and 
misconception that the DVI process is only compatible with the deceased). This 
fundamental issue instigated further research into this phenomenon and 
demonstrated a need to thoroughly investigate whether questions over the legality 
of the process was preventing implementation of DVI in hospital environments or 
whether there was a more latent and subversive barrier to its use.  
 
There is also a more personal reason for this research and one that only came to 
light as a result of discussing the contextual examples with family members. In 
1993, the Author’s cousin was critically injured in a car accident. He had no 
identification on him at the time and both he and his friend were incapacitated and 
rushed to hospital. After failing to turn up to work on Monday, his work colleagues 
finally contacted his mother to question his whereabouts. When she was notified 
that a person matching his description was critically injured in hospital, she was 
informed that he was, by that time, brain dead. She was asked to attend the 
hospital to make the decision to turn off life support.  
 
If he would have survived had his mother been notified earlier, or if the hospital 
decided to keep him alive so that family could say goodbye, is almost irrelevant. It 
is the knowledge that in our society, with ever advancing technology and a greater 
awareness of the ethical requirements of patient care, we should always aim for 
improvements to ensure relatives are notified as soon as possible. More 
importantly, every available resource should be used, and specifically in light of 
the potential for visual identification errors, these should be scientifically accurate 
to ensure better treatment and care of patients.  
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1.2 Research Question and Objectives 
 
Can the challenges presented by the identification of incapacitated patients in 
mass casualty and fatality events be resolved by using the scientifically accurate 
and internationally recognised protocols of DVI? (RQ). 
 
In order to answer the RQ the following objectives were established. 
 
• RO1   Examine how and why identification errors occur.  
• RO2   Determine the psychosocial implications of identification 
errors. 
• RO3   Examine the barriers from the responder’s perspective in 
accurately determining identity of an incapacitated unknown patient, 
specifically the medico-legal challenges relating to DVI . 
• RO4   Scrutinise how the lessons relating to patient identification 
errors and the use of DVI have been instigated by UK responders. 
 
All are interconnected through the idea that the disaster scenario is a challenging 
and complex arena, with many limitations and barriers making lessons hard to 
identify and change difficult to achieve (Coles, 2014). Furthermore, all questions 
are individually interesting and worthwhile subjects in their own right. 
 
To understand the problems presented by unidentified critically ill patients in 
emergency situations and whether these can be resolved using DVI (RQ), four 
further objectives were proposed. The first research objective (RO1) looks at how 
and why the issues of mistaken identification can occur. Using Turner’s (1976) 
Incubation Theory as a contextual reference point, this study seeks to determine 
the causative factors as to why errors are made, how individuals are mistakenly 
identified and uses retrospective analysis of examples of identification errors 
alongside observation and interviews.  
 
The second research objective (RO2) considers the implications of these errors. A 
significant concern was that potential psychosocial harm could occur as a result of 
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the errors in mistaking an individual’s identity. Both RO1 and RO2 need to be 
answered to understand why current identification methods are unsatisfactory and 
the problems that would need to be overcome by using DVI to identify 
incapacitated patients.  
 
DVI is an already established protocol to determine the identities of the deceased 
and is used by UK police forces nationwide in the aftermath of a mass fatality 
event. Yet, specific concerns were raised by DVI experts and some junior 
clinicians regarding the use of DVI techniques on the living without consent and 
the fear that doing so would be considered assault and invade the patient’s 
privacy. Therefore, the third objective (RO3) examines whether these concerns 
are justified and looks at what may be preventing or limiting the ability of 
responders to determine a living individual’s identity using DVI. 
 
The fourth objective (RO4) seeks to ascertain why responders are not adopting 
best practice from other similar organisations. International media reports of visual 
identification errors occur on a relatively frequent basis and the DVI community are 
well versed in the perils of mistakenly identifying the deceased (Black and Bikker, 
2016; INTERPOL, 2018; Forrest, 2019).  However, no effort has been made to 
amend current practice and broaden the application of a scientifically successful 
method to the living patient. To examine why this might be the case a theoretical 
understanding of organisational learning is applied to the findings derived from 
observation, interviews and documentation gathered from exercises conducted in 
a hospital and a mass casualty and fatality setting. 
 
The objectives (RO3 and RO4) help to understand whether DVI can be used to 
identify individuals and highlight where barriers to its implementation and use 
might be and therefore offers some solutions to the challenges identified in RO1 
and RO2. 
 
This study also gathered examples of incapacitated and unknown victims and any 
associated identification errors. The list of reported cases is provided in Appendix 
I. Appendix II contains a selection of these examples detailing the accounts of 
these incidents drawn from interviews and secondary data, including 
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autobiographical accounts, media reports and televised interviews. The contextual 
examples (CE) are continually referred to throughout this thesis (in a similar 
manner to case studies) in order to situate the reality of the problem and provide a 
depth of understanding (Yin, 2018) as to how the issue occurs and the 




1.3 Chapter Synopsis   
 
To critically examine the challenges, solutions and barriers to determining an 
unconscious patient’s identity this thesis is divided into twelve chapters, of which 
this introduction is the first. 
 
Chapter Two introduces the methodological approach taken to answer the 
research question and objectives outlined in Section 1.3 above. It explains the 
reason for the qualitative methodology and how the quasi-ethnographic approach 
triangulates observation, interviews and responder documentation to determine 
the answers to the research question and objectives. In order to understand the 
patient and deceased pathway and to observe how responders react in a complex 
and challenging mass casualty and fatality scenario, two major incident exercises 
were observed in 2016 and 2017. Alongside this fieldwork, semi-structured 
interviews with 29 subject-matter experts, including international DVI experts, 
Casualty Bureau (CB) staff, forensic teams and front-line medical staff, amongst 
others, were conducted during 2015–2017 to garner their views on why actions 
were taken and their understanding of the issues regarding the identification of 
patients. A ‘purposive’ sampling strategy (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011) was used to 
consult those with a specific understanding of mass casualty and fatality incidents 
and identification of the deceased. Informed consent was gained from all 
participants and ethics approval was sought and gained from local NHS Research 
Committees and the University of Lincoln School of Life Sciences Research Ethics 
Committee. In addition, responder documentation was critically examined to 
understand whether the actions and comments observed and heard corresponded 
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to legal doctrine and whether there were areas that needed addressing or 
refinement. The frameworks determined through the review of the literature 
(Chapters Four, Five and Six) related to the objectives and informed the analysis 
of the empirical evidence derived from the qualitative fieldwork, interviews and 
document analysis. Alongside this, Contextual Examples (CE) of misidentification 
were used to provide examples of such events. The topic studied is undoubtedly a 
sensitive one and there were clear ethical limitations to this study. Therefore, a 
careful approach was taken using advice and guidance from the principal 
supervisors Easthope and Langlois and a decision was made to not interview 
primary victims and their families. However, the CE take into account more 
personal perspectives gathered from a multitude of sources and testimonial 
accounts in autobiographies and interviews with the media.  
 
Chapter Three establishes the key principles within emergency response as 
outlined by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and the key requirements of 
emergency responders. It outlines the patient pathway and how UK emergency 
responders deal with those affected by a mass casualty and fatality incident, from 
the scene, known as the ‘hot zone’, through to their treatment and care in hospital. 
It also looks at the care of the deceased and how they are identified using DVI. It 
includes a brief explanation of each of the DVI processes. Finally, it considers the 
crucial element of family reconciliation and how relatives are reunited with their 
missing and deceased. Despite the emphasis being on UK responders, as with all 
isomorphic (corresponding or similar in form or relations (Lexico, 2020) learning, 
the findings and evidence presented here are equally applicable to similarly 
focused organisations both nationally and internationally. 
 
Chapter Four considers the theoretical foundations of incident causation to meet 
RO1. Turner’s Incubation Period Theory (1976) is used as a framework by which 
to examine the causative factors which may contribute to an individual being 
unidentified or mistakenly identified. Alongside Turner’s seminal research on 
incident causation, the key theories of academics and experts commonly 
associated with high risk industry accidents are also studied (Reason, 1990; Toft 
and Reynolds, 2005; Perrow, 1999, 2016; Vaughn, 2016).  This branch of 
academia is a useful comparative field of analysis, as the lessons, and more 
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importantly, associated learnings from high risk industries are long established and 
considered a ‘corner-stone’ of safety and improvements (Woloshynowych et al., 
2005; The Health Foundation, 2013; Deboard, 2015, Cox et al., 2018).  The focus 
for this research is on mass casualty and fatality incidents where the numbers of 
critically injured patients are likely to be higher and the complexities of the scene 
and overall responses arguably larger and more difficult to manage. However, this 
study and its findings are transferable to smaller incidents of misidentification 
where, as will be shown in the interviews and the CE, these mistakes can occur in 
very much the same way, if visual identification is relied on. Importantly, the same 
causative incubating factors are equally likely to be present. 
   
Chapter Five reviews the literature underpinning the consequences of failing to 
identify individuals correctly. In addition to the significant risk to life as a result of 
misidentification in relation to medical treatment (a lack of medical records could 
cause inadvertent allergies amongst other adverse outcomes), another 
fundamental concern is the potential psychosocial harm suffered. Media reports 
and interviews have highlighted the distressing accounts of relatives who have 
been in the unfortunate position of learning that the family member they thought 
had survived was not the person in the hospital bed, but was in fact deceased 
(Van Ryn et al., 2008; Brown, 2013; L’Express, 2016). Therefore, this review 
focuses on psychosocial harms – what is meant by psychosocial harm (National 
Health Service (NHS), 2018), how it occurs and what underlying values are 
associated with this outcome. A review of the three principal categories of those 
affected is carried out, looking at the impact to survivors, relatives and responders. 
Using the UK Health and Safety Executive’s (HSE) (Bond et al, 2006) analysis of 
stress in the workplace, the six key underlying causes of stress in the workplace 
are used as thematic waypoints to guide the analysis of the empirical evidence 
relating to responder stress and emotional impact obtained in the qualitative 
research. These causes of stress were mirrored in the recent study carried out by 
Mind.org.uk (2015 - 2019) in the UK of front-line responders demonstrating the 
importance in acknowledging their impact and the importance of mental-health 
awareness (Mind, 2019). 
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Chapter Six appraises the literature of organisational learning to understand the 
theory underpinning RO4 and considers the elements that encourage or detract 
from the need to identify and learn from past events. This chapter looks at what 
factors may help or hinder organisational learning, such as active and passive 
learning (Mitchel et al., 2009) and the various ways in which organisations can 
learn from each other and past events. It establishes that organisations should be 
learning from the lessons identified in public inquiries and governmental reports in 
the wake of mass fatality and casualty situations, but in practice little change takes 
place (Clarke, 1999; Coles, 2014, Macrae, 2016).The literature in this chapter also 
helps to explain RO3 and examines the barriers to adopting best practice from 
past events in similar organisations.  
 
The findings are subdivided into separate chapters, exploring objectives RO1 to 
RO4. Chapter Seven presents the first of these (RO1), looking at the causation of 
identification failures and provides evidence triangulated from the observations, 
interviews and document analysis. The results suggest that human error through 
the making of assumptions regarding personal effects, the complexity of the scene 
and the challenging circumstances of inter-agency working, accumulate to act as 
interlinked causative factors. Individually, these can lead to mistakes in 
determining a patient’s identity and even more concerning is that, amalgamated, 
they can have serious consequences for the patients, their families and the 
responders themselves. The empirical data confirms that an alternative approach 
to visual identification is needed and that the already established DVI protocols 
should be broadened to include the identification of the incapacitated patient. 
 
Chapter Eight details the findings concerning the psychosocial harms that occur as 
a consequence of identification errors (RO2). As noted in Chapter Five, research 
into the harms suffered by the responders has not received as much attention. 
This chapter adds to the growing body of literature regarding responder harms and 
presents the evidence collected from the fieldwork and interviews. Of significance 
is the finding that there is a gap in the literature with regards to harms to 
responders as a result of identification errors. Crucially, this chapter supports the 
argument that DVI should be considered as an alternative to using visual 
identification to determine the identity of an unknown patient. 
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As mentioned previously, a core argument preventing the use of DVI techniques 
on living critically injured patients concerned the interpretation of the applicable 
laws relating to patient consent and privacy. As this is a fundamental barrier to 
accurately determining an individual’s identity, under RO3, it is necessary to 
understand the legal responsibility responders may have in this respect. Most 
concerns revolve around criminal liability or liability under medical negligence law, 
and so this study will be limited to these key areas. Interviews with subject-matter 
experts in the field of DVI, policing, law and healthcare were conducted to gain an 
understanding of how the law is interpreted and applied in its current form. 
Chapter Nine presents the evidence that there is a misunderstanding of the law 
which results in confusion between legal doctrine, policy and practice. In addition 
to a misunderstanding of the legal position there are other reasons why DVI has 
not been used more widely to determine the identity of the living, especially when 
examples of successful application exist.  
 
RO4 raised the question of how lessons are identified and rectified in the wake of 
an identification error. Chapter Ten presents the evidence of how DVI 
organisations and UK emergency responders work to identify lessons, learn from 
events and set about trying to improve practice, or not, as the case may be. In a 
similar manner to that predicted by the Incubation Period Theory, there are 
numerous interlinking causative factors as to why lessons are either not identified, 
or more importantly when they are, why they are not learned. This chapter looks at 
the data accumulated from both the fieldwork and interviews (as well as the CE of 
identification errors) and presents the argument that, again, little positive change is 
occurring to prevent future identification issues. Without legal or professional 
enforcement, organisations have little impetus to change. 
 
Chapter Eleven draws together on the evidence associated with each of the 
objectives outlined above to discuss the solutions, challenges and barriers to 
identifying critically injured unknown patients and whether these can be resolved 
using DVI. The chapter proposes four key areas which responder organisations 
should consider if misidentification errors and the subsequent consequences are 
to be avoided. The first looks at raising the awareness of identification errors and 
the latent issues exhibited in the incubation period. The second makes 
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recommendation for plans and policies, either because they don’t exist, or they do 
exist but are violated or finally, where they have an inadequate or inaccurate plan. 
The third solution outlines the requirement for training and exercising the proposed 
or modified plans and argues that organisations need to continually reflect on 
lessons identified through, not only real incidents, the exercising and testing 
regime. Lastly, senior management need to drive the process of change and 
provide robust leadership for each of the recommendations above. It is suggested 
that without implementing these solutions identification errors and the 
consequences, including psychosocial harm to responding staff, will continue to 
occur.  
  
Chapter Twelve concludes the thesis and presents the main arguments and 
justifications for the adoption of DVI to determine the unidentified incapacitated 
individual in mass casualty and fatality incidents. The significance of this research 
and its contribution to academia, particularly in the fields of psychosocial harm, 
organisational learning and causes of error in front-line emergency response, is 
discussed. Furthermore, the impact of this research in the UK to date is presented, 
including the changes taking place as a direct result of the work done with 
multiagency partners since the inception of this thesis. Areas for further 
consideration and research are also presented and the potential for future 
exploration is discussed, particularly given the changes that are occurring in the 
field of patient identification and reconciliation. Finally, this chapter reflects on the 
research journey as a whole and offers some thoughts to fellow PhD candidates, 





1.4 Scope and Limitations  
    
In light of these specific research objectives, it is important to state what this thesis 
will not do. First, it will not attempt to provide detailed explanations of the individual 
DVI processes. A brief outline is provided in Chapter Three. However, the 
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successes or failures of the individual scientific attributes will not be considered in 
this study. This has been achieved to great effect elsewhere (Black, et al., 2010; 
Black et al., 2011; Bikker, 2013; Adams et al., 2014; Taylor and Kieser, 2015).  
Second, whilst Chapter Nine outlines the requirements and underpinning legal 
arguments as to why identification investigations might be necessary and how 
these could be achieved, it is not the purpose of this thesis to critically deconstruct 
the law or offer avenues of reform for the law itself. A brief introduction is important 
for contextualisation; however, a pragmatic decision was made to not venture into 
legal detail as this would detract from the main focus of the thesis.  
Third, the fieldwork and interviews included perspectives from international experts 
in France, Belgium, Canada and Australia. Where interviews were conducted with 
international representatives from non-English speaking countries, the 
documentation was translated by the individuals themselves and the interviews 
conducted in English. The findings presented here are primarily for use with UK 
responders, however, the lessons identified do have applicability on a wider 
international scale.  
Fourth, owing to ethical considerations, this research did not conduct any 
interviews with survivors or relatives. Accounts and narratives were gathered from 
secondary data easily accessible via the internet. This is discussed in more detail 
in Chapter Two. 
Fifth, the Manchester Bombings highlighted the emotional turmoil of clinicians in 
the care and treatment of adults and minors who were unidentified. However, this 
research does not include minors and young adults in its scope due to constraints 
on time and ethics. However, the issue was raised by the Author to the Care and 
Quality Commission (CQC) regarding the care and treatment of minors without 
appropriate consent in the wake of the Manchester Arena Bombings.  
Sixth, as this research attests, incidences of unidentified and incapacitated 
patients are not formally reported. As a result, the exact number of cases in the 
UK and internationally is unknown. Nevertheless, this research demonstrates that 
the consequences of misidentification are serious enough to warrant investigation 
and resolution. 
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Finally, the findings of this thesis seek to avoid apportioning blame. The evidence 
presented here represents challenges to the industry and depicts the difficulty in 
embedding new practice into resource stretched and pressurised emergency 




1.5 Potential Benefits for Practice, Education and Management   
 
This research provides a significant contribution to knowledge through its in-depth 
analysis of the potential barriers to and limitations of the use of DVI with living 
patients. It is acknowledged that DVI regarding the deceased is well researched 
and tested, yet its expansion to include the living is in its infancy. The findings 
presented in this thesis and the accumulation of contextual examples builds on 
this knowledge and highlights the issues underlying the failure to correctly identify 
individuals. 
 
The analysis of the legal position of DVI concerning the living patient is an 
essential benefit of this research and provides the legal remit to engage in the use 
of DVI in a hospital setting with immediate effect. More importantly, the study 
highlights a gap in the understanding of the legal remit and responsibility of the 
role of the police concerning the reconciliation of families in a hospital setting. This 
is an essential factor to be considered in the management of patient care and 
treatment.  
 
This research also contributes to the wider field of organisational learning in the 
emergency response domain. The analysis draws on best practice from across the 
health and police organisations, including the wider emergency responder 
community both nationally and internationally. The findings have the potential to 
influence policing, forensics and medical responders in the care and treatment of 
victims and their families in the wake of a disaster. The application of the lessons 
identified and highlighted in this thesis are readily adaptable to UK and 
international responder organisations. 
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As will be discussed in Chapter Two, Disaster Research is in itself a challenging 
field. The timing, access (including ethical considerations) and ability to draw valid 
conclusions whilst operating in a hot zone are recognised as unique 
circumstances which need to be overcome by the researcher. This study adds to 
the literature on Qualitative Disaster Research by reflecting on the complexities, 
challenges and benefits of undertaking research in post-disaster conditions and 




1.6 Positioning the Researcher in the Research 
 
According to Pitard (2017), it is vital that the researcher discloses their position in  
relation to the data to present the evidence as it relates to their personal 
experiences and philosophical standpoint. Furthermore, the researcher’s 
background, experiences and influences help inform the research process 
(Silverman, 2005; Heath, 2018). The following section contextualises how the data 
have been gathered and interpreted and provides an insight into how the Author’s 
personal reflexivity has influenced and guided the study.  
 
The Author’s first degree was in Mechanical Engineering before entering the Royal 
Navy as an Aeronautical Engineering Officer in 1999. This field of study was 
initially chosen due to a passion for logical and practical problem solving. The role 
required managing people in often difficult and complex situations and 
environments. This experience provided a unique perspective to operating under 
both organisational and political pressure to achieve results and helped guide the 
literature review in relation to incident causation and organisational learning. As a 
female officer the Author was often selected to act as Equal Opportunities Officer, 
and this led to the introduction to the field of Trauma Risk in Management (TRiM) 
in the Armed Forces. TRiM, in this setting, was used to assess and monitor fellow 
aircrew and engineers following aircraft incidents and accidents. Psychosocial 
support (from the perspective of a serving forces member) was provided in an 
attempt to prevent Post Traumatic Stress Disorder or, worse, suicide. These 
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experiences have helped to inform the research process in relation to 
psychosocial harms. 
 
In 2005, the Author left the forces to undertake a Master’s degree in emergency 
planning and disaster management. The Author’s thesis looked at Safety Culture 
in the Aviation and Aeronautical Industries and how incidents and accidents occur, 
and the processes high-risk industries undertook to address safety issues. On 
completion of the Master’s, the Author worked for a London Local Authority. This 
role required multi-agency incident response. In addition to planning for London 
specific incidents, work was carried out on national plans for mass casualties, 
mass fatalities and pandemic influenza. It was during this time that the Author 
gained an appreciation of multi-agency working, the complexity of plan 
development through to inception in front-line command setting and an intricate 
understanding of exercising and training. This experience was then utilised in the 
role of Resilience Manager for Addenbrookes Hospital in Cambridge, UK. This 
required both planning and preparing the hospital, one of the UK’s seventeen 
Major Trauma Centres, for major incidents, but also training and exercising both 
management and clinical staff across all levels of seniority. This unique experience 
gave a better insight into front-line responder experiences, a thorough 
understanding of the background to mass casualty and fatality responses and 
further appreciation of organisational learning. 
 
It was whilst working at Addenbrookes that the question regarding the 
management of unidentified patients first emerged. The solution proposed at the 
time, and that still remains, is to assign the individual with a unique reference 
number and use visual identification techniques to confirm the identity of the 
pateint. Whilst this ensured that clinical errors were reduced in terms of blood 
transfusion, patient tracking and so on, this did not assist in determining the actual 
identity of the patient. This remained a ‘gap’ in the care and treatment of these 
patients. As mentioned above, it was only after developing the research proposal 
for this field of study that the Author learned of the situation concerning her cousin.  
 
Having worked in the field of emergency planning and response meant that the 
Author was able to apply both understanding and knowledge to ensure that her 
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actions as a researcher were not based on assumptions or what may be deemed 
an outsider’s perspective (Pitard, 2017). Although experience in this field may 
constitute a bias towards the emergency services and front-line clinicians, the 
perspectives as a mother, wife and responder offer a more compassionate and 
understanding viewpoint. The Author’s positionality has naturally shaped how the 
data have been gathered, studied and interpreted (Oxford Reference, 2017; Jafar, 
2018) and what is presented is a balanced and grounded perspective looking at 
the issues in a pragmatic and realistic manner underpinned by thorough research 
across the themes covered.   
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Before the literature reviews are presented, this chapter outlines the 
methodological approach taken to the research in the form of a qualitative strategy 
based on ethnographic principles. The methodology chapter is at the forefront of 
this thesis to emphasise the qualitative nature of this research and the 
fundamental importance of the empirical data in determining whether DVI can and 
should be used to identify critically injured unknown patients. Furthermore, the 
methodological process taken contributes to the study of post disaster and 
disaster exercise scenarios and thereby adding to the Qualitative Disaster 
Research literature. 
 
The approach was exploratory in nature and sought to ask questions to determine 
what was happening and how individuals could be misidentified. Scoping literature 
reviews were initially conducted on the theme of Incubation Period and error 
causation, however as the research within the field progressed additional 
objectives were deduced necessitating further literature reviews in the areas of 
psychosocial harm and organisational learning. The benefits of this approach to 
the present study are explained, and the potential pitfalls and limitations 
addressed. This is followed by ethical considerations regarding how data were 
sourced. Next, a detailed outline of the interview methods, the observation of two 
mass casualty and fatality incidents exercises and the document analysis 
alongside the gathering of contextual examples of this phenomenon are 




2.2 Developing the Research Questions 
 
A review of secondary data, consisting of media reports and biographies, guided 
the development of the initial contextual examples (CE), looking at instances 
where identification errors took place. This focused the literature review, covered 
in Chapter Four, to understand the theoretical underpinnings of incident causation. 
As the fieldwork progressed, initial findings relating to psychosocial harms and the 
legal implications of identification emerged, leading to further research objectives 
being added. Finally, the evidence showing that lessons identified were not being 
learned in the field of DVI (specifically in respect of living unidentified casualties) 
led to the development of a research objective around organisational learning.  
 
The research question and objectives outlined in Section 1.3 were based on 
theoretical concepts extracted from the literature reviews and observation in the 




2.3 Research Strategy 
 
The methodology chosen provided the best approach to answering the research 
question in a reasonable time frame and ensured that the data retrieved were 
credible, transferable, dependable and could be confirmed (Yilmaz, 2013; Fusch 
and Ness, 2015; Marshall and Rossman, 2016 Korstjens and Moser, 2018). 
According to Imenda (2014), the research strategy adopted must carefully reflect 
on the findings within the literature to ensure that it considers the essential 
theories to advance the literature. Similarly, as Grewal et al. (2016) assert, a good 
literature review provides the essential basis on which to develop the 
methodological strategy, with an aim to answer the research question. All three 
literature reviews covered in Chapters Four, Five and Six were conducted 
following Cooper’s Synthesis (1998) with the strategy for each outlined in 
Appendix III for information.  
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Another desired outcome would be for responders to learn from the CE and 
findings herein and therefore implement change to prevent future identification 
errors. This latter outcome in particular guided the research strategy to ensure it 
had applicability and credibility across both the academic and professional 
domains. The qualitative ethnographic approach was chosen as a result of the 
initial findings from the CE analysis and the literature reviews relating to Incubation 
Periods and psychosocial harms. Therefore, the strategy chosen focused on a 
qualitative investigative approach combining ethnographic methods of observation 
and interviews to understand the perspectives and culture within emergency 
response. Fusch and Ness (2015) highlight the importance of triangulation to 
ensure reliability and validity of data.  
 
 
2.3.1 Qualitative Approach 
According to Silverman (2013) the overarching aim of qualitative research is to 
clarify ambiguity. To do so, qualitative methodologies explore situations and use 
techniques such as interviews and observations which try to make sense of 
unclear situations or phenomena. As will be demonstrated in the literature review 
in Chapter Four, the study of disasters or incidents and their causes, effects and 
outcomes have been examined and debated by anthropologists, historians, 
sociologists and scientists alike (Turner, 1976, Quarantelli, 1987; Toft and 
Reynolds, 2005; Vaughn, 2006; 2016). Studying the outcomes of disasters using a 
qualitative approach has been termed Qualitative Disaster Research, which is 
differentiated from other qualitative research by its context. Stallings (2007) 
maintains that three key factors are necessary to differentiate disaster research 
from ‘everyday’ research: first, timing or specifically when the process of observing 
or collecting data can begin within the disaster setting; second, access: to the 
responders / victims, the associated data and relevant material pertinent to the 
disaster; and lastly, as similarly reflected by Killian (2002, 54), “the ability to draw 
‘valid conclusions’ from disaster studies”. Following her studies looking at 
psychosocial implications and emergency responders, Moran (1998, 39) asserts, 
“Research in emergency contexts is not as controllable as that in stress 
laboratories”. Therefore, although this research was not conducted in the 
immediate aftermath of a disaster, the access to a four-day live exercise provided 
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a realistic alternative given the ethical constraints and limitations, as outlined 
below in Section 2.5. 
 
 
2.3.2 A Quasi-Ethnographic Approach 
Ethnographic research delves deeper into qualitative research to study a specific 
culture and the everyday behaviour of the individuals within that culture. 
Ethnographic research also incorporates a balance of participant (in this case, the 
responders) and observer interaction to understand the culture from a participant’s 
perspective. Furthermore, the feelings, beliefs and meanings of relationships 
between participants are studied as they interact within their culture or as they 
react to a certain phenomenon (Fusch et al., 2018). Amalgamating past 
experience alongside participant involvement in the field exercises, this inclusion 
of a quasi or mini-ethnographic technique was essential in understanding how 
emergency responder organisations behave and furthering the research in the 
context of incident causation and organisational learning in the aftermath of a 
mass casualty and fatality incident. As Rosen (1991) verifies, this is especially 
important when trying to comprehend behaviour across different organisations and 
countries where similar phenomena are occurring. To fully address the impact of 
identification errors it was necessary to adopt an ethnographic approach which 
would analyse and consider the feelings, beliefs and meanings of relationships 
between individuals as they interacted and reacted in response to the 
phenomenon. For example, observing first responders in the hot zone as they 
interacted with the casualties demonstrated how errors associated with personal 
effects could occur. Similarly, observing the handover of details from responder to 
responder provided evidence of how a name could be misinterpreted or misspelled 
triggering the initial error in identification. As discussed in s.1.6, considering 
personal biases, ideologies and values, qualitative elements where triangulated to 
ensure the interpretation of those actions was from the perspective of the 
responder and not subjectively influenced by personal previous experience in 
these settings (Silverman, 2013). The combination of interviews, document 
analysis alongside the ethnographic fieldwork provided a deeper understanding of 
the phenomenon. Therefore, although this research was not an ethnographic 
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process in the traditional sense, it did follow an ethnographic approach despite the 
relatively contracted timeframe (Jeffrey and Troman, 2002; Fusch et al., 2017). 
 
 
2.3.2.1 Using interviews in qualitative research, specifically ethnography, is an 
essential requirement to gather answers to questions and to further understand 
why actions are taken or how documentation is interpreted (Silverman, 2013). 
Interviews are a direct mechanism for determining answers to the originating 
research questions and are, essentially “…a conversation that has a structure and 
a purpose” (Brinkmann and Kvale, 2018, 9). The findings from the literature 
reviews necessitated the use of interviews to further develop the theory of 
responder harms and to gain greater insight than that established through the 
literature on this topic. This in turn allowed this research to add to the body of 
literature within this field. For example, the inclusion of interviews was essential to 
provide direct evidence of responder feelings and beliefs concerning patient 
identification and how they felt about specific actions taken or not taken in the 
circumstances (see s.9.3 and 9.4). It was also a necessary tool to gather evidence 
regarding historical incidents that could not be observed by the Author, in this case 
the responses to the Paris, Brussels and Nice attacks. Furthermore, it was 
essential to understand, directly from those who responded, why certain actions 
were taken. The responses given also invariably led to further questions and the 
information and the subsequent answers provided enabled further theoretical 
sampling (Corbin and Strauss, 2015). Semi-structured interviews and 
conversational interviews (see s.2.6) were both used in this study. Semi-structured 
interviews were necessary in the context of this research because they offered 
flexibility around the original research question and thus allowed the participant to 
elaborate, as necessary, on their responses (Merriam, 2015).  
 
 
2.3.2.2 Observations enabled first-hand accounts of the phenomenon being 
studied. As noted, gaining access to real incidents was not possible and therefore 
observing MI exercises gave the next best opportunity to study the treatment and 
care of patients who were unknown. To confirm and corroborate the evidence from 
the primary literature review regarding the complexity of the Incubation Period 
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(Chapter Four) and how and why mistakes could happen (RO1), it was essential to 
observe this unique point in a mass casualty and fatality incident. Furthermore, as 
Holloway et al. (2010) emphasise, observations enable researchers to become 
immersed in the culture being studied. This aspect was necessary to understand 
the perspective of the responder in these situations and assisted in gathering 
evidence of how identification errors could occur (RO1) and the psychosocial 
implications of such mistakes (RO2).  
 
 
2.3.2.3 The use of document analysis alongside other forms of qualitative research 
is crucial to elicit meaning, develop understanding and accumulate first-hand 
knowledge that has been recorded without the researcher’s involvement or 
intervention (Bowen, 2009; Corbin and Strauss, 2015). Furthermore, document 
analysis alongside interview and fieldwork forms an important part of triangulation 
to seek convergence and corroboration of results to ensure credibility and validity. 
Alongside data collected in the field, the documentation gathered as part of the 
literature review was also considered as part of the analysis process. As Bowen 
(2009) suggests, these documents are also evidence that yield data as a basis for 
analysis. Similarly, Merriam insists:  
 
Documents of all types can help the researcher uncover meaning, develop 
understanding, and discover insights relevant to the research problem 
(2015, 189). 
 
In terms of this research, it was necessary to analyse responder documents to 
substantiate statements made in interviews and actions observed, for example, to 
ascertain whether a policy or practice existed regarding patient identification and 
what practices existed to assist the reconciliation process. Furthermore, 
documents produced for seminars or exercise conferences could demonstrate 
whether actions were being taken or discussed to address lessons. These types of 
data can add to the literature in terms of highlighting where improvements are 




2.3.2.4 Contextual Examples were important in this research as they 
demonstrated the reality of error causation and the consequences of such failures. 
Analysis of the underlying causative factors in these unique situations helped to 
isolate potential operational links between events over time (Baxter and Jack, 
2008; Diaz Andrade, 2009; Thomas, 2016; Yin, 2018). Unlike Langrish’s (1993) 
approach, the CE in this research were not used to look at the different classes of 
phenomenon, or variables between examples. Instead, similar to Yin’s (1994) case 
study methodology, examples were studied to highlight the issues and identify 
where improvements could be made. However, the CE were not able to offer 
primary evidence as an insight into the personal beliefs and perspectives of the 
responders, which is why interviews and other methods were employed. It is highly 
plausible that future cases will occur or that historic cases, not previously 
published in the public domain, will emerge. Therefore, any further examples 
should be examined for further insight into this area of emergency response.  
 
An important factor to note is that some of these CE do not involve mass 
casualties and fatalities; misidentification errors are happening within day to day 
incidents such as road traffic collisions. However, as will be made clear through 
the subsequent chapters, it seems likely that the larger the scale of the mass 
casualty or fatality incident, the higher the probability of errors occurring. By 
analysing examples of reported identification errors, the findings presented here 
can be related to everyday incidents as well as mass casualty and fatality 
incidents. This research project accumulated as many cases of misidentification as 
was feasible to enable reflection on the findings from the interviews, observation 
and documents. By assessing the evidence gathered from all these different 
methods, a number of themes can be discerned, and these can help in 
establishing reliability and validity when these converge to the same results. The 







2.4 Consideration of Alternative Methods  
 
Other methodologies were considered in the initial stages of research which were 
subsequently considered inappropriate and therefore disregarded. The direction 
taken was not necessarily a preconceived ideal approach, more a result of the 
opportunities afforded, specifically the opportunity to observe Exercise Unified 
Response (EUR) (discussed in more detail in Section 2.6.2.1) and thereafter 
interview relevant personnel and accumulate artefacts.  
 
It was essential to use a qualitative approach as opposed to quantitative as there 
was a need to determine the underlying causes and effects of these occurrences. 
Whilst further research to analyse statistical prevalence of identification errors 
would be welcome, there is enough evidence demonstrated through real life 
experiences, as shown in the CE, to provide a basis to study the phenomenon. 
Although a mixed methods approach would have given some useful insights into 
the prevalence of these events, access to these data would have required a 
significant number of Freedom of Information requests and time was a limiting 
factor. 
 
In terms of qualitative research, grounded theory was discarded relatively early 
owing to preconceived views and ideas about what might be found (Silverman, 
2013). Although the methods used in grounded theory are the same as those used 
in this research, there was a reiterative process, incorporating a cyclical inductive, 
deductive, inductive approach which naturally ruled out the grounded theory core 
values. Similarly, phenomenological analysis was rejected as it requires more in-
depth and protractive analysis of observations and interviews including interviews 
with victims to gain the phonological understanding of identification errors (Smith 
et al., 2009).  As s.2.5 will explain, interviews with victims would need to be 
undertaken by specialist experts trained in trauma and as such were discounted.  
 
The use of a triangulated approach, assessing interviews (without in-depth 
narrative interpretation), alongside observation of disaster exercises and the 
critical analysis of documentation, provided a plethora of evidence with which to 
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determine findings and ascertain whether DVI could be used to identify critically 
injured unknown patients. Fundamentally, qualitative research is considered 
essential to the development of policy and practice (Davies, 1999; Thomas and 




2.5 Gaining Access and Ethics  
 
To fully grasp the phenomenon surrounding unidentified critical care patients, it 
was essential to understand the perspectives of all agencies involved. This 
naturally resulted in some ethical challenges. To mitigate any potential harm to 
any of the participants considered in this study (victims, family members, 
responders, institutions and researcher), the research was conducted in 
accordance with the University of Lincoln’s Research Ethics Policy (2011) and 
complied with the Economic and Social Research Council’s (2010) ‘Six Key 
Principles of Ethical Research’, paying particular attention to the regulations 
relating to the use of observations. Although the Author has experience as a 
Trauma Risk Manager and has been trained in psychosocial harms and the 
assessment and referral of such cases, it was decided that the assessment of 
victims’ experiences would be unnecessarily intrusive and would not provide 
significant benefit in researching this phenomenon. Therefore, the focus of this 
research was on those responsible for the care and treatment of these individuals. 
While there has been a significant amount of discussion regarding the ethics of 
conducting ethnography (Iphofen, 2015; Neyfakh; 2015; Van Maanen and de 
Rond, 2017), advice was sought from established academics and supervisors to 
ensure the approach taken withstood academic scrutiny and that the appropriate 
consents were gained.  
 
Ethical approval was granted by the University of Lincoln in December 2014 for 
the study, which included fieldwork, observations, interviews and the examination 
of policies and procedures. The ethical approval also looked at the privacy of 
individuals and the potential harm that this study might have for both victims and 
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responders. Approval was needed for access to NHS staff and associated NHS 
documentation. As interviews were to be conducted with NHS staff, a Health 
Research Authority application was made. The outcome determined that NHS 
REC approval was not necessary, however, approval was needed from individual 
organisations. As a result, prior to interviews with contacts made through EUR, 
consent was sought and granted for interviews and document analysis from the 
London Ambulance Service. Furthermore, in 2017, ethical approval was obtained 
from the Paris Prosecutor’s Office for an interview with the Head of France DVI, 
Elvire Arrighi (EA), who was responsible for the identification of the deceased in 
both the Paris (2015) and Nice (2016) terrorist attacks. Similarly, approval was 
granted for the use of correspondence from the Belgium DVI team, Christian 
Debouquec (CD) and Prosecutor, Ines Van Wymersche (IVW) detailing the 
response to the terrorist attacks in Brussels in 2017. Copies of these ethics 
approvals are contained in Appendix IV. Prior to entering the exercise 
environments for both EUR and Exercise Lock risk assessments were conducted. 
This included health and safety assessments for Personal Protective Equipment 
(PPE) and assessments to ascertain any potential harm or intrusion whilst in the 
exercise environment. As above, consent was gained prior to entry to hospitals, 
police and/or paramedic headquarters.  
 
The overriding approach was to ensure conformity with ethical and research 
principles and to do no harm (Iphofen, 2015). Continual discussion with those 
responsible for reconciliation and patient care meant that the potential to reduce 
harm to unidentified individuals was continually maintained. Although the mode of 
inquiry into the failings to apply DVI was noted (and could be considered an 
essential component of ethnography (Neyfakh, 2015)), the imperative to do good 
and make a positive change in this particular area of response remained the core 
objective. For further details in this respect refer to Chapter Twelve (s.12.5). 
 
In accordance with the University of Lincoln’s ethics requirements, individuals 
were only observed in settings where they would expect to be observed by 
strangers, such as dedicated exercises. All those taking part in either the 
interviews or observations were asked for their informed consent and provided 
with information sheets outlining the nature of the research, what their involvement 
 28 
entailed, the possible benefits and risks or disadvantages and what the research 
hoped to achieve, including further supporting information. The Medical Research 
Council and Health Research Authority (2014) Participant Information Sheet 
Templates and Consent Templates were used as guides in this respect. Examples 
of the information sheets and consent forms used are contained in Appendix V. 
Documents and data have been placed in a secure location in accordance with the 
UK Data Protection Act 1998 and 2018. Anonymity was negotiated rather than 
assumed and organisations and responders had the right to withdraw from the 
final study both during and after the data collection phase (Easthope, 2018).  
 
The nature of this research means that sensitive data regarding deceased or 
traumatised individuals (including the nature of their injuries) has been 
encountered, discussed and recorded. Using Disaster Action’s (2013) code of 
practice and advice available on their website, any potential harm to the 
participants has been mitigated. Therefore, regular liaison with gatekeepers took 
place and ‘potential users’ of the research were consulted to ensure that no 
information is released that is sub-judice or that has not been released to families. 
In addition, the privacy and wellbeing of all participants in this study has been 
carefully handled, for example when discussing the outcome of the research with 
supervisors, fellow students or when presenting or teaching.  
 
As the results of the research will be shared with responders and government 
organisations, it is hoped that any proposed changes to the current process will be 
adopted and used both nationally and internationally. Although this will not change 
the treatment and experience of those who have been affected by misidentification 
in the past, it should offer some comfort that improvements are being made and 









2.6 Collecting Data and Research Activities 
 
2.6.1 Contextual Examples (CE) 
Two instances of identification errors piloted the initial research and literature 
reviews, that of Gill Hicks following the 2005 London Bombings (CE-A) and 
Whitney Cerak and Laura Van Ryn in 2006 (CE-B). In addition, there was a 
personal connection to the topic that emerged only after the start of this study 
highlighted potential psychosocial harms.  
 
Essentially, in terms of CE selection, the aim was to compile a comprehensive list 
of this phenomenon and not to adhere to a sampling strategy. Naturally, everyday 
cases of drunk and disorderly or drug induced forgetfulness did not warrant the 
rigmarole or thoroughness of a DVI procedure. However, incidents reported on the 
internet or via the media (such as the Humboldt Broncos in 2018 (CE-F)), or from 
personal accounts online, in print (Cerak and Van Ryn 2006 (CE-B)), or from the 
responders themselves were included (CE-E). This was essential, as examples 
which challenged the findings also needed to be considered to demonstrate that 
bias was not present in the results (Thomas, 2016). For instance, the 
circumstances in Nice (2016) and Belgium (2016) offer examples of what might be 
considered as ‘extreme’ cases, which provide important evidence of successful 
implementation of DVI with living patients. Analysis of both these events 
demonstrated that DVI was possible in mass casualty and fatality incidents and 
thereby initiated a new research objective asking why lessons were not being 
learned from these types of examples (RO4). As a reminder a list of reported 
identification incidents and errors is presented in Appendix I and the CE are 
presented in Appendix II.  
 
 
2.6.2 Fieldwork  
The emphasis of this research stemmed from disaster and mass casualty 
handling; therefore, it was pragmatic to focus associated fieldwork within this 
domain. Personal circumstances and the need to balance a family life with young 
children meant that protracted amounts of time in the field or international settings 
was infeasible. Therefore, all observations were restricted to the UK. As 
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mentioned above, gaining access to disaster zones to carry out research is 
extremely difficult and brings numerous ethical concerns to the fore. Likewise, 
gaining access to individual organisation exercises to observe is problematic, 
therefore any opportunity to attend exercises based on mass casualty and 
fatalities within the UK, regardless of scale or location, was taken.  
 
 
2.6.2.1 Exercise Unified Response (EUR) 2016  
The first opportunity to observe responders in a mass casualty and fatality 
exercise setting came in February 2016. An invitation was offered by the Head of 
UK DVI, Howard Way (HW), to observe DVI teams and front-line responder 
interactions as part of the exercise assessment. EUR was a live, multi-agency, 
multinational disaster exercise set over four days and allowed unprecedented 
access to a simulated disaster setting. Responders could be followed in their role 
extracting and treating patients in the hot zone through to casualty clearance and 




 Figure 1. Artist’s representation of EUR layout provided by London  





 Figure 2. Photograph of the initial placement of train carriages on top of 
   each prior to adding the rubble and disaster debris (London  
   Fire Brigade, 2016). 
 
 
Prior to the exercise, briefing events were held in London and via email. 
Afterwards a large conference was held on the 12 October 2016 (also in London) 
to discuss the outcomes and take lessons forward. All of these events were 
personally attended, and findings documented. 
 
The EUR scenario was based on a building collapse over a main rail line and 
underground tube station in central London. It was designed to test all levels of an 
emergency response from strategic decision making (Gold) through to tactical 
(Silver) and operational front-line responders (Bronze). Participants from the UK 
included the police, the fire brigade (including speciality trained underground 
search and rescue teams), ambulance crews (including hazardous area response 
teams (HART)), helicopter emergency medics (HEMS), DVI teams, a coroner, 
local authorities, voluntary agencies and media agencies. In addition to UK 
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participants, emergency response agencies from the European Union (EU) also 
sent participants to take part. Italy, Hungary and Cyprus sent rescue teams and 
DVI teams from Belgium, France and Germany had the opportunity to work 
alongside the UK DVI teams in the mortuary. In total, over 4,000 responders were 
involved (London Fire Brigade (LFB), 2016). The focus of the exercise was the 
rescue scene within the inner cordon or ‘hot zone’ and the care and treatment of 
survivors and the deceased beyond the hot zone. Of particular importance was the 
ability to test rarely exercised plans. Thousands of tonnes of rubble were 
positioned around the eight carefully placed carriages to portray the collapsed 
building and train wreckage, as seen in the image below.  
 
 
 Figure 3. Wide angle black and white photograph showing the final  
   layout  of the scene, February 2016. 
 
 
In addition, over a hundred actors portrayed casualties trapped within the 
carriages.  
 
The exercise had a strong ‘casualty focus’ and enabled functions such as a 
temporary mortuary, community support and hospital major incident plans 
to be tested simultaneously. This allowed participants to experience the 
complexities of delivering a response across a range of functions (LFB, 
2016).  
 
Essentially, in the context of this research, the setting offered an exceptional 
venue in which to test the theoretical concepts and determine the answers to the 
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research objective concerning the Incubation Period (Chapter Four and RO1) and 
once the data was re-examined following the interviews, organisational learning 
(Chapter Six and RO4). Responders were followed as they moved through the 
carriages and their interactions with the casualties and each other were observed 
along with their reactions to situations. This also gave the opportunity to ask the 
responders why they felt that a particular action was necessary. This process 
ensured individuals could be questioned about their beliefs and offer their own 
interpretations and words behind their activities and enabled an understanding of 
the psychosocial implications of their actions (RO2).  
 
As the exercise was being observed by researchers, responders and media, 
notices were placed in and around the exercise site informing all personnel of this. 
This meant there was no requirement to request additional consent as this had all 
been pre-arranged in advance with the event organisers. The exercise organisers 
gave each observer an iPad to record notes and observations, including 
photographs and videos. Along with being asked to witness certain actions by the 
event organisers, there was also the opportunity to record personal fieldnotes.  
 
Difficulties encountered included the extreme cold, the hazardous environment in 
which to operate and the cumbersome personal protective equipment (PPE) and 
clothing. Observers were expected to wear the same PPE the responders were 
wearing, including double layer gloves, face masks, eye and ear protection and 
hard hats or helmets. This was because, despite it being an exercise area, it was a 
high-risk working environment with multiple hazards present. The role as observer 
was very similar to that of the responders and shared the difficulties experienced 
in the same hazardous conditions. This gave a unique insight into efforts and 
impediments responders would experience operating in similar conditions whilst 





 Figure 4. Photograph of a DVI team member in full PPE showing the  
   cumbersome protective equipment needed in the hot zone.  
 
 
In terms of data, photographs, short videos, fieldnotes and conversational 
interviews were all collected. Documentation pertaining to patient treatment and 
care was either collected in hard copy or photos were taken. S.2.6.4 provides 
detail regarding the documentation methodology. Fifteen patients were tracked 
over the course of the four days, the majority with known identities and a few with 
identities that were either unknown or had been shared by word of mouth. For 
example, Patient Stacey was an actor who had a coat belonging to a passing 
paramedic thrown over her. Appendix VI provides the fieldnotes regarding Patient 
Stacey’s care and treatment during EUR. In addition to casualties, the UK DVI 
teams were observed to understand their role regarding the treatment, care and 





 Figure 5. Photograph of the presumed ‘Patient Stacey’ receiving  
   medical treatment from international rescue teams. 
 
 
2.6.2.2 Exercise Lock 2017 
In 2017, an invitation was received to observe medical responders in a hospital 
emergency department (ED) during an exercise to test their MI plans. The 
scenario was based on the events of the Westminster Bridge Attacks (22 March 
2017). The hospital was in the process of opening a new ED facility and senior 
management felt it would be an excellent opportunity to test the MI plan and facility 
at the same time. The exercise took place on 18 May 2017, approximately two 
months after the Westminster Bridge Attack in which a marauding terrorist used a 
vehicle to plough into innocent pedestrians on Westminster Bridge before trying to 




 Figure 6. Photograph of the patient handover of the unidentified patient 
   from LAS to ED staff during Exercise Lock, May 2017. 
 
 
The details of the exercise were kept secret from staff to ensure they made 
decisions based on what they were faced with without the ability to prepare. 
Although staff had been informed that an exercise would be held which would test 
the MI plan, the details were not shared beyond the exercise planning team. A 
successful request was made, in light of this research, to add a scenario inject into 
the exercise to test staff response concerning incapacitated and unknown patients, 




 Figure 7. Extract from Exercise Lock Patient Inject documentation  
   outlining the inject scenario for the unidentified patient. 
 
 
The exercise ran over a six-hour period and involved hospital staff who would 
ordinarily be on a normal shift in an ED. Casualties were portrayed by semi-
professional actors to provide a realistic sense of drama and allow the responders 
to perform their role in representative conditions. As in EUR, data were collected 
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using an iPad and notepad. The data accumulated included photographs, 
fieldnotes, patient documentation (which, as shown in Figure 8 below, clearly 
demonstrates that responders have not added a name to the patient being treated 




 Figure 8. Patient notes for ‘Female 1’, the unidentified patient in  




In addition, conversational interviews were conducted with ambulance and hospital 
staff and the DVI documentation teams. This was essential, especially as it 
became apparent that no action was being taken with regard to an unidentified 
patient. Whilst the main aim was to observe the responders’ actions, it was 
important to determine exactly why nothing was being done and whether it was 
due to hospital policy or personal choices. These interview responses and 





Despite the geographic focus of the thesis on the UK it was necessary to consider 
the perspectives of those who had successfully implemented the identification 
process in a mass casualty and fatality incident. Furthermore, it was essential to 
understand the perspectives and viewpoints of those who had been involved with 
identification errors previously. Therefore, interviews were carried out in France 
and the UK and telephone interviews were undertaken with DVI representatives 
from Canada, Belgium and Australia. In total 29 semi-structured and 
approximately 40 conversational interviews were conducted with both national and 
international participants, including one interview in France (for a full list see 
Appendix VII). Interviews were conducted with specialists in the fields of DVI and 
forensic services, and clinicians with extensive experience in Major Trauma 
Centres or within incident hot zones such as those in Pre-Hospital Teams or 
HART teams. Apart from DVI experts, all interviews were conducted with UK 
representatives. Participants were identified through various means; through 
snowball sampling, seeking recommendations from other participants or 
colleagues within the field of expertise, or via internet searches, or a combination 
of both. Snowball sampling was employed specifically due to its ability to target 
hard to reach populations such as those in the emergency services (Faugier and 
Sargent, 1997). Snowballing was an essential element in this thesis as in the first 
couple of years both clinicians and police contacts were generally reluctant to 
respond to emails unless they had been introduced via another participant or 
contact from previous experience. The difficulty in getting individuals to be 
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interviewed is a common issue in qualitative research and perseverance and 
alternative approaches need to be adopted to fully meet the requirements for 
thorough and valid research (Silverman, 2013; Thomas, 2017). In addition to these 
formal interviews, informal conversational interviews took place while in the field 
(Patton, 2002). These particular interviews allowed participants to be questioned 
on the spur of the moment with a minimal hold on their responses (Corbin and 
Morse, 2003; Jamshed, 2014). “Conversational interviews are a powerful way of 
gaining access to an individual’s interpretations of their personal experiences” 
(Burgess-Limerick and Burgess-Limerick, 1998, 65).  
Conversational interviews with international DVI team members took place 
following a DVI Conference in February 2017. Despite these being classed as off-
the-record, they yielded useful information and some of these contacts were 
followed up to conduct formal interviews. Interviews were audio recorded followed 
by transcription; in the absence of audio recording notes were taken. Semi-
structured interviews lasted between twenty minutes and eighty minutes. 
Conversational interviews were much more opportunistically focused (Given, 
2008) and were between thirty seconds and five minutes. Both interview styles 
and timings were dependent on the information required and the time the 
participant had available. All semi-structured interviews were formulated and 
derived from the findings in the literature review and were structured based on 
themes derived from the research objectives, therefore several questions were 
mirrored across each interview regardless of participant background. An example 
of the interview questions is contained in Appendix VIII. The thematic framework 
was designed to understand the participant’s perspective on the following areas: 
the causation of these errors (Incubation Period) and complexity of the response; 
the consequences of identification errors; the psychosocial harms as a result of 
identification errors; and lastly, how organisations could learn from errors. The last 
stemmed from the answers given by the interviewee concerning previous incidents 
or as a result of discussions centred around the attacks and use of DVI in France 
and Belgium. The flexibility afforded with semi-structured interviews meant that, 
despite the generic thematic basis of each interview, participants could discuss 
any themes or issues which may have been relevant at the time. The questions 
generally looked at experiences, behaviours and feelings (Merriam, 2015) focused 
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around the identification process operating in an incident and hypothetical actions 
that should be taken (in their opinion) when dealing with an unidentified individual. 
These hypothetical questions elicited responses based on the participants’ actual 
past actions in similar situations, as seen in similar interview techniques conducted 
by Merriam (2015). This also meant that questions were generated around 
organisational learning. These interview responses led to the addition of RO4: why 
lessons were not being learned despite the acknowledgement that some of these 
detrimental issues had been encountered before.  
 
Saturation was reached when the participants continued reflecting the same points 
previously noted. In all interviews, participants were asked whether they could 
recommend any further suitable contacts. Over the course of the research, 
numerous incidents occurred which subsequently meant that this process became 
easier as responder organisations began to see the merit of the work being 
investigated. This is discussed further in the impact section in Chapter Twelve 
(12.5).   
 
As the interviews were all based on the original thematic framework, comparable 
data could be obtained. All interviews prior to November 2016 were based on 
hypothetical scenarios of the use of DVI in hospitals. The only interviews which 
differed significantly from the others were the ones conducted with the French DVI 
lead, (EA), and Belgian DVI expert (CB) and Prosecutors (IVW). These interviews 
sought to understand details regarding the actions taken following the identification 
of the deceased and living in the wake of terrorist attacks in both countries. The 
attacks in Brussels and Nice subsequently led to the successful implementation of 
DVI with the living. As the research progressed it became clear that the focus of 
psychosocial harm to the victim and their relatives also encompassed the harms 
inflicted on the responders and as a result interviews conducted in the later stages 
had an additional component of psychosocial impact.  
 
Difficulties were initially encountered in the first few interviews due to sound quality 
and the recordings being incoherent in parts. Fortunately, notes were taken 
alongside the transcriptions and, therefore, although some parts of the interviews 
were not directly transcribed, the supplementary notes aided in capturing all the 
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relevant data. Furthermore, participants were sent the transcripts of their 
interviews so that they could clarify or check that their views had been captured 
correctly (for those where notes were taken) or to amend anything they felt had not 
been communicated effectively as mentioned above. This process of ‘member 
checking’ (Carlson, 2010) was conducted to develop trust and confirmability in the 




Documentation was collected from various sources both before and after 
interviews and fieldwork. These included organisational plans and policies, 
handouts from the field and supplementary notes (a full list is contained in 
Appendix IX). Presentations, seminar handouts and conference forms were also 
gathered as these provided useful sources for contacts for potential interviews, 
including links to further documentation. Extensive internet searches were also 
carried out for each organisation and these elicited numerous relevant reports and 
publications, including web-based communication. Some documents such as 
patient casualty forms were gathered during the exercises,line as seen in Figure 8. 
To avoid selective bias, every attempt was made to ensure that the forms and 
documents compiled by responders were gathered systematically during the 
exercises or were photographed so that they could be included if copies could not 
be taken. This is an important requirement according to Yin (2018). 
 
Documents were also shared following interviews, such as the ‘Circulaire 
interministérielle prise en charge des victimes d'actes de terrorisme’1 (Republic of 
France Prime Minister, 2017) (Appendix X). This ministerial letter, shared by EA in 
2017, outlines the requirements of French emergency responders when dealing 
with victims of terrorist attacks including, specifically, those who are unconscious. 
Other UK specific policies and documents were studied and gathered during the 
course of the research. 
 
 
1 [Translation: Inter-ministerial Circular – Taking Care of Victims following Terrorist Attacks] 
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All front-line responder and hospital plans and policy documents were scrutinised 
for details regarding patient identification and reconciliation. In addition, 
information relating to patient consent and actions to be taken in the event of an 
unknown patient were recorded and critically analysed. This analysis helped 
generate some of the questions for the interviews and provided an area to focus 
on in the observation, for example whether front-line responders would make a 
note of a patient’s name or if they would class the patient as ‘unknown’ in 




2.7 Data Processing and Analysis 
 
According to Corbin and Strauss (2015), analysis should ideally begin after the 
first interview, observation or document review as this would assist in the 
development of relevant concepts and identify novel lines of inquiry. The 
qualitative methodology outlined above was used to determine the evidence 
necessary to address each research question outlined in s.2.2 above. These 
questions were used as a basis to guide the analysis and ensure coherence. 
Initially the objective was to assimilate as many cases of mistaken identification 
errors as possible to compare and contrast responder actions, apparent causes for 
the errors and determine consequences for those affected. Owing to ethical 
limitations of interviewing those directly affected, secondary data were used 
alongside the literature review of causation and consequences to guide the 
methodology above. Contrasting events such as mass casualty and smaller scale 
road traffic collisions, where identification errors occurred, were useful in terms of 
ensuring credibility of the findings and led to useful insights in terms of both theory 
and explanatory processes. This was particularly the case when looking at what 
‘normal business’ is for a front-line responder as opposed to the actions taken in a 
mass casualty or fatality incident. As such, the approach was both exploratory and 
explanatory (Thomas, 2017). On completion of the initial analysis, a number of 
themes began to surface that had been identified in both the literature reviews and 
throughout the data gathered. These themes were discussed at length with 
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supervisors and peer PhD colleagues to ensure they reflected the findings from 
the data gathered. 
 
Although the research followed primarily an inductive approach whereby themes 
emerged through the observations of empirical reality (Hussey and Hussey, 1997), 
there were times where a deductive process necessarily occurred. This was 
particularly the case when the adopted position was tested through further data 
analysis, specifically responder harms and organisational learning. This, 




2.7.1 Coding and Themes 
Another important factor to avoid bias was the need to ensure that all the evidence 
retrieved should be examined exhaustively with exacting attention to detail (Yin, 
2018; Silverman, 2013). Several themes were developed following the literature 
reviews, with some codes developed at this early stage and data sorted into these 
initial codes, such as ‘scene complexity’, ‘organisational exclusivity’, ‘sanitising 
world of hazards’ and so on (see Chapter Four). Other themes only became 
apparent following extensive analysis of the data. These generated objectives for 
further investigation. 
 
As the study developed the theoretical framework was revisited and refined. This 
was mostly a result of the terrorist events of 2016 and 2017, coupled with the 
interviews with those responders (EA, IVW and CD) who had successfully 
implemented DVI for use with the living. This led to the transcripts, documentation 
and fieldnotes being reviewed a second time using the newly developed codes 
and themes around organisational learning. The themes and codes generated 
were then compared and contrasted with the CE that had been accumulated to 
cross reference and ensure validity of the findings (Yin, 2018). Furthermore, where 
codes had been generated that did not match with the CE presented, these were 
noted to highlight areas of further research. For example, although the literature 
focusing on emergency responders in the UK suggests resourcing and funding 
might be potential barriers (Wankhade, 2018), the data sourced did not raise any 
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particular examples relevant to DVI. This does not mean that resourcing or funding 
issues do not prevent the use of such techniques, simply that the research 
conducted did not find any evidence of this, and there remains scope for future 
research in this particular area. 
 
To ensure credibility, transferability and confirmability, and triangulation of all the 
data, the results were also peer reviewed by supervisors and a panel of 
independent PhD candidates. Raw data from the fieldwork and interviews were 
analysed alongside the suggested codes and themes to either confirm findings or 







The use of DVI in hospital settings in 2017 changed the impetus of the research 
from the hypothetical scenario of whether DVI could be used to a question of why 
it was not being used in the UK despite its success despite its success in France 
and Belgium. This finding naturally altered the research objectives and initiated a 
further objective based on why organisations failed to learn. 
 
As interviews, conversations and conferences took place where the information 
researched was being discussed and presented, individuals and organisations 
began to reconsider their plans and policies. As a result, any future research in 
this domain may elicit alternative answers based on any changes that might occur 
in the reconciliation process.  
 
Another consideration is the limited extent of fieldwork. Front-line responder 
agencies are only expected to test their MI plans once every three years (JESIP, 
2018). Additionally, there is no directive to insist that these plans test mass 
casualty and fatality incidents or require the exercise to take any particular length 
of time. This research included two live MI exercises. One was four days in length 
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and encompassed extensive hot zone exercising and included casualty extraction 
and reconciliation. This offered an extremely valuable insight and research 
opportunity and provided extensive data to enable critical analysis of the issues 
being examined. Additionally, Exercise Lock tested an ED over the course of a day 
in a busy London hospital. This provided an exceptionally rare and beneficial 
opportunity to study this niche area of emergency response during mass casualty 
and fatality incidents. It should also be mentioned that these areas of response 
concerning unidentified casualties were considered to be relatively novel. 
Therefore, any analysis of actions and activities also took into account what had 
been encountered by the Author as the norm in previous major trauma hospital 
and emergency planning experience. 
 
As discussed above, another possible approach to identifying examples of this 
phenomenon is a quantitative approach, whereby hospitals would be contacted 
through the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to discover cases of mistaken 
identities. However, as the findings will attest, the reporting of such events is not 
being carried out and therefore it is suggested that despite this approach possibly 
highlighting a few more examples, it would be unlikely to create an extensive or 
particularly useful list. This approach would be restrictive, as hospitals are not 
allowed to share identifiable patient data or circumstances without patient consent. 
Generally, those who wish to share their story have done so personally using 






This chapter has outlined the methodological approach taken to assess the 
research question and objectives. Examples of identification errors were 
accumulated and scrutinised to elicit understanding as to why and how such 
failings could occur and to understand the implications of such errors. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted with subject-matter experts to deduce, 
based on their personal experience, how mistakes could happen and what could 
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prevent their occurrence in the future. Observation of two mass casualty and 
fatality exercises provided a unique insight into how unidentified patients are 
treated and cared for. Importantly, these exercises provided an understanding of 
the cultural interactions between responder agencies when faced with complex 
and challenging disaster response situations. In addition to the above, 
documentation was scrutinised throughout the research process to triangulate 
what was being seen and heard and to ascertain whether gaps remained in the 
policy and protocols to which responders are expected to adhere. The data from 
these sources, alongside the literature pertaining to these themes, was critically 
analysed to determine themes which reflected and categorised the evidence. As 
examples of DVI being used in hospital settings became apparent (such as those 
in France and Belgium), the interviews began to incorporate questions regarding 
how failings are identified and learned from and solutions implemented to effect 
change. Ultimately four main themes were identified; the Incubation Period where 
identification errors occurred; psychosocial harms to the victim, their families and 
the responder themselves; the barriers to the implementation of DVI including any 
legal issues which influence their decision making and lastly, the theme of 
organisational learning. The following chapter outlines the fundamental principles 
associated with disaster response in the UK and the respective responsibilities in 
terms of casualty and deceased management, to situate the concept of DVI within 











This chapter outlines the casualty and deceased person’s pathway following a 
mass casualty and fatality disaster. It provides the background to emergency 
response and introduces the role of the relevant agencies and how they interact in 
a multi-agency disaster situation. An explanation is given about the processing 
and treatment of these individuals, including triaging, which categorises and filters 
the individual for further care. This section also describes how the deceased are 
identified using DVI and provides a brief explanation of each of these processes 
for information. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the reconciliation 





3.2 Principles of Emergency Management  
 
As mentioned in the introduction chapter, the focus of this thesis is on UK 
responders and whether the DVI process can be used to identify the living under 
the remit of UK laws and legislation. Therefore, it is necessary to explain the 
principles of emergency and disaster management in the UK. It should be noted 
that although the specific legality of the response and detailed responsibilities of 
the agencies may be unique to the UK, the overarching principles of saving life are 




The UK Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) of 2004 establishes the foundations on 
which emergency response and recovery arrangements are built and managed 
from local to national level. It makes clear the roles and responsibilities of all 
involved in emergency response and provides regulatory and statutory guidance to 
ensure that those at the core of the response (Category 1 Responders) meet the 
six core civil protection duties as outlined below.  
 
Category 1 Responders are made up of the emergency services (police, fire and 
rescue service and ambulance service), local authorities and NHS bodies. Under 
the Act, all Category 1 Responders are required to: 
 
• Assess the risk of emergencies occurring and apply this knowledge to their 
planning arrangements 
• Make relevant plans for those risks 
• Establish business continuity arrangements to ensure they can operate and 
recover from said risks 
• Have arrangements to communicate with the public about those risks 
• Share information with other local responders 
• Cooperate with other local responders 
 
A seventh responsibility exists for Local Authorities to ensure businesses and 
voluntary agencies are supported in awareness and assistance in developing 
business continuity arrangements. 
 
 
3.2.1 Emergency Responders – Category 1 Responders 
The management of an emergency requires responders to adopt a hierarchical 
command structure to effectively control and co-ordinate the incident. According to 
the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP) (2016) doctrine, 
this does not establish rank or seniority but generates a level of command that is 
specific to the incident itself and based on roles and not specific individuals. It is 
broken down into three levels, strategic (Gold), tactical (Silver) and operational 
(Bronze) and reflects the basic responsibility of each tier.  
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All Category 1 Responders follow the same hierarchical command structure, 
although there may be intricacies within each organisation where specific roles are 
expected to branch across a level. For example, Emergency Planning Officers 
(EPOs) may be required to provide both strategic level awareness and guidance 




3.3 Management of Emergencies and Incidents 
 
Whilst the terms disaster, emergencies and major incidents (MI) are often 
considered synonymous and are frequently used interchangeably in common 
parlance, in the UK the CCA 2004 provides a clear definition which establishes 
what an emergency is, namely; 
 
An event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare… 
or … the environment or, war, terrorism, which threatens serious damage to 
the security of the United Kingdom (CCA, 2004, Chapter 36, Part 1).  
 
It further defines the threat to human welfare as loss of human life, human illness 
or injury. 
 
In terms of the response to such an emergency, responders in the UK will often 
use the term ‘major incident’ (MI), especially when the emergency response effort 
has the potential to overwhelm local resources. Inconsistencies in the terminology 
led the UK JESIP to provide a more precise definition to avoid confusion or error:  
 
 An event or situation with a range of serious consequences which requires 
 special arrangements to be implemented by one or more emergency 
 responder agency (JESIP, 2016, 7).  
 
Their reason for establishing a clearer definition was that “Agreeing and using 
common terminology is a building block for interoperability” (JESIP, 2016, 7). The 
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declaration of a MI would therefore trigger predetermined strategic and tactical 
response arrangements from multi-agency partners. The declaration would 
therefore offer the best opportunity for co-operation and co-ordination of the 
incident. 
As to assessing the extent of an incident in terms of casualty and fatality planning, 
the Cabinet Office has established definitions for mass casualty and fatality 
incidents. According to the interoperability lexicon published in 2013, a mass 
casualty incident is “…an incident (or series of incidents) causing casualties on a 
scale that is beyond the normal resources of the emergency services” (Cabinet 
Office, 2013). Likewise, a mass fatality incident is, “Any incident where the number 
of fatalities is greater than normal local arrangements can manage” (Home Office, 
2004, 3). Examples of mass casualty and mass fatality incidents are provided in 
Appendix XI. 
When dealing with a mass fatality incident it is important to consider whether such 
an incident is an open or closed incident. An open disaster is one where the 
number of deceased is initially unknown and for whom prior records or descriptive 
data are unavailable, such as a train crash or city centre explosion (INTERPOL, 
2018a). A closed incident has a fixed number of deceased with potentially 
identifiable data which can allow comparative identification to be made (College of 
Policing, 2018b). It is possible that a combination of the two events could occur, 
such as an aircraft crash in a residential setting.  
 
Furthermore, whether the cause of the incident is terrorist or non-terrorist affects 
the management process in terms of identification and police priorities (College of 
Policing, 2018b). For example, terrorist incidents provide additional powers for law 
enforcement and may change the focus of the incident management process 
(Harris, 2016). In a non-terrorist related incident, the normal protocol would be to 
save life, minimise harm and then determine the identity of the deceased. 
Conversely, in a terrorist incident, the protocol would have the additional 
imperative of identifying the perpetrator/s to prevent further harm. This objective 
would take priority in policing terms over the identification of the deceased (Gehl 
and Plecas, 2016). 
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3.3.1 Standard Operating Procedures for an Incident: METHANE 
The JESIP Joint Doctrine sets an expectation of UK emergency responders to 
work following common principles in terms of incident command and control. It 
provides a method for commonality and interoperability which, if used correctly, 
should enhance the response and recovery effort, not just for MIs but also for 
‘business as usual’ multi-agency working (JESIP, 2019). In terms of the initial 
response to a MI, it sets an expectation that responders use a METHANE 
reporting method to share the crucial incident information. An example METHANE 
report is provided below for an example scenario such as a terrorist attack in 





 Figure 9. Screen shot of the METHANE acronym used to communicate 
   an accurate understanding of the incident between   




If a MI is declared, Category 1 Responders are expected to implement their 
individual command and control arrangements as outlined above. In the UK, the 
police would normally take overall responsibility for the incident. 
 
At the scene of the incident, the operational level commanders will be working to 
control and deploy the resources of their respective service to meet the objectives 
established by their tactical commanders. Although each service has their core 
objectives and speciality such as fire service or policing, the primary responsibility, 
for all emergency responders, regardless of organisation, is always to save lives 
and reduce harm (JESIP, 2016, 16). Appendix XII provides a breakdown of the 
responsibilities of each service and those who may be present at the scene of a 




3.4 Casualty Management 
 
Those affected by the incident are, ideally, triage sieved by those responsible for 
their rescue where they are found, i.e. in non-medical locations. As all emergency 
personnel are responsible for saving lives, the triage system may take place at any 






























 Figure 10. Diagram representing the inner cordon. Adapted from the  
   LESLP Guidance (2015). 
 
 
Ideally, ambulance crews or other medically trained personnel (for example HEMS 
or HART personnel) will sort or triage the injured individual, who will then be 
directed or moved to the appropriate tent/area in a Casualty Clearing Station for 
basic medical treatment and care where necessary.  
 
Similarly, other triage emergency service documentation such as that used by the 
LFB ‘Casualty Report Form’ will be completed, to note patient details alongside 
any presenting conditions or treatment provided.  
 
If the need to extract patients rapidly from the inner cordon takes precedence over 
any treatment or ability to record details, patient identification may not take place. 
Likewise, if a patient loses consciousness between handover of emergency 
responders, the name of the patient may not be recorded or handed over to crews 
who are able to record patient details. These patients may be recorded as 
UNKNOWN on any subsequent documentation. In other countries, the patients 
may be recorded as Jane or John Does (Janowak, 2018). 
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An unidentified patient admitted to hospital will be searched initially for clues to 
ascertain their identity. Wallets, coats and belongings will be scrutinised for any 
hint of an ID. If they are unable to verbally confirm their identity, and no 
identification is found on them or known to the persons who admitted them, they 
will be issued with a temporary alpha-numerical identifier and a best-estimate date 
of birth (NHS Improvements, 2018a). This will be the identity by which the 
individual is referred to throughout their stay whilst they remain unknown. A ‘real’ 
name such as Mark Smith is not used, as it may, by chance, be the same as 
another patient receiving treatment at the same time. The use of Jane and John 
Doe (as commonly seen in films and television series) is avoided in the UK due to 
the same potential for coincidence.  
 
Medical teams will carry out all lifesaving procedures including X-rays, bloods (to 
ascertain blood groups), and surgery before stabilising the individual and 
transferring them to recovery and critical care. Although the majority of treatment 
can take place without knowing a patient’s name, the limited access to prior 
patient notes and records can have serious consequences in terms of continuing 
care and treatment. Therefore, the police will normally be notified that a person 
without identity is being treated. The police will then proceed to try to determine 
who the patient might be. There have been a number of cases in the UK over the 
past five years which have demonstrated a procedure whereby social media and 
the local media have been used to try to determine the unconscious patient’s 
identity. The brief details of these are contained in the examples listed in Appendix 
I. Furthermore, as demonstrated in the following cases:- Cerak and Van Ryn, 2006 
(CE-B), Boston Marathon, 2013 (CE-D), Moulin, 2015 (CE-E) and Humboldt 
Broncos, 2018 (CE-F), there is a propensity for the hospitals and police to rely on 
visual identification techniques such as photographs of the person in a coma 
alongside a visual description of the individual and their personal effects. If there is 
only a single person in such a state, as above, it may be that a family will be easily 
reunited with the only individual missing. However, if there are larger numbers of 
patients and deceased affected, or even in the case where there are two 
casualties, there is scope for error.   
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3.5 Management of the Deceased 
 
Those who die at the scene will be left in situ until such time as forensic and 
investigation teams have analysed and recorded their details. They are then 
transferred to a mortuary for further investigation of the circumstances surrounding 
their death and, more importantly, to determine their identity (World Health 
Organization (WHO), 2004; Dorries, 2014). The management of the dead is often 
cited as one of the most important aspects following a disaster, especially if there 
is a potential criminal aspect to the incident, such as terrorism (WHO, 2004; Pan 
American Health Organisation (PAHO), 2016; INTERPOL, 2018a). Despite the 
technical and logistical issues surrounding the retrieval and management of the 
deceased, the identification of the individuals is the most time-consuming aspect 
and often the reason why there is a delay in releasing the bodies to families. This 
is further compounded when there are body parts involved, as each body part is 
treated as an individual body (PAHO, 2016). There are both psychological (Eyre, 
1999; Coles, 2014; ICRC, 2016) and political desires (Edkins, 2011, 2019; ICRC, 
2016) to ensure the identification process is achieved quickly, yet a rush in both 
retrieval and identification can lead to serious consequences such as missing 
evidence, further damage to the individual and the potential for misidentification. In 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the Coroner will assume responsibility for 
the deceased. In Scotland it is the Prosecutor Fiscal. The Coroner is responsible 
for investigating unnatural, violent deaths or deaths where the cause is unknown. 
They are responsible for determining the identity of the individual and the 
circumstances of the death, including where, how and when the death occurred. 
They may decide to hold an inquest to further investigate the circumstances 
surrounding the death. In the UK, The Guide to Coroner Services (UK Ministry of 
Justice, 2014) provides an excellent summary of the role of the Coroner and those 
tasked with supporting this service. The coronial process is similarly applied in 






3.5.1 Identification  
Under normal day to day circumstances where a death has occurred and the 
identity is unknown the deceased will be taken to the local mortuary until relatives 
are found (Coroner’s Service for Northern Ireland, 2014; UK Ministry of Justice, 
2014). In these circumstances, where there is only one deceased, it is often the 
case that families will come forward and quickly be reunited with the only individual 
matching the description. As the case of Whitney and Laura (CE-B) demonstrates, 
mistaken identification cases can occur in smaller incidents where the numbers of 
deceased are too small to be considered a mass fatality. Yet, it is only in mass 
fatality events where the role of UK DVI will be used to determine the identity of 
the deceased. As defined above, a mass fatality event is a situation where local 
resources are overwhelmed. The use of numbers of deceased to reflect a mass 
fatality event, such as the arbitrarily historic figure of 40 in earlier mass casualty 
plans, is now avoided as it is the ability to cope with the scenario that determines 
the outcome (Goh, 2017).  
 
 
3.5.2 Disaster Victim Identification 
DVI is an internationally recognised process which aims to use means of 
identification that are scientifically sound, reliable and applicable in the field.  
The INTERPOL guidance provides the basis upon which all national DVI 
documentation is based. This allows for variation in local organisational structure 
and enables different procedures to be used (Jennet, 2011; Ellis, 2019). 
INTERPOL, Jennet (2011) explains, does not dictate how teams and policy are 
managed, they merely expect the minimum international standard to be achieved. 
Ultimately, this results in variation between both international and national 
jurisdictions. For example, depending on a jurisdiction’s post-mortem process, a 
DVI team might require one primary identifier accompanied by two secondary 
identifiers, or as recommended by INTERPOL, all three primary identifiers are 
used to confirm a match (Black et al, 2010). Similarly, there may be discrepancies 
in the protocols and standards used including the completion of the forms 
(proposed in English) and the quality of the work carried out in taking samples or 
conducting autopsies (Byard and Winskog, 2010).  
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The USA is the largest developed country not to sign up and uses its own 
organisational system known as the Disaster Mortuary Operational Response 
Team (D-MORT) to identify its mass fatality deceased. Despite not being an 
INTERPOL member, the process for identifying the deceased is very similar and 
collates fingerprint, DNA and odontology evidence alongside visual identification 
resources (US. National Transportation Safety Board D-MORT, 2011). Although 
many countries do not sign up to the international agreement many do agree to 
the principles, but due to limited resources, funding and religious differences may 
disagree on the policy process and paperwork. This, Jennet (2011) and Ellis 
(2019) point out, can lead to areas of tension in multinational disaster situations. 
 
DVI consists of four phases; scene management, post-mortem, antemortem and 
reconciliation (INTERPOL, 2018a). The scene phase takes place during the 
recovery of the victim from the disaster area. All aspects of evidence capture and 
retrieval are conducted systematically along the lines of standard scene 
management in a criminal investigation (College of Policing, 2018c). The post-
mortem phase requires the collaboration of a wide range of subject-matter experts, 
including pathologists, forensic odontologists, fingerprint expert teams, radiologists 
and DNA experts (Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), 2011). These 
interdisciplinary teams work alongside each other to collate as much information 
as possible to determine the identity of the victims and will enter the information on 
the post-mortem documentation such as that used by INTERPOL (see below). DVI 
Teams may also have access to Plass Data, a software tool, that corresponds to 
the INTERPOL forms and allows all AM and PM data relating to each tehnique to 




 Figure 11.  Image of the INTERPOL Post-Mortem ‘Pink’ form used by DVI 
   teams to identify victims. 
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In the UK, a criterion will be established by either the Coroner or Procurator Fiscal 
in collaboration with the police Senior Investigating Manager (SIM). A SIM is a 
dedicated senior police officer who is charged with the accurate determination of 
the identities of the deceased. Depending on the circumstances the criterion in the 
UK may be a combination of primary identifiers or a single primary identifier 
supported by secondary identifiers (College of Policing, 2018c). The highest 
standard of evidence incorporates all primary identifiers to conclusively determine 
identity, however, there may be valid reasons why some primary identifiers cannot 
be used, for example when a body has been so badly disfigured that dental 
records or fingerprints cannot be accurately obtained (Black et al., 2010; Black and 
Bikker, 2016). The table below provides examples of what the INTERPOL DVI 
process considers to be acceptable primary and secondary identifiers, the latter of 







• Fingerprints, footprints and palmprints 







• Unique nail art 
• Unique Medical Identifiers – pacemaker numbers, serial 
numbers on implants etc 
• Personal effects 











   
  
 Figure 12. Extract from the INTERPOL DVI Guidance (2018a) which  
   establishes the acceptable scientific identifiers. 
   
 
3.5.3 Explanation of DVI Process 
The following outlines each of the primary identification processes used by 




3.5.3.1 Fingerprints, Palmprints and Footprints 
The ridges present on an individual’s palms, feet and fingers are unique to each 
person. The whorls, loops and arches have been used in forensic investigations 
for over 100 years to assist in determining identities (Kaushal and Kaushal, 2011). 
Prints can be categorised as known, latent or plastic impressions. Known prints 
are those that are retrieved from an individual directly by means of a fingerprint 
card or via a scan on to an electronic device (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
2016). These known prints are compared to the stored data prints that may have 
come from a previous known fingerprint or via a latent or plastic impression. Latent 
impressions are two-dimensional reproduction of prints created when the oils, 
sweat or other contamination on the fingers transfer the unique ridge impression of 
the finger to another object or surface. These replications are usually made visible 
when forensic equipment such as fingerprint powder, chemical techniques or 
specialist light sources are used. Similarly, plastic impressions are prints that have 
been captured in a wax or similar malleable surface (Kaushal and Kasushal, 
2011).  
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The analysis, comparison, evaluation and verification (ACE-V) of prints needs to 
be conducted by the appropriately trained professionals to ensure conformity in 
the evidence chain (Dror et al, 2006; Ferraro, 2016). Prints that have not been 
captured correctly and are distorted or unclear may make the analysis difficult or 
impossible. Whilst the use of prints to determine identities has been historically the 
most highly regarded method for forensic confirmation of identity, it is not an 
infallible technique (Black et al., 2010; Black and Bikker, 2016). Following the 
release of a paper by the US National Research Council in 2009 highlighting the 
potential issues with the reliance on fingerprints as a mechanism for determining 
identities, a number of prominent international sources of experts, such as the 
European Network of Forensic Science Institute and International Association for 
Identification, amongst others, offered their opinions on the matter (Champod, 
2015). Importantly, they all agreed that 100% reliability on fingerprints was to be 
avoided and generally all reflected the sentiment “that errors do occur and 
furthermore that claims of zero error rate in the discipline are not scientifically 
plausible” (Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and 
Technology, 2009, 4). However, the general position from the academic and 
scientific community stressed the need for sound practices and competency in the 
ACE-V process.  
 
 
3.5.3.2 DNA  
DNA, or deoxyribonucleic acid, is commonly referred to as the building block for 
life and is present in all humans and almost all organisms on earth (US National 
Library of Medicine, 2019). The closer the biological relationship, the more the 
genetic similarities occur. For example, identical twins will share the same DNA 
profile, whereas siblings from the same family will only have a proportion, in the 
region of 60% of the DNA genetic profile similarity (Black et al, 2010). A child will 
have 50% of each biological parent. As there have been examples of situations 
where the apparent father of the child has, following DNA analysis, been found not 
to be the biological parent, the application of DNA testing is normally only 
conducted with the mother to avoid such circumstances.   
 
 64 
The collection of DNA from the deceased needs careful management to preserve 
the sample. However, there are numerous methods to retrieve a deceased 
individual’s DNA including extraction from teeth, internal bone material 
(spongiosa), blood and muscle tissue, amongst others.  
 
In the case of a living individual, the recommended collection of DNA is via a blood 
sample or saliva (buccal or saliva). A buccal swab involves rubbing a swab (similar 
to a cotton bud) on the inside cheek of the individual’s mouth. This painlessly 
removes the epithelial membrane cells which contain the individual’s DNA. 
According to Cascella et al (2015), buccal swabs are a preferable option due to 
their stability and longevity in storage in comparison with saliva. Furthermore, 
buccal swabs are considered non-invasive, quick and relatively inexpensive in 
comparison to blood samples (Theda et al, 2018). The collection of a buccal swab 
would not normally require medical or police personnel’s involvement. The 
individual responsible for collecting the sample should have a basic understanding 
of the forensic DNA evidence process, to ensure that the collection, labelling, 
preservation and chain of custody for the sample is adhered to. If there is any 
likelihood that there will be a delay in assessment or comparison of the sample, 
preservation of the sample should be carefully managed to avoid the need to 
repeat the process.  
 
It is worth noting that the collection of DNA samples from hospitalised patients who 
have through the course of the incident, or disaster, been subject to amputation 
should be considered at an early stage. Where a body part is found at the scene of 
an incident, it is automatically given a unique reference number and considered a 
separate, potential victim. As this process increases the numbers of presumed 
deceased, capturing a hospital patient’s DNA can assist in ruling out these body 




Forensic Odontology is described as the “application of dental science to the 
administration of the law and furtherance of justice” (Taylor, 1963). Odontology is 
not dentistry and it has been repeatedly noted that only those with specific skills in 
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forensic odontology should be allowed to examine an individual to accurately 
determine identity. The reason for this is that forensic odontology requires 
expertise and experience that ordinary dentists do not have (Taylor and Kieser, 
2015). Although the pathway to becoming a forensic odontologist requires a 
degree in dentistry as a minimum, the actual application of forensic odontology 
requires more detailed understanding of what could be considered as the ACE-V 
for dental recognition. In other words, the identification of a deceased, or 
unconscious individual, through the detailed analysis of the jaw and teeth would 
need to satisfy the courts in terms of the admissible standard of evidence. It would 
be unlikely that a normal dentist’s analysis would satisfy the evidential criteria 
necessary. 
 
Determining identity via dental analysis is argued to be the cheapest, easiest and 
least invasive method of all the DVI methods (Adams et al, 2013; Manica and 
Forgie, 2017). Although this may be true for a deceased individual, it may be 
argued otherwise for a living person where the manipulation of the jaw required for 
a detailed x-ray or radiological analysis could be considered as a more physical 
interaction than that of obtaining a buccal swab. Furthermore, young children very 
rarely have detailed x-rays of their teeth until the majority of teeth have erupted. 
However, an analysis of an unconscious, or a deceased, individual’s teeth could 
provide an estimated age range, even in new-borns, something DNA or fingerprint 
analysis would not (Adams et al, 2013). As Adams et al (2013) confirm, a family 
would simply need to provide the details of the individual’s dentist for a 
comparison as opposed to providing samples of DNA or fingerprints. Yet, there is 
a possibility that the individual’s lifestyle meant they had numerous dentists in 
varying locations, which would mean that gathering a full dental history of the 
individual may be a little more arduous for both the family and the forensic 
odontologist than previously supposed. Furthermore, not all dentists keep patient 
records and in the UK there is no centralised database. In addition, there are 
several countries where dental record keeping is not as detailed (Manica and 
Forgie, 2017). 
 
Analysis for odontology would need to include a collection of dental photographs 
and a complete full mouth dental examination including odontogram should be 
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completed, including full mouth dental radiography (Adams et al, 2013). However, 
gaining access to the mouth and teeth when an individual is incapacitated may be 
problematic. This is especially true if the individual suffered injuries to the head 
and he or she has feeding and/or oxygen tubes attached. It is suggested that in 
such cases any supporting x-rays taken by the medical teams, along with notes on 
any unusual dental anatomy or specific fillings or positioning of the teeth and jaw, 
are noted as a minimum to aid possible identification.  
 
There is no set minimum number of identified dental findings required for a 
positive odontology identification. The forensic odontologist will need to 
accumulate the evidence and make a judgement based on their relative expertise 
and knowledge within the field (Adams et al, 2013).   
 
 
3.5.3 Visual Identification 
Visual appearances and descriptions of a victim are only considered as assistive 
identifiers and not categorised as scientifically appropriate evidence (College of 
Policing, 2018c). As INTERPOL state in their DVI Guidance:  
 
Identification based on photographs can be notoriously unreliable and 
should be avoided as the sole means of identification. Visual identification 
by a witness may provide an indication of identity but is not sufficient for 
positive identification of victims of a large-scale disaster, as victims can be 
disfigured, resulting in the visual comparison being unreliable. The 
psychological stress frequently involved in confrontation with the deceased, 
by relatives, also makes this form of identification unreliable (2018a, 18). 
 
Similarly, in their INTERPOL White Paper, the avoidance of the use of visual 
techniques is underlined, in bold type with double exclamation marks – highlighting 
the importance of this fact:  
 
“Based on these INTERPOL criteria, a victim can never be identified solely 
by means of visual recognition!!” (INTERPOL, 2018b, 4). 
 
 67 
The DVI process is dependent on good evidence retrieval, analysis and 
documentation. In terms of the deceased, the type of disaster will dictate the 
nature and protocols to be followed for determining identity. For those who are 
incapacitated in hospital the effective gold standard of identification would be a 
triangulation of the three principal identification methods combining DNA, 
fingerprints and odontology. Whilst the analysis, comparison, evaluation and 
(ACE) element of the investigation of the person, alive or deceased, is critical, so 
too is the process of gathering comparative samples, the validation (V) aspect 
(Ferraro, 2016). The absence of comparative samples would therefore impede the 





3.6 Reunification and Reconciliation Process 
 
It is essential that a comparative sample is provided to determine the identities of 
the deceased and those found unidentified in hospital. In the majority of cases, 
these comparisons are provided by families seeking their missing relative. In the 
aftermath of a mass casualty and fatality incident, the details of the missing person 
should be entered onto the DVI AM Yellow form – for Missing Persons. This form 
consists of twelve pages and requires the relatives to complete a plethora of 
information. Alongside the standard nominal data, such as address and marital 
status, the family are expected to describe the individual’s body, any personal 
effects that may have been with them at the time and their medical history 
including surgical implants or prostheses. The family are asked to fill in the 
person’s family tree and provide their own DNA samples to enable a thorough 
DNA biological profile and corresponding match to be made. Furthermore, they will 
need to connect the Family Liaison Officers (FLO) with the individual’s dentist to 
complete the odontology information.  
 
Primary and secondary identifiers are only of use if they are compared against 
another identifier. Therefore, alongside the requirement to have thorough protocols 
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for ascertaining the identities of the deceased or unknown living patient, there 
must be rigorous processes in place to gather information about the individual 
prior to their current circumstances. In events such as tsunamis and mass fatality 
events caused by natural disasters, this can be extremely difficult, especially when 
entire families are lost simultaneously. Gathering information from families 
concerned about the wellbeing and welfare of their relatives is a daunting task and 
one that needs to be conducted with care and consideration (Richardson et al, 
2017). As INTERPOL state:  
 
This process can involve many complex dimensions as the task involves 
interviewing families, relatives or friends to obtain sufficient facts on a 
potentially deceased loved one. In addition to this difficult and confronting 
task, representatives from this phase may need to closely coordinate their 
activities with other agencies, jurisdictions or nations, to secure ante-
mortem data from remote locations (INTERPOL, 2018a, 16).  
 
Whilst this statement is intended for information regarding the deceased, the same 
sentiment could be applied to any family searching for news of their relative. 
 
 
3.6.1 Casualty Bureau 
The Casualty Bureau (CB), according to the College of Policing, is “the initial 
single point of contact for receiving and assessing information about people 
believed to be involved in an incident” (College of Policing, 2018e). The CB is 
normally associated with mass fatality incidents, however, there may be occasions 
where there is a significant demand for information following an incident such as 
natural disasters abroad. The SIM is responsible for managing the CB and 
appointing the appropriate manager to implement the agreed strategy for handling 
the incident. The main purpose of the CB is to provide information on the 
investigation process, trace and identify persons involved in the incident and 
reconcile missing persons with survivor, casualty and evacuee records. The SIM 
will appoint a FLO to those families who are most likely to have an individual 
directly affected or missing as a result of the incident. The FLO will act as a liaison 
between the police and family in order to collate any personal effects or provide 
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information regarding the investigation and identification process (College of 
Policing, 2018e). The CB will use the HOLMES (Home Office Large Major Inquiry 
System) will be used to cross check, examine and confirm any potential matches .  
 
 
3.6.2 Documentation Teams 
In the aftermath of a mass casualty or fatality incident, the SIM is required to 
despatch documentation teams to those locations most likely to receive survivors, 
evacuees and casualties. These may include: the scene of the incident, survivor 
reception centres, receiving hospitals, Friends and Family Reception Centres 
(FFRC) and Humanitarian Assistance Centres. Not only are they required to 
identify those directly involved, they are also required to collect the relevant data 
on the missing persons, survivors, evacuees, casualties and any corresponding 
evidence (College of Policing, 2018d). These data need to be inputted into the CB 
online database as soon as possible to assist the Nominal Matching Unit and the 






This chapter has outlined the context of emergency response concerning the 
victims, both living and deceased. It provides a succinct explanation of the 
INTERPOL DVI procedure and who is involved at each stage of the identification 
process. The ACE-V needs to be conducted by the appropriately trained 
professionals to ensure the evidence chain is adhered to. This same process is 
essential for the identification and reconciliation of survivors and casualties and 
therefore the SIM and CB play a vital role in the aftermath of an incident. The 
current Interpol Yellow AM form provides an essential link and gathers vital 
information that can help identify and reunite the individual with their family. 
However, it may be worth considering the creation of a shorter, more succinct form 
which could fast-track the process for families and friends that have not yet been 
allocated FLOs in the immediate aftermath. This could be considered a 
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presumptive or tentative identification form which could then be used to aid in the 
preliminary identification standage. Documentation Teams can then help the CB 
and the Nominal Matching Unit allocate FLOs to the families most likely to be 
related to the unidentified patient.  
 
The MIs over the past twenty years in the UK have provided an intense focus on 
the identification of the deceased and the respective treatment of the bereaved. 
Yet, it is argued by the Author, those who survive the incident and their respective 
families are not given the same level of consideration and support by responder 
organisations, despite the assertion that “the care and identification of casualties is 
a primary responsibility of the emergency service in a major incident” (London 
Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP), 2015). Having reviewed multiple 
inquiry reports and investigations into mass casualty and fatality incidents, it would 
appear that the focus has been on the care and treatment of deceased and 
bereaved, not those who survive the incident. Investigations into mass casualty 
and fatality events tend not to investigate the level of care survivors receive. 
Furthermore, documentation referring to DVI tends to imply that a victim in the 
aftermath of a disaster is a deceased individual and that survivors and casualties 
are not considered victims. Yet, the LESLP Manual considers that the 
classification of victims can include any of the following categories: survivors 
(uninjured); casualties (injured); evacuees; or dead (LESLP, 2015, 30). There is a 
gap and a misunderstanding of the need to respond with equal impetus to all those 
affected in the aftermath, regardless of the terminology used to describe them.  
 
To answer the research question as to what the problems associated with 
unidentified critically ill patients are and whether DVI should be used, the next 
chapter critically reviews the literature to examine the causative factors of 
identification errors and uses Turner’s (1976) Incubation Period Theory as a 
theoretical framework. The mistaken reliance on visual identification to determine 
an individual’s identity is simply a contributory factor in how these errors are made. 
The Incubation Period Theory considers other important causative factors such as 
organisational exclusivity, the way information is handled and how violations of 






 Causative Factors Within the Incubation Period  
 
 
4.1 Introduction   
           
This chapter seeks to understand the reasons why and how errors in identification 
can occur, which is key to establishing whether DVI is an appropriate alternative. 
There have been numerous accounts of individuals being mistakenly identified 
through the misguided belief that accompanying personal effects suffice for 
identity or the reliance on visual recognition, such as Cerak and Van Ryn in 2006 
(CE-B), the Boston Marathon in 2013 (CE-D) and the Humboldt Broncos in 2018 
(CE-F). Yet, these failures are simply one of the causative factors that can 
contribute to these errors. Consequently, a review of the literature on the causative 
factors in near misses, incidents and disasters was conducted to understand the 
theory relating to RO1; why identification errors are made. This review provides 
the academic context to the findings discussed in Chapter Seven and the findings 
add to the literature in this field of disaster response and recovery. Each literature 
review was conducted using Cooper’s (1988) synthesis to ensure conformity and a 
thorough analysis. Appendix III outlines, for information, how this synthesis has 
been applied to each review.  
 
Identifying the causes of mistakes, incidents, near misses and accidents is 
standard protocol for organisations in the aftermath of disasters(Coles, 2014, 
Institution of Occupational Safety Health, 2015). Discussions relating to the causes 
have often revolved around terms such as ‘acts of god’ or technological failures, 
both of which, it is argued, over-simplify the underlying issue. Vaughn (2016), 
amongst others, suggests that the causative factors are much broader and are 
most often an amalgamation of socio-technical failures incorporating both the 
human sociological and technological interactions at play. What is clear from the 
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majority of inquiries into emergencies and disasters is that the aftermath is chaotic 
and complex, and it is within this challenging arena that the sociological and 




4.2 What Causes an Incident, Accident or Disaster 
 
4.2.1 The Incubation Period 
Following an in-depth analysis into 84 responses to natural disasters, Turner 
discovered that as the latent defects within the system built up, warnings were 
missed, resulting in accidents and disasters (Turner, 1978; Turner and Pidgeon, 
1997). Turner termed the phrase the ‘Incubation Period’ (Turner, 1976). Latent 
failures are considered to be those remote from the ‘sharp end’ of the system, 
which would generate ‘active’ failures (Reason, 2016). For example, an 
ambulance operator incorrectly using a specific piece of lifesaving equipment 
would be considered an ‘active failure’. The latent failure could be considered the 
lack of training and testing with the said piece of equipment or faulty design of the 
equipment forcing the operator to misuse it. Latent failures are considered more 
difficult to discern and as a consequence harder to determine as the cause of 
incidents, despite their significant role in causation. Perhaps more significant was 
Turner’s profound awareness of the role of human behaviour in the Incubation 
Period and how the interaction with the technological systems played a crucial role 
in how failings occurred. This combination became known as the ‘socio-technical 
problem’ (Turner, 1976). The influence of human behaviour alongside the 
technical system is something that has been studied extensively. Reason’s Swiss 
Cheese Model (1990, 2016) acknowledges that human error plays a significant 
role in technical and socio-technical failures. Human error is defined by Reason 
(1990, 9) as: 
A generic term to encompass all those occasions in which a planned 
sequence of mental or physical activities fails to achieve its intended 
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outcome, and when these failures cannot be attributed to the intervention of 
some chance agency.  
Recent reviews of incidents show that, despite warnings being highlighted and 
lessons identified, the same failures seen in Turner’s Incubation Period were being 
witnessed across a wider spectrum of industries and organisations including 
healthcare and policing (Vincent et al., 1998; Lawton and Parker, 2002; Toft and 
Reynolds, 2005; Macrae; 2014; The Kerslake Report, 2018; Grenfell Tower 
Inquiry, 2019). Whilst the use of Incubation Period Analysis is more commonly 
applied to high risk industries and those associated with technological and social 
causes of disaster, it is argued that the key themes and concepts are just as valid 
in their applicability to smaller scale incidents such as identification errors. 
Furthermore, the learning and outcomes are just as relevant (Coles, 2014; Pollock, 
2013; 2017).  
 
There are other theories which aim to determine how incidents and accidents are 
caused. One such theory is that of Root Cause Analysis (RCA). Although this has 
been heralded as an excellent mechanism for determining event causation 
(Rooney and Vanden Heuvel, 2004) and used extensively in the UK National 
Health Service in the last 10 years, there have been arguments more recently that 
this theory is flawed. Peerally et al. (2016) and Smith and Plunkett (2018) argue 
that its use is particularly unsuitable in healthcare settings. They cite issues such 
as the misguided belief that there is ‘a’ root cause, thereby narrowing the focus of 
the investigation and potentially ignoring the possibility that there may be a 
multitude of factors which lead to errors occurring. In addition, they argue that, 
based on the results of previous RCA investigations done in healthcare settings, 
there are issues with the suitability of investigators and the potential for political 
hijack as a way of swaying the focus of the investigation (Peerally et al, 2016).  
  
Turner’s (1976) Theory of the Incubation Period has a much broader scope for 
potential investigations. Within the Incubation Period four distinct areas were 
recognisable as being attributable to the development of incidents and the more 
serious disasters. Although the failure to correctly identify an individual in the wake 
of a disaster is not what one might class a disaster per se, it is, however, a serious 
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issue with ramifications for the victims (deceased and living), their relatives and 
the organisations which fail to act appropriately. It is proposed that Turner’s 
Incubation Period Theory and the attributable causative factors could help explain 
why there remains a failure to adopt change within this area of disaster response, 
despite the numerous warnings of these events and their consequences. This is 
especially so in organisations which are highly complex and hierarchical, such as 
policing and healthcare settings (Braithwaite et al., 2016; Cox et al., 2018).   
Importantly, incident causation is not necessarily attributed to a single point of 
failure (Turners, 1976; Reason, 2016; Perrow, 1999; Vaughn, 2006, 2016). 
Organisations will typically have a number of systems and procedures in place to 
ensure that a single failure will be prevented from causing catastrophic errors. It is 
due to the accumulation of these errors, or the chance of the errors happening 
simultaneously or in a very short space of time, that these potentially minor issues 
can have serious consequences. Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model (1990, 2016) 
provides an apt analogy for how a hazard can become a loss due to the 
circumstance of all the errors aligning, despite numerous safeguards in place. 
This, as mentioned above, is all the more common in the immediate aftermath of a 
mass casualty or fatality incident, where the response effort is commonly 
described in government reports and inquiries as ‘complex’, ‘challenging’ or 
‘difficult’ (Coles, 2014; The Kerslake Report, 2018; Grenfell Tower Inquiry, 2019).  
 
 
4.2.1.1 Organisational Exclusivity  
According to Turner (1976), mistakes and errors may go unnoticed or ignored due 
to incorrect assumptions regarding the significance, or lack thereof, of the event or 
action. Ott’s (1989) perception, albeit of industrial and commercial industries, was 
that organisations were impermeable and exclusive, creating an ‘organisational 
rigidity’ of beliefs and perceptions about the underlying cause of a hazard. 
Furthermore, management and personnel dealing with the issue may be distracted 
or misled by ‘decoy’ events. Turner explained that the ‘decoy phenomena’ 
occurred when: 
 
 …a contributory factor to the disasters was the attention paid to some well-
 defined problem or source of danger which was dealt with, but which 
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 distracted attention from another dangerous but ill-structured problem in the 
 background (Turner, 1976, 388).  
 
Pidgeon and O’Leary (2000) reasoned that, especially in the aftermath, the stress 
of the sudden event has a tendency to cloud objectivity and distort facts. In 
addition, any concerns or warnings are misinterpreted, dispelled or ignored, 
especially if they originate from outside the organisation (Pidgeon 1998; Turner 
and Pidgeon, 1997). This element of organisational exclusivity exhibits a striking 
similarity to the medical term of ‘cognitive rigidity’, which is described as “holding 
onto initial explanations despite the subsequent accumulation of contrary 
evidence” (Klein, 2011, 270).  
 
Examining post-disaster government reports and public inquiries, it is clear that 
organisational exclusivity has occurred and is, in part, attributable to the failings of 
various front-line responders (regardless of whether the incident error was in the 
moment or over a protracted period of time). A recent example was the delayed 
response by firefighters to the Manchester Arena bombing in 2017. A distortion of 
the facts and a belief that there may have been multiple terrorists meant 
firefighters did not attend the scene for fear of placing further lives at risk (The 
Kerslake Report, 2018). Similarly, from a healthcare perspective, many public 
inquiries cite warnings that are misinterpreted or ignored (Kerslake Report, 2018), 
such as the argument that the deaths at the Mid Staffordshire Hospital were 
merely ‘coding errors’ (Francis Inquiry, 2013).  
 
 
4.2.1.2 Variable Disjunction of Information  
Disaster emergency response is inevitably a complex field, with the need for a 
rapid intervention to save as many lives as possible whilst trying to manage the 
risk to responding personnel. Yet the myriad sources of information, fluidity of the 
situation, misinterpretation of facts, confusion and incomprehension within the 
complex response can result in a wholly incomplete picture (Turner and Pidgeon, 
1998; Pidgeon and O’Leary, 2000) and thus can negatively influence decision 
making (Horita et al, 2018). Toft and Reynolds explain that: 
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 Variable disjunction of information’ is a (complex) situation in which a 
 number of parties handling a problem are unable to obtain precisely the 
 same information about the problem, so that many differing interpretations 
 of the situation exist (2005, 50). 
These factors were very much present in the immediate aftermath of the 2005 
London Bombings, where “multiple, often conflicting, reports were being made…” 
(7 July Review Committee, 2006, 12). The disconnectedness of information meant 
there were 25 minutes in the immediate aftermath devoid of the right level of 
response by emergency services. These errors have been reflected on in the 
public inquiries following the 2017 terrorist attacks in the UK and are noted in the 
media with headlines such as “‘Chaos and confusion’ hindered ambulance 
response to London Bridge attack” (SkyNews.com, 2019). Within hospital settings 
the confusion generated can often affect the handover of patient information and 
negatively impact patient care (Yu et al., 2016). Furthermore, the unpredictable 
nature of the public response to a frightening event and the influx of information 
(both true and speculative) via social media leads to further levels of complexity 
(Turner and Pidgeon, 1997; Pidgeon, 1998; Pidgeon and O’Leary, 2000; Collins et 
al, 2016).  
 
4.2.1.3 Handling Violations of Regulations 
Safety precautions may be disregarded and organisational codes of practice, 
regulatory norms or legal safeguards or laws may be ‘bent’, especially when 
events or situations are complex and individuals are pressurised (Turner, 1976; 
1978; Toft and Reynolds, 2005). It could be argued that the ethical and moral 
desire to ‘do the right thing’ can result in a decision that conflicts with regulations. 
The following areas have been highlighted by researchers as contributory factors 
in terms of regulatory and policy violations: ambiguity, lack of understanding, 
conflict with other goals and outdated regulations (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997; 
Pidgeon, 1998; Pidgeon and O’Leary, 2000; Reason, 2000; Lawton and Parker, 
2002; Toft and Reynolds, 2005). Each of these are briefly reviewed in turn. 
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Ambiguity: Doubt as to which area of the organisation holds responsibility for an 
action or set of procedures. There may even be lack of clarity between 
organisations as to who leads on a particular area of response (Randall and 
Procter, 2008). For example, in a hospital setting, there may be questions as to 
whether the medical teams should be notifying police of incoming patients to 
obtain their details, or police should be proactively dispatched to any and all 
declared hospitals if there is the potential for patients or families to arrive. 
 
Lack of understanding: Not grasping the full implications of actions taken or why 
certain protocols should be followed or procedures taken. For example, 
responders may not know why identification of an individual is important or what 
the issues may be if an assumption was made about personal effects of an 
individual. Similarly, the confusion generated while individuals are trying to 
ascertain the answers in the immediate aftermath can further hinder the response 
effort. An example of where this has occurred was in the Grenfell Tower response, 
where METHANE reports were not utilised appropriately, resulting in a confused 
and insufficient response (Grenfell Tower Inquiry, 2018, 37).  
 
Conflicting goals: This has been cited as an underlying cause in numerous 
incidents, especially where political and organisational pressures have dictated the 
focus (Vaughn, 2016). For medical professionals, their primary concern is that of 
saving life and the secondary concern is the treatment and care of a patient. This 
is an essential component in understanding why there may be a delay or a 
perceived apathy toward determining the identity of a patient. Likewise, for the 
police: crime scene investigation, evidence retrieval and identification of the 
deceased victims all conflict with the identification of casualties – the majority of 
whom would be able to communicate their identity effectively to their friends and 
families in the wake of an incident. 
 
Outdated regulations: Technological advances and improved online data security 
constantly test the boundaries of regulatory policy control. Outdated and 
mismanaged information can hinder processes from being adopted across 
organisations. This is certainly the case when discussing the merits of bio-metric 
data: fears of data mismanagement and abuse of personal information are 
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repeated arguments as to why health organisations are delaying the 
implementation of online data sharing and the implementation of biometric security 
(Pato and Millet, 2010; Knaus, 2017; Kugler, 2018). Yet there is a strong argument 
that biometric data could resolve a significant portion of identification errors if the 
system is implemented and managed correctly. 
 
In addition to the above areas, there may also be an element of selective moral 
disengagement whereby individuals do things that are clearly wrong but create a 
sense of acceptance when doing them or choosing to remain uninformed about 
said wrongdoings, to the point where “moral self-sanctions are selectively 
disengaged from inhumane conduct” (Bandura, 2002, 101; Bandura, 2016). It is 
proposed that this method of selective moral disengagement is a reason why 
individuals who are aware of the failures regarding the misidentification of 
individuals fail to ‘raise their head above the parapet’ to prevent reoccurrences or 
to make changes. The above point contributes to a wider issue of organisational 
silence where individuals realise there is a problem but they “…dare not speak the 
truth to their superiors” (Morrison and Milliken, 2000, 706) and where there is a 
managerial structure which fears and rejects negative feedback or feedback that 
may unsettle the status quo (Vakola and Bouradus, 2005; Harmanci Seren et al, 
2018). This culture of resistance to raising concerns or ‘whistleblowing’ has been 
identified in numerous public inquiries and governmental reports across the board 
in emergency response organisations and provides a plausible reason as to why 
there may difficulty acknowledging problems regarding the identification of 
unconscious victims (Mannion and Davies, 2015; Mannion et al., 2018). 
The Kerslake Inquiry in 2018, outlining the lessons identified following the 2017 
Manchester Bombing at the Ariana Grande concert, highlighted some excellent 
examples of how some violations are handled (The Kerslake Report, 2018). It also 
demonstrated that there are some occasions where certain violations can in fact 
positively contribute to an evolving situation. In this particular circumstance the 
position of Police Gold was filled by an individual who had the right level of 
expertise to handle an attack involving a combination of terrorism and serious 
crime and who had experience as a strategic firearms commander. The 
challenging needs of this particular incident very much benefited from this 
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serendipitous allocation as it was noted that it meant “the right resources, solutions 
and personnel that would be needed to respond effectively” were prioritised (The 
Kerslake Report, 2018, 131). However, the response was “…inevitably 
complicated by the multiplicity of her roles” which as a result meant that certain 
areas of the response were affected. This included comments by partner agencies 
that the strategic co-ordination of the incident did not occur in a way that was 
“anticipated, planned or trained for” (The Kerslake Report, 2018, 131). It was not 
only the Gold level response role that demonstrated this particular situation of 
‘right person at the right time but too much to do’. The Greater Manchester Police 
Force Duty Officer, acting in the role of Silver, made a series of decisions which 
were seen as crucial to the response. However, as the situation warranted multiple 
roles to be performed by the same Force Duty Officer, critical decisions and their 
implications were not passed to other emergency responders, such as the 
declaration that it was a Marauding Terrorist Attack (codenamed Operation 
PLATO) to the ambulance and fire and rescue service (The Kerslake Report, 
2018, 66). The pressure to ‘get the job done at all costs’ could also be attributed to 
a mindset which seeks to disengage with the consequences of getting it wrong, 
because the focus is on achieving a positive end result. This could be seen to 
minimise or ignore the emergent danger or negative potential outcome. 
 
4.2.1.4 Minimising Emergent Danger 
The desire to downplay events to avoid considering the worst-case scenario can 
often lead to individuals and organisations trying to minimise the perceived impact 
(Turner and Pidgeon, 1997; Pidgeon, 1998; Pidgeon and O’Leary, 2000). This can 
be referred to as ‘sanitising their world of hazards’, making it a perceived safer 
place to live and work and thereby becoming over-confident about the risks they 
face (Toft and Reynolds, 2005). This would also lead to individuals ignoring the 
warning signs and, in some cases, creating psychological ‘blind spots’ (Bazerman 
and Tenbrunsel, 2011), as seen in the reports and investigations following both 
terrorist attacks and a number of failures in healthcare settings, most prominently 
the Mid Staffordshire Foundation Trust (Healthcare Commission, 2009; Francis, 
2013; Macrae, 2014). Similarly, the Grenfell Tower Fire in London 2017 provides a 
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classic example of the minimising of emergent danger. Although there had been 
numerous complaints about the fire safety of these types of buildings, the risk of a 
catastrophic fire was ignored. Warnings not being heeded resulted in the deaths of 
166 people (Grenfell Tower Inquiry, 2018). 
 
According to Slovik (1987), risk perception is a subjective judgement made when 
distinguishing and evaluating hazards. Furthermore, an individual who has had a 
personal and direct experience with a hazard has a perceived idea of future risks 
and hazards and their potential consequences (Pidgeon and O’Leary, 2000; Toft 
and Reynolds, 2005; Knuth et al., 2013). It could be deduced that the likelihood of 
responders addressing and preparing for a risk they have never personally 
confronted is low and may explain why they might disregard the potential risk or 
outcome of a proposed risk. It is because of this low perception that the danger is 






Before concluding this literature review it is necessary to briefly introduce the 
phenomenon of groupthink. In 1972, Irving Janis published a book outlining the 
principles of the psychological phenomenon that is groupthink. Essentially, 
groupthink occurs when a group’s desire for cohesive working becomes irrational 
and dysfunctional. The ‘ingroup’ have the ability to steer decision making and 
become, in a sense, invulnerable to change that does not conform to their 
mindset. This particular theory has been used to explain how decision-making has 
been flawed in the run up to significant events and incidents (Esser, 1998; 
Whyte,1989; t’Hart, 1990), especially the issues around management and 
decision-making in governmental and healthcare organisations (Kaba et al., 2016). 
Whilst there is a danger in oversimplifying decision-making of laying the blame 
solely at the phenomenon of groupthink (Paulus, 1998; Hauz et al., 2016), it 
should be recognised that there are real antecedents in this theory that do exhibit 
themselves in complex and stressful environments such as those seen in the 
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immediate aftermath of the 2017 Manchester Bombing and the Grenfell Tower fire 
in 2017. Therefore, the theory should be considered as a contributory factor in the 






A critical component to determining whether DVI could be used to identify an 
incapacitated patient (RQ) was understanding how such a failure of identification 
could occur in the first instance (RO1). Although there may be a simple isolated 
active error such as assigning a nearby wallet to an unconscious individual, there 
may be numerous contributory latent failures which accumulate to the point 
whereby that same individual is reunited with the wrong family. This chapter has 
examined the theory concerning RO1 and how numerous causative factors in the 
Incubation Period can contribute to incidents and accidents (Turner, 1976). 
Furthermore, linked with the findings in Chapter Seven, it provides a new 
perspective on the literature relating to incident causation. From the review of 
recent major incidents in the UK it is apparent that these factors are still prevalent 
in emergency response and are contributing to the failures highlighted in the 
numerous governmental and organisational inquiries and reports. Whilst in 
isolation some of these may be accepted as simple and erroneous, as they 
accumulate, the potential for serious consequences increases. For example, 
failing to accurately communicate all the necessary details included in a 
METHANE report can result in an insufficient emergency response resulting in a 
potential loss of lives. Similarly, acting according to one’s own agenda or goal, 
based on perceived risks and experience, may be extremely valuable in certain 
circumstances. However, if others are relying on the rules and procedures being 
followed to achieve a more strategic and longer-term goal, then this behaviour, 
whilst initially valuable, may have serious ramifications. The next chapter looks at 
the theoretical underpinnings of the potential consequences of these errors and 
the psychosocial harms that can result, further contributing to the argument that 





Psychosocial Implications of Mistaken Identities and 





To understand why there may be a need to use DVI as an alternative to visual 
identification, it is necessary to investigate the implications in terms of harms 
suffered by those involved in a mass casualty and fatality incident. This chapter 
examines the literature relating to the psychosocial harms and is divided into four 
sub-sections. First, the literature relating to psychosocial harms and stress 
following a mass casualty and fatalities as a whole is discussed. Second, a 
summary of the impact on the survivors themselves is appraised. This includes a 
brief review of the literature relating to the importance of identity to an individual. 
The psychosocial harms to secondary victims, namely the relatives, are then 
considered in the third section and finally the impact on responders is critically 
reviewed.  
 
Although the term ‘victim’ is commonly used to describe individuals who have 
received the maximum exposure to the traumatic incident, there are, of course, 
others who may be affected. Taylor (1999), in line with similar legal classifications, 
classifies victims in a numerical hierarchy. For example, Alcock v Chief Constable 
of South Yorkshire Police2 distinguished between primary and secondary victims; 
“those …involved, either mediately, or immediately, as a participant” and those 
who “…were no more than a passive … unwilling witness of injury caused to 
others.” Similarly, Page v. Smith3 required the primary victim to be “directly 
 
2 [1991] UKHL 5 
3 [1995] UKHL 7 
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involved in the accident, and well within the range of foreseeable physical injury”. 
In this study, primary victims are those individuals directly involved and who have 
experienced maximum exposure. Secondary victims are affected relatives and 
friends and the third level is made up of rescue workers and first responders. 
Although Taylor (1999) classifies six levels of victim, for the purpose of this review, 
only the first three will be considered. 
 
The CE provided in Appendix II provide examples of where and how the 
psychosocial harm to the unidentified individual manifests itself and is aggravated 
by the failings of the responders and those ultimately responsible for the patient’s 
care and wellbeing. The method by which the review was conducted is contained 




5.2 Psychosocial Stress and Harm 
 
Disaster analysis by the likes of Quarantelli (1987), North (2016), Paz García-Vera 
et al. (2016) and Tehrani (2019) have emphasised specific psychological 
outcomes encountered as a result of disasters, ranging from natural disasters 
through to man-made technological disasters. Of note were the increases in 
psychological harms and stress as a result of intentional disasters, such as 
terrorism or shooting sprees (Norris et al., 2002; Paz Garcia-Vera et al., 2016). 
This review looks at the literature on psychosocial harms in the wake of sudden 
acute onset disasters or incidents. However, as an identification error can take 
place over a prolonged period of time (such as the five weeks to determine the 
identity of Whitney Cerak (CE-B), it was necessary to ascertain how a protracted 
event may affect individuals.  
 
Psychosocial refers to the emotional, cognitive, social and physical experiences of 
people in the context of particular social and physical environments (Department 
of Health, 2009a; NHS England, 2018a, 8), or “the close relationship between the 
individual and the collective aspects of any social entity” (International Federation 
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of the Red Cross, 2018, np). Therefore, psychosocial stress and harm is any 
situation which detrimentally impacts an individual as a result of destabilising their 
psychosocial wellbeing (Sandifer and Hayward Walker, 2018).  
  
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) sits at the extreme end of the 
psychological effects following a mass casualty or fatality incident. PTSD presents 
a pattern of symptoms following exposure to a traumatic incident. These include 
re-experiencing the event; avoidance and emotional numbing; negative thoughts 
and feelings; hyperarousal; and substance misuse (American Psychological 
Society, 2017; NHS, 2018; NICE, 2018). Other psychosocial issues include mental 
health issues, self-harming, destructive behaviours and physical symptoms which 
can result in work and social problems. Symptoms may persist from a period of a 
month to sometimes years (American Psychological Association, 2017). In the UK, 
the Cabinet Office describes PTSD as: 
 
The most destructive form of stress. Comes about as a direct result of 
unresolved critical incident stress and typically requires mental health 
intervention to overcome it (Cabinet Office Lexicon, 2013, 66).  
 
The cause is generally attributed to exposure to one or more of the following 
scenarios whereby the individual: directly experiences the traumatic event; 
witnesses the traumatic event in person; learns that the traumatic event occurred 
to a close family member or close friend (with the actual or threatened death being 
either violent or accidental); or experiences first-hand repeated or extreme 
exposure to aversive details of the traumatic event (not through media, pictures, 
television or movies unless work-related) (American Psychological Association, 
2013).  
 
Ultimately, the development of PTSD depends on the subjective perception of the 
traumatic event alongside objective facts (National Institute for Health and Care 







Those who survive a mass casualty and fatality incident will commonly experience 
some form of emotional shock and many will suffer from PTSD. A significant 
amount of research has demonstrated that individuals exposed to traumatic 
incidents experience a variety of after effects (Mcann and Pearlmann, 1990; 
Ledoux, 1994, 2003; Tehrani, 2019) and that these can lead to stress and trauma 
(Katz, et al., 2002; Benedek et al., 2009; American Psychological Association, 
2013; Gartlehner et al., 2013; European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, 
2014; Brewin, 2015; NICE, 2018). The physical recovery may take months to 
years depending on the severity of the injuries and, for some, full recovery may 
never be achieved due to loss of limbs, nerve damage or serious internal damage 
sustained. Yet, according to de Ceballos et al. (2005, 109), the psychological 
injury to victims should be considered as important as the physical injury and 
treated accordingly. Although the emotional shock is generally not lethal 
(excepting for suicide following the incident), there is significant potential for long-
term psychological disability (Frykberg, 2002; de Ceballos, 2005; Makwana, 2019). 
Numerous studies have demonstrated that a large proportion of individuals 
admitted to ICU, such as an incapacitated disaster victim, are likely to suffer stress 
and emotional difficulties and many are at significant risk of suffering PTSD 
(Bienvenu et al., 2013; Hoffman, 2013; Ratzer et al., 2014; Langerud et al, 2017). 
Injured patients might be more vulnerable to PTSD due to factors such as: 
memories of the incident itself (Marra et al., 2017); the unfamiliarity of or 
discomfort with the clinical ICU environment (Van Ryn et al., 2008; Davidson et al., 
2012); and loss of control, including individuals being restrained and medication to 
ensure sedation (Sackey et al., 2008; Hoffman, 2013). These factors can influence 
the emotions and feelings during their recovery process. 
 
 
5.3.1 Incorrect Identification and the Importance of Identity 
It is also necessary in the context of this research to consider the implications of 
being identified incorrectly or not at all. Whilst this is a novel area of research and, 
as previously explained, there is no literature that exists pertaining to this specific 
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field, it is essential to briefly examine literature which considers the psychosocial 
impacts as a result of misidentification.  
 
Goffman, Elliot and Mead considered the “self” to be a product of society, social 
interactions and the individual’s environment (Mead, 1934; Erikson, 1963; Freud, 
1963; Lamert and Branaman, 1997; Elliot, 2014). Similarly, English dictionaries 
consider the self as “the distinct individuality or identity of a person …” (Collins 
Dictionary, 2020) or “a person’s essential being that distinguishes them from 
others, especially considered as the object of introspection or reflexive action” 
(Oxford English Dictionary, 2014). Analysis of literature relating to the 
development of self and identity suggests there are four inter-related base-line 
components in the development of identity and self; nature, nurture, cognition and 
time (Howe and Feast, 2000; Rocque, Posick, Paternoster, 2014; Lodi-Smith et al. 




In terms of nature, an individual’s genetic uniqueness is a product of their 
biometric blueprint, ascertained by DNA. An individual’s biometric identifiers 
include fingerprints, facial characteristics, voice recognition through vocal patterns, 
retinal scans and hand and foot geometry. These scientifically identifiable features 
are essential in determining the exact identity of an individual (INTERPOL, 2018a). 
Reflecting on Kagan’s (2018) extensive analysis of neurological development, it 
would appear that some brains are more easily triggered by events than others 
and may thus be more vulnerable to experiences and the impact of nurture, 




Nurture consists not only of the bond between parent and child, but also includes 
the role of society and community in the development of identity and sense of self. 
Studies that have considered the importance of nurture and the potential damage 
that an individual can sustain through poor nurturing include studies of foster home 
care (Triselotis, 1973; Winter and Cohen, 2005; Vinnerljung and Hjern, 2011) and 
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research on foundlings or abandoned babies (Mullender et al, 2005) and adoption, 
including studies on babies and children, who ‘fail to thrive’ (Drotar, 1985; Homan, 
2016). Studies into child brain development and the potential socio-emotional 
damage sustained through not being nurtured have demonstrated that there are 
critical outcomes which, at the most extreme, can be life threatening (Drotar, 1985; 
Perry, 2002; Homan, 2016). It is clear from the literature that the nurture of those 
who are vulnerable is essential to their development and that the deprivation of 
nurture has serious consequences for an individual’s sense of self (Triseliotis, 




Cognition is fundamentally the concept of the self. In other words:  
 
 … is a knowledge representation that contains knowledge about us, 
 including our beliefs about our personality traits, physical characteristics, 
 abilities, values, goals, and roles, as well as the knowledge that we exist as 
 individuals (Stangor et al, 2014, np).  
 
A crucial aspect of self-concept is the importance of an individual’s name, which 
as Stangor et al. (2014) explain is why even in a bustling and noisy room a person 
can pick out when their name is mentioned. This cognitive awareness of our name 
and the importance we and others attribute to it (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; 
Mahmood and Skogman Thoursie, 2006), provides some indication as to why an 




The development of an individual’s identity and self are shaped by time (Lodi et al, 
2017). As the brain develops, the influence of all the previous interlinked factors 
adds to the development. As Siegel (2015) identifies, the relationships between 
cognitive development, influence of nurture and the genetic uniqueness all enable 
increased neural activity as an individual develops. McAdam and Cox (2010) and 
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Lodi et al (2017) explain the connectivity of these factors and how they influence 
identity and the self across an individual’s life span.  
 
These four interrelated factors, it is proposed, determine an individual’s identity 
whereby a negative impact to a person’s nature, nurture, and cognition over a 
period of time can have serious consequences. It is argued that the failure to 
determine identity, by incorrectly naming or by not naming the primary victim at all, 
can cause emotional trauma. Furthermore, the absence of family and with it the 
denial of nurture at a crucially vulnerable point in an individual’s recovery has 
serious consequences in terms of cognitive stability. Ultimately, as shown above, 
the importance of physical healing alongside mental recuperation, incorporating 
care, compassion and empathy by family and those the patient comes into contact 
with, is a crucial requirement in a critically injured patient’s recovery (Merilainen et 
al., 2013).  Therefore, determining identity and reuniting the individual with their 






Relatives are also at risk of suffering emotional and psychological harm. PTSD 
can occur in an individual learning about the violent death of a close family 
member or learning of the unexpected injury or violent death of someone close 
(WHO, 1992; NICE, 2005; Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2015; American 
Psychological Association, 2017). The accounts and narratives by families in the 
aftermath of disasters all echo the same desperation and need for information 
(Edkins, 2011; Kerslake, 2018; Disaster Action, 2019) and families are also at risk 
of strong emotional distress (Norris et al, 2002; Wisner et al, 2018). Alongside the 
primary victim, relatives may have difficulty dealing with anger, distrust, contrition 
or blame, eventually resulting in severe mental health problems in the long term 
(Norris et al., 2002; Edkins, 2011; Wisner, 2018; Disaster Action, 2019). 
Furthermore, a study conducted into the Sewol Ferry Disaster in 2014 found that 
relatives of primary victims suffered changes in their own relationships and those 
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with society (Huh et al., 2017). These sentiments are all reflected in the accounts 
of families of the unidentified (see Appendix II). Clearly, the knowledge that their 
relative has been affected by a disaster is a cause of significant distress.   
 
Though some families may be made aware that their relative has been located 
and is receiving treatment, others may be left without any information regarding 
their loved one’s whereabouts. In the initial stages relatives and friends will begin 
the automatic process of searching for any news of their loved one (Edkins, 2011; 
American Academy of Paediatrics (AAP), 2018). At this stage “…the uncertainty is 
the cause of indescribable suffering…seesawing between hope and despair…” 
(International Committee of the Red Cross, 2014, 6-9). For those who are 
informed that their family member is deceased, a sense of finality is provided. 
Although there have been examples where the process of identification of the 
deceased has been protracted, there is a point where the search ends. The 
answer is no longer ambiguous, and the physical presence of a body can mean 
that the victim's suffering is over (Miller, 2011; Rubin et al., 2012). Although the 
families of the deceased may now begin the mourning process, the idea of closure 
is a myth and the families affected are still repeatedly reminded of the tragedy of 
their relative’s death long after the news of their death has been given (Jackson, 
2013).  
 
Those who have no information will continue to search using all avenues in the 
hope that their relative will be found alive (Fatiya-Williams, 2006). As outlined in 
Chapter Three, relatives and friends will use all available means to determine 
answers. For those who are not physically able to search from hospital to hospital, 
online sources will be scoured for any news of their loved one’s whereabouts 
(Edkins, 2011; Bikker, 2013; AAP, 2018), alongside frantic calls to Casualty 
Bureaus (CB). Fear, agitation and nervous emotions are all a part of the start of 
what is termed by some academics as ‘ambiguous loss’ – a space where loss is 
‘unfinished’ (Kean, 2010, Wayland et al., 2015; Boss, 2016). Alongside the 
desperation for any sort of news is the deep sense of hope (Wayland et al., 2015). 
Numerous studies looking at ICU patient care and the involvement of families cite 
the need for relatives and friends to be involved in the relative’s care (Agard and 
Harder, 2007; Davidson et al., 2012; Blom et al., 2013; National Institute for Health 
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Research, 2018). It can therefore be inferred that those families who experience 
obstacles to being able to provide support will experience feelings of guilt, 
frustration and a need to blame others for not providing information about their 
loved one’s whereabouts. These sentiments have all been reflected in the 
statements by families of those who have been misidentified or not identified 
quickly enough (Fatiya Williams, 2006; Disaster Action, 2019).  
 
For families searching for their relatives, the sudden knowledge that their loved 
one has been affected by the disaster may result in a ‘sudden assault on the 
nervous system’ (Rix and Cory-Wright, 2018). This is known in English Law as 
nervous shock, for which victims may be able to claim for compensation. 
Notwithstanding the legal basis for a claim, there is an acknowledged impact on 
those who may not be directly affected but similarly suffer emotional harm and 
distress as a result of the news. Some families are led to believe that their 
relatives are being treated in hospital. This may be as a result of another family 
identifying someone they thought was their relative, as in the case of Cerak and 
Van Ryn, 2006 (CE-B) and the Humboldt Broncos, 2018 (CE-F), or because a 
hospital staff member has unwittingly suggested that a photo bears a resemblance 
to a missing person, such as the case of Justine Moulin in Paris, 2016 (CE-E). It 
could also be because a responder has assumed the identity of the deceased 
based on personal artefacts on or near the body, as in the misidentification cases 
in Boston, 2013 (CE-C), Northern Ireland, 2006 (CE-D) and Scotland in 2018 (see 
Appendix I). An in-depth study (n=128) by Worsham (2009, 5) looking at the 
impact of medical errors from the family perspective found that relatives can 
“suffer enduring, emotional duress that diminishes their ability to enjoy life and are 
at increased risk of PTSD”. Although little evidence has been found to directly 
support the findings that families suffer psychosocial harm following mistaken 
identification, the literature regarding the plight of families in the aftermath of 
disasters clearly indicates that emotional trauma is sustained as a result of their 
loved ones being involved. Furthermore, inferences can be drawn from research 
into medical and police errors: patients and their families suffer further harm as a 
result of these failures, particularly in what they believe is a safe setting (Vincent, 
2003; Pierce, 2013). There is a sense of betrayal by those who were in a position 
of accountability and a perception that the authorities responsible for their 
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protection have failed in their duty (Casciani, 2015). Furthermore, the psychosocial 
implications of the feelings of blame and shame can cause trauma (Brooks et al., 
2016). These negative effects of trauma can be further intensified when the people 
or organisations a victim depends on for their safety and survival have violated 
their trust. This is known as institutional betrayal (Freyd and Birrell, 2013; Martin et 
al., 2013; Smith and Freyd, 2014; Brooks et al., 2016).  
 
 
5.4.1 Disaster Information Aftermath 
Another potential area of stress for survivors and relatives, regardless of the issue 
of misidentification, is the combination of both the desire and need for information 
surrounding the primary victim (Eyre, 1999, Kerslake, 2018). Media reporting, 
which often sensationalises, misreports or reports out of context, is considered a 
prominent stressor (Paton, 2003; Scanlon, 2009; Scanlon and McMahon, 2011; 
Monahan and Ettinger, 2017), especially with the repetitive nature of media 
coverage (Holman et al., 2014) and the reports of media harassment to those 
affected (The Kerslake Report, 2018). Furthermore, the complex legal processes, 
including the identification procedure, potential autopsies, inquests, criminal trials, 
likely civil proceedings and numerous inquiries, are intrinsically linked and place a 
significant amount of stress on both primary and secondary victims (Miller, 2002; 
Disaster Action, 2019). Similarly, information will be required from numerous 
agencies such as financial service industries and police FLOs, as outlined in 
Chapter Three, all of which would be sourced from relatives of the individual. In 
some cases, the absence of pre-arranged powers of attorney and joint bank 
accounts can make life extremely stressful for those left resolving financial issues 
(Armstrong, 2014). In addition, there is often an insatiable desire for more personal 
information, often from relatives, friends and social media (Bikker, 2013; Kerslake, 
2018). This accumulative demand for information can be described as the 
‘Disaster Information Aftermath’ and, it is argued, is a significant cause of 





5.5 Responders  
 
To examine the interrelationship between the various psychosocial harms to the 
responders (as outlined in RO2), this next section appraises the literature looking 
at the associated variables which result not only in the stress as a result of the 
incident itself, but also the stress responders are faced with when dealing with a 
case of unknown identity or a mistaken identity. Furthermore, the understanding of 
how an error made by themselves or by their organisation leads to psychosocial 
harm to the responder is considered. These three separate stresses can 
significantly contribute to the development of PTSD if they remain unmanaged 
(Bond et al, 2006; Cox, 1993; Cox et al., 2006; Mind, 2018; HSE, 2019). As 
mentioned previously, there are many causative factors that can result in stress 
and emotional trauma in the wake of a disaster. There is no quick fix for stress and 
the remedial action to help individuals is as varied as the causes. It is therefore 
essential that organisations understand the causative factors and are legally 
obliged to apply preventative strategies to ensure their workforces are resilient and 
supported. As outlined above, PTSD is an extreme manifestation of emotional 
harm and is a significant area of concern for responder agencies. This is 
especially true when responders are dealing with the seriously injured or the 
deceased (Miller 2011; Brookes et al., 2016; Soomro and Yanos, 2018; Velazquez 
and Hernandez, 2019; Tehrani, 2019).   
 
To ascertain the causative factors of psychosocial harms, the following section will 
be broken down into six sub-themes as identified by the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) ‘Business Case for the Management of Stress Report’ (Bond et 
al., 2006) and which continue to reflect the current workplace causes of stress  
(MIND, 2018; HSE, 2019). Whilst very few of these stressors are unique to 
responders as a whole, these respective sub-themes provide a suitable framework 
to guide the literature review and present the findings specifically related to 






The first significant cause of responder stress in the workplace relates to demand. 
This can include work overload or underload, inflexible working patterns and poor 
physical working environment (Bond, 2006; Mind, 2018; HSE, 2019). A number of 
workplace environment studies have found that the physical environment in terms 
of temperature, noise, familiarity and comfort have all played a role in the 
causation or prevention of workplace stress (Seidman and Standring, 2010; 
Bluyssen et al., 2011; Health and Safety Professionals Alliance, 2012; Brookes et 
al., 2016; Gatersleben and Griffin, 2017). As Tehrani (2019) asserts, there are 
multiple stressors which contribute to the potential for emotional harm in a mass 
casualty and fatality event. These include the complexity of the scene, the 
unpredictable nature of mass casualty and fatality events, time pressures, casualty 
handling, management of the deceased and the demand for information from 
multiple sources, much the same as those described in the ‘Disaster Information 
Aftermath’ above (see 3.4.1). The last is particularly stressful as the demand to 
provide relevant and accurate information quickly is essential but doing so can 
cause substantial emotional harms if the individual is not absolutely certain of the 
facts. This was confirmed in by a study carried out by the HSE (1999) which 
investigated the implications of mental fatigue and possible ill health as a result of 
error causation. Fatigue and long working hours are a common feature of 
responders (Mind, 2018), especially in the wake of complex disasters plagued with 
uncertainties (Wilkinson and Bell, 2015;). Furthermore, the psychosocial 
environment where individuals may be faced with people who are aggressive, in 
fear or distressed can further exacerbate stress and harm to the responder (Tee et 
al., 2016; Newbury-Birch et al., 2017; Macguire et al., 2018). This can include a 
phenomenon known as vicarious trauma, where professionals are required to deal 
with and listen to both primary and secondary victims’ fear, pain and suffering and 
as a consequence may feel fear, pain and suffering because they care (Figly, 
1995; Violanti and Paton, 1999). “In effect, people can be traumatised without 
actually being physically harmed or threatened with harm” (Wilson and Gielissen, 
2004, 201). In terms of managerial support and pressure, both Nieuwenhuijsen et 
al.’s (2010) review of 2426 studies and Theorell et al.’s (2015) systematic review 
of the literature looking at workplace environment and stress related disorders 
support the above findings, but also determined that high demands with limited 
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support from management demonstrated a strong basis for psychosocial harm. 
These same findings were reflected in the recent analysis on front-line responders 




How much or how little staff members have a say in how their work is carried out 
was also considered by Bond et al. (2006) and the HSE (2019) to be a significant 
factor in stress. Job control is the perceived ability to exert some influence over the 
work environment, thus making it more rewarding and less threatening (Ganster 
and Fusilier, 1989). When responders were given little control over a highly 
demanding role, the evidence suggested that there was a high risk of long-term 
health impairment (Fox et al., 1993; Sverke et al, 2017; Mind, 2018). Other factors 
included little or no input into decision-making processes; little support when 
undertaking a new function; or an expectation to simply do something beyond their 
control (Ayres and Flanagan, 1994; Lloyd, 2018), including the possible risks 
associated with unknown danger (Blau, 1994). Although there are conflicting views 
over whether individuals consider the work demands and corresponding control as 
challenges or hindrances, Jackson and Frame (2018) believe that this ‘decision 
latitude’ or the lack of control creates an antecedent to stress within the workplace. 
Of course, these may also depend on the individual’s personal ability to cope 





The HSE statistical report on work related stress (2019) also found an increased 
risk of stress owing to the way in which responders interacted with others in the 
workplace. Berlin and Carlstrom (2011) analysed the collaboration of first 
responders and identified that there was a rhetorical ideal in terms of the 
expectations of responder organisations that did not reflect the reality of the 
response. This, they argued, was due to a number of influences, including differing 
priorities, silo mentalities in terms of organisational goals, fragmented and 
sporadic information flows resulting in mismanagement of the incident and 
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ultimately strain. Brooks et al.’s (2015) systematic literature review of social and 
occupational factors associated with psychological distress also found that a lack 
of interagency agreement was an additional stressor during the disaster period. 
Another interesting finding was that the quality of inter-organisational interaction 
and team working affected stress levels. In a disaster, responders from multiple 
agencies are expected to work together often with little or no prior contact. 
Differences in cultures, terminology, expectations and organisational needs are all 
substantial sources of stress (Paton and Flin, 1999). They assert: 
 
 This issue is particularly salient when agencies operate collectively only 
 during a disaster, when conflicts emanating from accrued diversity in skill, 
 professional knowledge and philosophy, and personalities, can undermine 
 the effective implementation of structural response models and increase 
 demands on those in leadership roles (1999, 264).  
 
Inadequate communication resources will introduce unnecessary delays in the 
capacity to adequately respond. Similarly, a response will be severely hampered if 
there is a failure to obtain accurate and relevant information in a timely manner 
and poor communication between responders will result in stress (Myer, et al., 




Expectations placed on responders to step out of their respective roles may induce 
fear or doubt on the part of the responder, resulting in ‘role conflict’ or ‘role 
ambiguity’ and ultimately stress (Cox, 1993; Ayres and Flanagan, 1994). For 
example, FLOs are expected to support those directly affected by an incident 
whilst simultaneously being required to be part of the criminal investigation, which 
may include investigating the same family being supported (HM Inspectorate of 
Constabulary for Scotland, 2003). As Cox (1993, 38) asserts, role ambiguity 
“manifests itself in a general confusion about appropriate objectives, a lack of 
clarity rewarding expectations and a general uncertainty about the scope and 
responsibilities of the job”. Individuals who are inadequately trained or have 
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When responders felt unsupported, through poor management or a general lack of 
leadership, especially during a high demand situation such as a disaster, there 
was a high risk that those responders would feel under pressure and undervalued 
and have a strong chance of being psychologically affected (Brooks et al., 2018a). 
This treatment would leave staff feeling disregarded, hurt or unappreciated by their 
supervisors (Mitchell, 2011; Mind, 2018). The converse was also true; leaders who 
had wildly unrealistic expectations of what could be achieved by their teams also 
induced unease and discomfort (Mitchell, 2011). Lack of adequate communication 
and collaboration resulted in stress, especially where staff members were given 
responsibility without the authority to make decisions, or were unclear, or were not 
consulted about the wider implications of their role and actions during an incident.  
 
Another factor related to support was the influence of the feelings of guilt amongst 
individuals. Barton’s research into the impact on organisational staff in the 
aftermath of an incident identified that where an individual was exhibiting signs of 
stress or even PTSD, the additional perception that an error or mistake “occurred 
on their clock” would elevate the complexity of any disorder suffered (Barton, 
1994, 20). Research looking at medical errors found that clinicians and staff who 
were involved in near misses or incidents had similar feelings of guilt and suffered 
as a result (Harrison et al., 2014; Bari et al., 2016). It can be inferred from the 
research of Dewa et al. (2017) that the level of harm suffered by the primary victim 
had a correlation to the stress the responder suffered. 
 
The need to train in advance of incidents and disasters was a crucial predictor of 
stress for responders. Inadequate, little or no training meant that staff members 
were unprepared for the difficulties and uncertainties commonly seen in the wake 
of disasters (Mitchell, 2011; Macguire et al., 2018). Both Brooks et al’s systematic 
reviews of the literature looking specifically at how training for disaster affected the 
psychological impact of an incident found that pre-disaster training could improve 
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the confidence of individuals and their ability to cope with disasters (Brooks et al., 
2016; Brooks et al., 2018b). Similarly, they found that when pre-disaster training 
was offered, employees were better able to recognise the signs of distress 
amongst responders and understand where the organisation might be vulnerable. 
This would better support colleagues in future incidents and reduce the risk of 
psychosocial harms.  
 
Paton (2003) reports that stress vulnerability increased when organisations 
remained inflexible, did not delegate appropriately and senior management 
interfered with processes to try and protect the organisations from blame and 
criticism. The way in which an institution supports its staff can greatly affect how 
staff members perform their role, but also how mistakes and errors are handled in 
the wake of an incident. As reflected in the aviation and nuclear industries, no 
blame cultures and incident reporting aimed at determining the truth without 
apportioning blame or guilt have been shown to improve staff wellbeing and 
satisfaction (Reason, 1998; Helmreich and Merritt, 2017). Institutional culture and 
the influences of subcultures within an institution (such as those of medical and 
non-medical staff) can alter the likelihood of disclosure, as the individuals feel 
pressure from reprisals (Fein, et al., 2005). When an individual’s perceptions, 
needs and reactions came into conflict with the organisation’s demands, stress 
increased (Emanuel and Ursano, 1999, 57). Similarly, where the organisations 
took action against those who made errors, individuals were left feeling betrayed 
and unsupported; known as betrayal trauma (Platt et al., 2009; Freyd and Birrell, 
2013). In the same way that survivors and families can be left feeling betrayed by 
the institutions that hold a role of protection, as discussed previously, individuals in 
the workforce can experience frustration, anger and sadness when they feel 




5.5.6 Change  
Stress can also occur as an outcome of how changes are managed in a team 
(HSE, 2019). Clearly incident response is coupled with uncertainty and how well 
responders are consulted in terms of expectations and issues can have a direct 
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impact on their ability to cope (Treurniet et al., 2012). To assist with dispelling 
uncertainty, METHANE reporting (see s.3.3.1) is intended to pass information to 
responders (JESIP, 2017). Yet, the METHANE can only report information that is 
currently known and the complexity of incidents will always have elements of 
uncertainty and the situation will be in a constant state of change. The fast-paced 
nature of emergency response means that personnel lack the opportunity to 
discuss the issues, contributing to stress (Bond, 2006). 
 
Another factor for high levels of stress is the lack of understanding of the rationale 
for changes, including the lack of communication and updates (Bond, 2006; HSE, 
2019). Brooks et al. (2016) explore how concerns regarding the provision of 
resources and allocation of time to implement changes with minimal resources 
similarly affected responder wellbeing. 
 
 
5.5.7 The Role of the Responder and the Influences of Stress 
Research has shown that emergency responders may well be able to remain task 
focused and able to ignore negative emotions for a limited time (Moran and 
Britton, 1994; Mind, 2018). However, there is agreement that these traits are 
limited and tend to be self-destructive, and there is a risk that these coping 
mechanisms will eventually reach a critical point (Paton, 1989; Moran and Colless, 
1995). According to Moran (1998, 38), there is an automatic assumption that 
individuals who choose a career in emergency response are “hardier than most” 
and good at suppressing their feelings. However, studies have demonstrated that 
there is little correlation between experience and psychosocial impact (Eyre, 2004; 
2006, Mind, 2018) and that, as shown with primary victims, the multitude of factors 
that can cause negative emotional impacts are so varied that any supposedly 
desensitising effect is reduced or negated (Moran, 1995).  In the management of 
the critically injured and the deceased, it was found that the physical exposure to 
death, the presence of dead bodies and those critically injured and dying appeared 
to be a universal risk factor for more severe post-traumatic stress reactions (Miller, 
2011). Furthermore, personalisation and identification with victims in those 
circumstances demonstrated a particular risk factor for psychosocial harm. 
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Ultimately, perceptions and interpretations of events around us contribute to our 
experience of stress and how individuals perceive and process the emergency 
environment in different ways. How these may account for different stress 
reactions must all be taken into consideration. Paton and Flin’s (1999) study 
looking at the stress responders faced when responding to disasters found that a 
lack of plans and protocols initiated ad hoc decision making and significantly 
increased stress. Similarly, when individuals relied on poorly written plans or 
procedures (which were based on untested assumptions) they were at risk of 
executing poor decision-making processes. Similarly, responders were vulnerable 
if there was role ambiguity as a result of poor plans and a lack of training. These 
would lead to inappropriate assumptions regarding role expectation, especially 
when operating in unfamiliar conditions (Kruger and Dunning, 1999; Paton, 2003; 





Unsurprisingly, exposure to traumatic incidents is significantly associated with the 
psychosocial wellbeing of primary victims, their relatives and responders. Whilst 
there is a substantial amount of literature looking at the impact to victims of all 
categories following a traumatic event, the research looking at errors regarding the 
identification of the critically injured is under researched. However, studies looking 
at the effects of stress on the responder community are growing. As responders 
are a part of the disaster and subject to the same physical environment, fears for 
their own safety and that of those around them should be considered as valid 
(Richardson and Ardagh, 2013). This explains the necessity to include them under 
the blanket term of ‘victim’ or affected; responders have the additional burden of 
being a victim who has a role to perform in traumatic and often tragic 
circumstances. While there is evidence to show that some are better able to cope 
due to their profession, there is also evidence which demonstrates that there is an 
interrelationship between the working stress in their normal front-line role and an 
increased risk of PTSD stress as result of a traumatic event or repeated traumatic 
events. Nevertheless, there is a need to assess how identification errors can 
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impact a responder. There is also a need to determine how the lack of planning 
and development of protocols and similarly training within this specific area affects 
those staff responsible for the care and treatment of victims. Ultimately 
understanding the psychosocial impact of identification errors supports the 
argument that DVI should be used as an alternative to visual identification and will 
remove some of the causes of stress outlined in s5.5.  
 
The next chapter examines the literature regarding why organisations fail to 
identify errors and, more importantly, learn from previous incidents. There is a 
misguided belief that the law relating to patient consent is preventing the use of 
DVI in cases of incapacitated individuals. It is necessary to understand why 
organisations may be using this as a barrier to the implementation of DVI in mass 







Organisational Learning  
 
“The social costs of accidents make learning very important; the politics of 




Sagan (1994) sums up the dilemmas within the emergency response field 
regarding incident reporting and, more importantly, the barriers to learning from 
them. There is a desire to ensure that responders are identifying and collating 
lessons relating to an incident, but rarely is the actual learning embedded into the 
organisation (Birkland, 2009). 
 
Objectives RO3 and RO4 are necessary to understand if DVI can be used in the 
UK to determine the identity of unknown patients(RQ). This is a particularly 
important factor to investigate, especially to understand whether DVI can been 
used in response to such disasters (RQ). As outlined in Chapter Three, the 
technical application of DVI is already established and utilised in the mass fatality 
response domain, therefore understanding what other factors may be preventing 
its application in mass casualty responses is important. This section analyses the 
literature on how organisations within the emergency response industry practically 
set about trying to identify lessons in the wake of a near miss, incident or accident 
RO4). It considers how the lessons are documented and information reported. 
Furthermore, how individuals and organisations learn from a disaster in terms of 
active or passive styles of learning is discussed and the mechanism of isomorphic 
learning as a method is considered.  
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6.2 Learning in the Aftermath of an Incident 
 
In UK emergency response organisations, there are clear guidelines as to how 
organisations are to gather feedback following an incident and identify the 
strengths and weaknesses of that response (JESIP, 2019). As the guidance 
states, “It cannot be emphasised enough that debriefs are a critical source of 
capturing lessons identified” (JESIP, 2017, 5). These debriefs are conducted to 
gather specific challenges and operational considerations whilst the event is still 
acutely memorable. ‘Hot’ debriefs tend to take place in the first 24 hours following 
an incident and ‘cold’ debriefs take place in the following weeks when individuals 
and teams have had a chance to reflect on their actions so that further lessons 
may be identified and hopefully addressed.  
 
 
6.2.1 Types of Learning 
An important aspect of learning lessons is not only the manner in which the 
information is accumulated but how it is processed and then assimilated. There 
are, according to the literature on learning, two distinct types of learning, passive 
and active learning (Mitchel et al., 2009; Antonetti and Garver, 2015). Passive 
learning occurs when a problem is simply known or identified and active learning 
takes it a step further (Antonetti and Garver, 2015). Similarly, the knowledge 
gained through an accident occurring spurs remedial action to rectify the issues at 
fault. As Toft and Reynolds (2005) admit, there is little point in knowing that a 
disaster has occurred without actively trying to remedy the discrepancies, and they 
add that lessons are not learned without putting into place active learning. 
 
 
6.2.1.1 Passive Learning dominates the education landscape (Boyer, 1990, 
Bonwell and Eisen, 1991; Mitchell, 2009; Tedessko-Schneck, 2012; Macdonald 
and Frank, 2016). Work conferences, seminars and lectures through to the mere 
act of reading are all forms of passive learning (Billings and Halstead, 2016). 
Macdonald and Frank’s 2016 experiments testing the sequence of passive and 
active learning found that there was in certain circumstances a direct benefit to 
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receiving passive types of learning, prior to incorporating the active process of 
embedding and practising the learning activity. It could be summarised from their 
experiments that simply learning about a problem helps the learner to assimilate a 
better way of resolving it because it generates a hypothesis about the issue in 
advance. However, simply knowing about an issue through passive learning does 
not give an individual or an organisation the skills to handle or respond to the 
threat or hazard. Macdonald and Frank (2016) claim that a more active form of 
learning can be adopted based on knowledge gained through the passive 
experience. Yet, there is a plethora of academic literature that argues that the 
active form of learning is far more comprehensive and beneficial to those seeking 
to fully comprehend an issue (Bonwell and Eisen, 1991; Mitchel et al., 2009; 
Johnson and Johnson, 2017).  
 
 
6.2.1.2 Active Learning places an expectation on the learner to be involved in 
and responsible for their own learning (Mitchel et al., 2009; Antonetti and Garner, 
2015) where it “engages students in the learning process” (Prince, 2004, 223). 
Bonwell and Aisen (1991) have been at the forefront of active learning and have 
argued that the methods incorporated in active learning such as debate, visual 
learning, cooperative learning and the simple method of writing during learning 
provide a far more successful way of learning. Active learning can incorporate a 
number of sub-types, including collaborative learning (Gokhale, 2012; Laal and 
Ghodsi, 2012), cooperative learning (Slavin, 1980; Johnson and Johnson, 2017) 
and problem-based learning (Coombs and Elden, 2004; Yew and Goh, 2016). 
 
 
6.2.2 Single and Double Loop Learning 
Prior to discussing the various ways in which organisations can elicit lessons from 
various events, it is necessary to briefly introduce the concept of single and double 
loop learning. There are multiple theories that replicate the single and double loop 
learning model, such as lower and higher level (Fiol and Lyles, 1985), and first and 
second order (Arthur and Aiman-Smith, 2001). Despite differing originating 
perspectives, the fundamental principles are all reflected in single and double loop 
learning. Furthermore, the terms single and double loop learning are more 
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commonly seen in emergency response literature and are therefore considered a 
more pragmatic approach to use in the context of this research. 
Single loop learning can be described as superficial learning (Chourlaton, 2001; 
Coles, 2014) and is commonly seen in organisations (Argyris and Shon, 1978, 
Romm and van Witteloostuijn, 1999; Rouse et al., 2017). Single loop learning 
reflects the inability of organisations to see that there are latent errors that need 
resolving and that a simple correction of the obvious failure will not suffice. This 
reflects an organisational blind spot (Vaughn, 2005, 2017; Fotaki and Hyde, 2014) 
to the need to critically assess the Incubation Period, as outlined in Chapter Four. 
Double loop learning involves reframing the scenario or situation to see it in a new 
context or, as Argyris (1999, 68) describes, “‘when mismatches are corrected by 
first examining and altering the governing variables and then the actions”. Double 
loop learning allows the organisation to question the underlying values, beliefs and 
initial assumptions driving the action it takes. Finally, triple loop learning is argued 
to be a method whereby processes and methodologies for arriving at the 
assumptions are re-imagined (Romm and van Witteloostuijn, 1999).  
 
 Figure 13. Single and double loop learning. Adapted from Bryant  
   (2009). 
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6.2.3 Levels of Learning 
Toft and Reynolds explain that there are four ways in which an organisation can 
learn from disasters or accidents (2005). Isomorphism is a term used to describe 
the ability to transfer “lessons between situations which at first hand appear very 
dissimilar” (Kirkwood, 1999, 34). It is important to reflect that every incident or 
disaster may appear to share the same traits, yet each will be unique owing to the 
multiple factors with the potential for change, for instance people, resources and 
timings. Therefore, isomorphism is not the study of ‘sameness’; it is the analysis of 
similarities that can enable learning and therefore change.  
 
Kirkwood (1999) argues that the use of isomorphic thinking has resulted in 
organisations using it to define system boundaries and that it is not used to guide 
the decision-making process. However, it is argued that his perspective is flawed. 
The process should, if used correctly, achieve both; an understanding of the limits 
and boundaries and a mechanism to enable decision-makers to consider the 
options available (having learned from positive or negative outcomes in other 
events) if such an incident were to occur in the future. What Kirkwood (1999) has 
failed to appreciate is that it is not the isomorphism that is at fault, it is the 
organisations failure to enact double loop learning, as discussed above. In 
Kirkwood’s view the failure is noted in a similar organisation, and a system 
boundary is created to try and prevent its occurrence in their own. However, if the 
organisation were to consider the causative factors of the incident and drill down 
into their own organisation to see if similarities were present, then the full extent of 
higher order learning (or the double loop) would have made proper use of the 
isomorphic technique which could be shared again. Therefore, it is essential that 
this management learning technique should be considered as a sound method for 
understanding how lessons can be learned to enact change. Yet, it may not be the 
level or type of learning that is at fault, there may be more intangible barriers which 
inhibit learning, as discussed later. 
The first level of isomorphic learning is classed as event isomorphism, where two 
different events occur which create similar hazardous outcomes (Toft and 
Reynolds, 2005). Again, using the CE in Appendix II, Cerak and Van Ryn, 2006 
(CE-B) and the Boston Marathon, 2013 (CE-D) mistaken identification cases are 
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clear examples of two different types of event, one being a terrorist attack during a 
marathon and the other a road traffic collision. Both exhibited failures that were the 
result of the assumption that the identification in the pocket of the victim was that 
of the individual carrying it.  
The second is cross organisational isomorphism, which exists in organisations in 
the same industry (Toft and Reynolds, 2005). An accident in one organisation 
provides the opportunity for the other to learn from its mistake. The case of Moulin 
(CE-F) is an example of where experiences in one DVI unit (France) led to 
learning and positive changes in another DVI unit (Brussels); this is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter Ten. 
The third type of isomorphism is that of common mode isomorphism (Toft and 
Reynolds, 2005) where organisations can belong to completely different industries, 
yet the processes, procedures, tools or techniques may be the same. For 
example, reports and inquiries following major disasters can highlight issues such 
as communication and command and control issues which are common to all 
responders. Therefore, all organisations can learn from the mistakes highlighted in 
the reports, despite being a separate organisation.  
 
The fourth type of isomorphism is that of self-isomorphism where the organisation 
is so large that sub-departments and sections can have accidents and incidents 
which provide an opportunity for learning in other parts of the organisation (Toft 
and Reynolds, 2005). This particular isomorphism is very useful in NHS and police 
environments where the uniqueness of the organisation does not often provide the 
opportunity to learn from the other types of isomorphism, yet self-isomorphism 
may offer that opportunity.  
 
Ultimately, by acknowledging isomorphism, the opportunity for organisational 
learning can be increased and errors can be reduced or eliminated (Toft and 
Reynolds, 2005). Despite all these opportunities to learn from previous events and 
incidents and the plethora of research which highlights how these organisations 
can embed learning, a barrier remains to actually learning. There is, as Macrae 
and Stewart (2019) point out, clear justification as to why there are difficulties or 
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why some of the methods of isomorphic learning simply do not engender change. 
The second half of this review looks at what these impediments to learning are in 
order to reflect on the data found in Chapter Nine as to whether the UK emergency 





6.3 Barriers to Learning 
 
There is a multitude of reasons as to why an organisation could be at the mercy of 
an incident recurring. An analysis of the organisational learning literature found 
there are a number of potential areas at fault. First, because errors go unreported 
(Mancini, 1998; Sanne, 2008) and second, because organisations are unable to 
identify the latent conditions within the system (Jacobsson, et al., 2009). Third, 
individuals and organisations may seek a scapegoat or find excuses as an 
alternative to the actual incident causation (Sagan, 1993; Pidgeon and O’Leary, 
2000), and fourth, due to political and organisational decision processes (Hovden, 
et al., 2011). Lastly, there may be issues of hindsight bias and a failure of foresight 
(Toft and Reynolds, 2005). As highlighted in the analysis in Chapter Four as to 
why an incident can occur in the first place, it would appear that the same reasons 
are reflected in why an organisation fails to learn from other organisations or from 
internal incidents within the same organisations. Furthermore, the accumulation of 
evidence following an incident or crisis can be vast and may include witness 
statements, texts, media artefacts, reports and other various documents, which 
amounts to a diverse and multi-faceted array of information that all needs to be 
synthesised and contextualised. This is both time consuming and resource 
intensive and requires significant dedication from an organisation to ensure it is 
done effectively. This is a notable issue reflected across the literature and is 
considered a barrier to organisations effectively learning from an incident (Dechy 
et al., 2015). As Macrae (2016, 75) points out, “We collect too much, but learn too 
little”. Similarly, Birkland (2009) argues that organisations are quick to write up the 
post incident reports and identify learnings, but in essence these are “fantasy 
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documents” (Clarke, 1999) which enact little change. In addition to all the above, 
there is scepticism of research and evaluation practices, which are seen as too far 
removed from the realities of everyday operational life (Fleming and Wingrove, 
2017). Nevertheless, it is important to understand why we make mistakes and to 
acknowledge that mistakes are being made. Accepting that these occur shows 
humility (Dhaliwal, 2016). Failure to acknowledge them demonstrates hubris, 
proves that organisations are bound to repeat the same mistakes which can lead 
to reputational suicide and the potential for criminal convictions.  
 
 
6.3.1 Unreported Incidents 
Toft and Reynolds note that staff may feel their job is in jeopardy if they highlight 
risks in their organisation and therefore avoid reporting incidents for fear of reprisal 
(2005). The aviation industry has addressed this to ensure individuals are praised 
for highlighting potential failures and use schemes of Confidential Incident 
Reporting or CHIRPs (Civil Aviation Authority, 2019; CHIRP, 2019) to ensure that 
near misses and incidents are swiftly addressed. This also aligns with the Authors 
own military experience. However, as highlighted in Chapter Four, organisational 
silence and selective moral disengagement will ensure that certain lessons are 
ignored for a variety of reasons, from fear of reprisal to an outright desire to avoid 
‘more work’ due to laziness or organisational pressure in other areas (Morrison 
and Miliken, 2000; Bandura, 2002; Vakola and Bouradus, 2005, Lebel, 2016). This 
is something that has been noted in current clinical practice (Tarrant et al., 2017; 
Harmancini et al., 2018) and where, despite a voluntary reporting system for 
incident reporting in healthcare organisations, fewer than 5% of patient safety 
incidents were reported, with reasons cited as “patient harms were inevitable, 
about which nothing can be done” (Yu et al., 2016, 4). There is a recurring thread 
of scepticism in much of the literature focused on medical and police responses as 
to whether there is an appetite to learn from any incident which is not newsworthy 
or has not gathered enough political impetus (Pollock, 2013; Macrae, 2014; 
Waddington, 2015). Conversely, there may be a fear of reporting mistakes and 
errors out of concern for criminal prosecution at a later stage (Waddington, 2015). 
Where numerous failures are identified, those that are considered less important 
at the time may be overlooked or ignored as the focus is drawn to those perceived 
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as more serious or politically damaging. However, these more subversive, or latent 
conditions could, in other circumstances, lead to significant failures in other 
settings. Birkland (2009) noted that in some cases errors may have been observed 
on numerous occasions prior to an incident yet remained unreported. It is only in 
the aftermath that these failures are acknowledged and only then incorporated into 
the incident reports as lessons.  
 
 
6.3.2 Inability to Identify Latent Conditions 
Pidgeon and O’Leary (2000) found that in the Incubation Period leading up to a 
disaster, difficulties in understanding the information circulating, or the 
‘intelligence’, skewed judgements about the actual causes of the disasters after 
the events. This can limit the learning to be gained from a disaster, as the analysis 
in the aftermath is determined by the perceptions of the Incubation Period or 
cause leading up to the disaster. 
 
Furthermore, as Macrae (2014) points out, the more an organisation focuses on 
capturing and communicating about the relevant lessons, the more likely it is to 
miss the warning signals of other potential incidents. Waddington (2015) laments 
that rather than a ‘call to arms’, the process of learning lessons in the wake of a 
disaster is mere pandering to the public, a device for avoiding criticism that costs 
little and allows an organisation to avoid culpability without appearing “arrogantly 
dismissive” (Waddington, 2015, 117). These arguments were commonly reflected 
in the press in the aftermath of incidents such as the Hillsborough Disaster and the 
Grenfell Tower Fire where it was argued that responders and the political players 
tried to deflect attention from the cause of the incidents (Scraton, 2013, Bloomer, 




6.3.3 Political and Organisational Decision Process  
The intensive and extensive nature of collecting evidence following an incident 
requires significant dedication from an organisation to ensure it is done effectively 
(Stern et al., 2014; Macrae, 2016). Pope and Burns (2013, 677) noted that even 
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when the evidence is accumulated and presented to senior management within 
healthcare organisations, there is a “resistance to hearing evidence of a problem 
and taking effective action”. In their literature review of organisational dysfunction, 
it was highlighted that this was not a unique issue within the NHS and that it was 
also reflected in non-UK healthcare organisations. In the aftermath of some 
events, the learnings may be hijacked by unrelated political motivations that 
pander to a need to find something to amend but in actual fact have little relevance 
to the underlying issues (Birkland, 2009). Birkland argues that this political 
opportunism plays on a societal expectation that ‘something be done’. However, at 
a more grassroots level, as mentioned in Chapter Four, organisations and their 
staff can exhibit selective moral disengagement (Bandura, 2016), organisational 
silence (Pope and Burnes, 2013; Seren et al, 2018), an avoidance of issues to 
protect reputations and image (Francis, 2010) and what is described as a 
normalisation of deviance (Vaughn, 2016). Vaughn’s study of space agencies and 
the decision-making surrounding some of the most catastrophic space industry 
accidents revealed, in addition to the above, how organisations create blind spots 
and enable “a way of seeing but simultaneously not seeing” an error for what it is 
(Vaughn, 1996, 394) or as Chikudate refers to it, a “collective myopia” where 
management are collectively unable to see that a problem exists (2015). This 
normalisation of deviance accounts for how errors can be simultaneously 
recognised and then ignored. This phenomenon has been noted in clinical practice 
and is gaining increasing interest in the medical sector (Banja, 2010; Schwappach 
and Gehring, 2014; Price and Williams, 2018). Whilst the normalisation of 
deviance contributes to incident causation, it also accounts for how lessons fail to 
be learned and how they are simultaneously ignored when highlighted. In many 
circumstances, lessons identified may fail to be learned due to the organisation’s 
political justification that enacting change is too costly or infeasible or, as 
highlighted above, simply better off being ignored. Birkland’s study of 
organisational learning noted that it is possible for lessons learned to “decay over 
time” (2009, 153) and, unless the lessons are institutionalised and built into law, 





6.3.4 Blame and Tendency to Seek a Scapegoat 
Historically, the language used to reflect the cause of disasters has focused on 
statements such as operator or ‘human error’, however, this can often limit the 
amount of learning possible, due to not considering the wider perspective of the 
incident and the factors behind it (Harvey et al., 2001). As previously mentioned, 
‘latent’ (or organisational) failures often underlie the (individual’s) ‘active’ errors 
(Reason, 1998). In the event that all the relevant information relating to the crisis 
has been accurately captured and critically appraised, there is some debate as to 
the effectiveness of the reporting practice in the aftermath (Macrae, 2016; Macrae 
and Stewart, 2019). As Leistikow, et al. (2017) point out, there is a question as to 
whether it is there for punitive purposes or to enable an organisation to learn from 
its mistakes. While disaster ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ debriefs assist in recognising the 
success or failure of the recent response, and hospital incident reports analyse the 
cause of the individual incident and the nature of the response, rarely do they 
incorporate the latent causes or the subtler organisational intricacies that can 
contribute to the mistakes made. Often, scapegoats are used to deflect attention 
from the true cause (Elliot, 2009; Scraton, 2009) and a blame culture may use 
arguments or excuses of under resourced and over stretched staff (Elliot, 2009).  
 
 
6.3.5 Hindsight Bias and Failure of Foresight 
In the aftermath of accidents and disasters, there are often individuals who claim 
to have known that an accident was inevitable due to the decisions made at the 
time (Toft and Reynolds, 2005). However, from the perspective of the decision 
makers, it is all too easy to claim a hubristic discernment of hindsight when no 
action or disagreement was made at the time. Turner and Pidgeon (1997) argue 
that the decision should be based on whether it was reasonable or rational and not 
judge the decision-makers with the biased reasoning of hindsight. This is 
particularly important in terms of organisational learning, as there may be a 
tendency to try to apportion blame. When judging the decision-making process, 
reasonability and rationality need to be used. Although some good may come from 
changes immediately following an event, these should be implemented cautiously. 
It is extremely difficult to implement rapid change in the culture of an organisation; 
although the procedures or policies may change, the underlying beliefs and 
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attitudes may take months or even years to change (Guldenmund, 2000). 
Furthermore, enforcing a rapid amendment to a process can lead to an incorrect 
or even harmful corrective strategy (Dhaliwhal, 2016). A high-risk approach that 
results in success can be hailed as confident, strategic, experienced or gutsy, yet 
if the decision results in an error, the same decision could be called narrow 
minded, foolish, over-confident or negligent (Meshkati and Khashe; 2015; Weick, 
2015). This reflects what Flin and Fruhen (2015) argue as lack of clarity of 
decision-making in a crisis. According to Randall and Proctur (2008), ambiguity 
can trigger ambivalence and while heuristics and biases are both natural there 
should be a pragmatic accounting process for decision-making (van Stralen and 
Mercer, 2015). Furthermore, the 20/20 hindsight (Turner, 1976) can often be 
overly judgemental, especially if the complexities and the context of both the 
subject-matter and the influential factors at play in the Incubation Period are not 
appropriately factored, which Stern et al. (2014) argue are essential for extracting 





This chapter has critically reviewed the literature looking at how organisations may 
be able to learn from previous events, other organisations or even errors that have 
occurred within the same organisation. This chapter reflects many of the 
underlying reasons why errors, incidents and accidents can occur in the first place, 
especially within the Incubation Period as seen in Chapter Four. Furthermore, this 
chapter has outlined some of the most commonly recognised methods through 
which an organisation can reflect on what it does and therefore implement double 
loop or higher-level learning. There are understandable barriers to not only 
identifying lessons but to actually learning from them and ultimately taking action 
to prevent re-occurrence. It may be, as Macrae and Steward (2019) reflect, a 
combination of the complexity of introducing a change, or that organisations simply 
cannot accept that it will happen to them, or a hubristic superiority over other’s 
failures. To become informed, organisations need to actively learn from the 
disasters within their own organisations and from those beyond their 
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environments. By overcoming the barriers to organisational learning, industries 
can accumulate vast amounts of knowledge which can be utilised in the creation of 
contingency and business continuity plans. Expansion of this knowledge can 
enable an organisation to protect itself from a wide range of latent errors and 
develop foresight by working alongside other organisations. As Lagadec (1997) 
argues, it is important not to become attached to any particular model or to 
compare them too critically. Organisations need to adopt a method of learning that 
takes into account the evidence and addresses the specific needs of the 
organisation, and not become overly focused on attempting expansive and 
unachievable results. This needs to be achieved through in-depth understanding, 
interpretation and integration that reflects the needs of the organisation in a 
manner that identifies and corrects the errors (Crossan et al., 1999). Whilst this 
thesis does not explore the legal impetus that can drive change, it was noted 
during the course of this review that there appears to be frustration at the lack of 
enforcement by the authorities to govern change as a result of lessons identified 
(Elliot and McGuiness, 2002; Elliot, 2009; Burgess, 2011; Coles 2014; Belle, 2016; 
Pollock, 2017). Although public inquiries and government reports make 
recommendations and prepare guidelines, these are “often to little avail or impact” 
(Elliot, 2009, 165). Furthermore, regulators and the regulated often hide behind 
statistics and as a result an in-depth analysis of actual change and whether 
lessons have been learned is not conducted. This remains a serious concern and 
warrants further research.  
The following chapter presents the evidence relating to the first objective (RO1) 
concerning how errors in identification occur and submits the findings supporting 
the argument that DVI should be used as an alternative.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
 
Findings  
Research Objective 1 – Incubation Period 
 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
The principle aim of this research was to understand whether DVI can and should 
be used to identify critically injured unknown patients (RQ). This chapter 
amalgamates evidence that helps to explain the numerous interlinking causative 
factors that contribute to a patient initially being unidentified and then potentially 
misidentified (RO1). This chapter uses Turner’s Incubation Period Theory (1976) 
as the guiding analytical framework along with the theory discussed in Chapter 
Four on incident causation from the likes of Vaughn (2016), Perrow (2016), 
Reason (2016) and Toft and Reynolds (2005). The data presented here add to the 
growing literature on the Incubation Period and accident causation within the 
response effort and look specifically at the interagency work between policing and 
front-line medical practice. 
 
Observation of Exercise Unified Response (EUR) in 2016 and Exercise Lock in 
2017 gave unique insights into the dynamics at play in the initial aftermath of an 
incident and how the complexity of the incident scene and the clinical setting all 
influence decision making. These exercises provided an abundance of data which, 
following extensive scrutiny, was used to understand the nuances that affected the 
decision-making and response effort. Adding to observation in the field, interviews 
were also conducted with numerous responders, which provided essential 
qualitative data in terms of personal perspectives on why incidents occurred. As 
noted in a conversational interview, “All emergency responders are tasked first 
and foremost with saving of lives” (Conversational Interview, London Fire Brigade 
Silver, EUR, 2016). These interviews helped to explain what was witnessed in the 
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field. In addition, these interviews were essential to determine the underlying 
nature of incident response and decision-making during this critical period. The 
third methodological process used document analysis as a basis for understanding 
responder actions and the expectations of those tasked with the care and 
treatment of critically injured persons. Coupled with the accumulated data sources 
described above was the use of contextual examples of actual incidents where 
identification errors occurred. The data presented here provide a basis for 
understanding why a patient could be unidentified and not reconciled with their 
relatives in the aftermath of a mass casualty and fatality incident and ultimately 
seeks to ascertain whether DVI can be used (RQ).  
 
In the Incubation Period (Turner, 1976) there is a “gradually increasing (and yet 
unrecognised) risk” of errors occurring (Dekker and Pruchniki, 2013, 534). It is 
within this early stage of an incident that assumptions, misunderstandings, 
rigidities in belief, disregard of warnings and the outcome of distraction all 
contribute to errors and failings. Furthermore, the organisations themselves are 
often inherently complex and bureaucratic, with systemic cultural issues which 
inhibit the sharing and cooperation between organisations. What was noted during 
the analysis of the observations, interviews and documentation was that these 
factors were interlinked. Some were consequences of the complexity of the 
response and others were influential factors which, as will be seen in this chapter, 
often result in further confusion and misunderstanding. Ultimately, the combination 
of these resulted in repercussions which further influenced the outcome of patient 
identification and care. These causative factors coupled with the legal uncertainty 
also contribute to organisations failing to identify and learn from previous incidents, 




7.2 Variable Disjunction of Information 
 
The first causative factor discussed is what Turner (1976) describes as the 
‘variable disjunction of Information’ whereby different organisations are unable to 
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obtain precisely the same information about a problem, inhibiting effective 
response. Chapter Three outlined the legal remit under the CCA 2004 for 
Category 1 and 2 responders to co-operate and share information before, during 
and after an incident. Similarly, the JESIP joint doctrine outlines the key 
requirements for effective response, which include co-location, communication, co-
ordination, joint understanding of risks and shared situational awareness (JESIP, 
2016).  The expectation is that all UK responders are to use the guidance 
alongside their normal procedures to ensure an effective joint response to an 
unknown hazard (JESIP, 2016; The Kerslake Report, 2018). Yet, the evidence 
presented below demonstrates that there are multiple influences which negatively 
impinge on the ability to meet these legal requirements and, as a consequence, 
information and communication is compromised which can lead to errors such as 
misidentification.   
 
 
7.2.1 Complexity of the Scene 
The difficult nature of the response and its complexity was evident throughout this 
research. Documentation relating to mass casualty and fatality incidents such as 
inquiry reports, responder plans, protocols and academic articles all refer to a 
mass casualty and fatality incident as ‘complex’, ‘challenging’ and ‘difficult’ (7 July 
Review Committee, 2006; Pollock Report, 2013; The Kerslake Report, 2018; 
Grenfell Tower Inquiry, 2019). Interviews with responders confirmed that the fluid 
and uncertain nature of the situations and the number of unknowns meant that 
these particular incidents were exceptionally complicated and offered little 
opportunity to grasp the exact nature of the situation. This was reflected in 
statements such as those used by initial responders during the early stages of 
EUR: 
 
This situation is blowing my mind, I can’t make out where I’m supposed to 
be or how many patient’s we are expecting in there, it’s an incredibly 
complex situation and I’m struggling to make head or tails of it 
(Conversational Interview HART paramedic, EUR, 2016).  
 
 117 
It would appear that despite JESIP’s (2017) recommendations, the knowledge of 
METHANE reporting (Chapter Three, Section 3.3.1) is uncommon, especially its 
use in Emergency Departments (ED), leading to responders dealing with unknown 
hazards and resulting in inadequate command and control of these complex 
incidents. During observation of Exercise Lock, it was evident that it was not being 
used by Bronze level staff in the ED itself to help them ascertain the facts as they 
stood at any given moment. It was unclear whether it was being used at strategic 
levels of hospital management to gain better insight into the situation as it was not 
possible to co-locate to the Silver meeting area and watch the patient treatment 
process simultaneously. However, as the information was not being shared with 
operational or Bronze level responders, clarity over the incident cause and the 
potential ramifications was lacking. This was of concern as staff had no knowledge 
of what exactly they were dealing with in terms of patient numbers and, more 
importantly, potential hazards to staff themselves. This was especially worrying as 
this was a terrorist incident exercise and the perpetrator was at a later stage being 
treated as an injured survivor.  
 
In terms of the unidentified patients, there was no reporting mechanism in the 
chaos to highlight that an individual was admitted without relatives or identity. As 
will be discussed later, this is due to there being no protocol which directs staff in 
these instances. Therefore, in amongst the chaos, the ‘unknown identity’ patient, 
P1, and their specific circumstances, in terms of lack of identity, went unnoticed. 
 
Similarly, almost every CE analysed is accompanied by statements from 
responders explaining that the mistake occurred due to the complexity of the 
scene and confusion and chaos in the hot zone (see Appendix II). 
 
 
7.2.2 Sharing Information  
The chaotic nature of the event impacts on what information is known and how it is 
consequently shared amongst responders. Information sharing within an 
organisation itself is essential to ensure that the situation is managed 
appropriately, and that resources and help are provided in a timely manner. As 
seen in Exercise Lock, these were issues experienced among hospital staff, but it 
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was also an issue between responder organisations. Whilst information sharing 
between paramedic crews and hospital staff was very good and reflected the 
normality of this aspect of casualty management, this was not the case in terms of 
interagency working with the police. The attending police documentation team was 
not informed or in fact involved in any aspect of the casualty documentation 
process during the exercise. The hospital plan outlines this role in a MI and 
requires the management of documentation teams in the hospital to be overseen 
by senior ED staff. However, this did not occur during the exercise and the 
knowledge that it should occur was lacking as will be shown later. As a 
consequence, information concerning patients being treated in this hospital would 
not, in similar circumstances, be passed to the Casualty Bureau (CB) and 
consequently relatives would be unaware that their family member was being 
treated in hospital.  
 
Observation of EUR also highlighted issues in terms of sharing information, such 
as the failure of the Tactical Command Team to notify the police SIM that the first 
‘joint’ tactical meeting was taking place. This resulted in the SIM not being able to 
share information and to pass the intelligence pertaining to the hot zone to his 
respective teams, thereby impacting on the overall victim identification process. 
Similarly, poor information sharing was identified in the duplication and timings of 
meetings overlapping. Key personnel were required to be in two places at once 
and this expectation ultimately added to the variable disjunction of information.  
 
 
7.2.3 Poor Communication  
The simplest of communication issues in terms of noting a person’s name, 
annotating it and handing it over were seen to have serious consequences if the 
patient subsequently lost capacity. Observing two police officers during EUR 
(2016) who were dealing with a casualty with a head injury (in and out of 
consciousness), the Author’s fieldnotes state:  
 
As the police officers handed over their patient to a paramedic and walked 
away, I stopped them and asked whether they knew the person’s name 
they had been looking after. After thinking for a little while, the officer 
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responded with his name [with a look of relief on her face]. I then asked if 
she had passed his name to the paramedic who then took charge of the 
patient. [A look of surprise crossed their faces as they looked at each 
other]. They admitted that, “No, I’m not sure we did”. I asked if they had 
written his name down anywhere and again, they responded that they had 
not (EUR Fieldnotes Day 1, D.Osborn, 2016).  
 
Despite there being an issue with the documentation process, it is also apparent 
that patient’s names were not being passed on to the CB as recommend (see 
s.3.6.1). This is an example of how an individual could become an unnecessary 
‘unidentified’ and unknown victim and can impact on the reconciliation process. 
 
Although the CB system was not tested in Exercise Lock or observed as a 
component of this study during EUR, it is evident that its function is an essential 
element that relies on accurate and timely communication being passed from the 
scene and the hospital.  
 
 
7.2.4 Hierarchy  
It was also noted that chain of command affects the way an incident is managed 
and controlled as witnessed during EUR in a multi-agency meeting. There were 
also occasions where certain personalities would cause friction and a definite 
display of ‘groupthink’ (Janis, 1972) was present in meetings, resulting in tension. 
These strained relationships between the responder organisations could have 
resulted in a sense of resentment by those on the receiving end, thereby 
hampering the communication and information sharing requirements. An extract 
from the fieldnotes elaborates: 
 
In the meeting, [NAME REMOVED] from the Local Authority joined the 
conversation via teleconference. It is clear the individual is not fully aware of 
the current Mass Casualty and Mass Fatality plans as they are asking 
questions which are outlined in the policy documents. The Chair of the 
meeting has just rolled their eyes and deridingly explained the process. 
Another representative from the Local Authority has asked about funding. 
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This has been met by a response which has made them look ill-informed 
and incompetent, despite it being a legitimate question from his area of 
expertise. There is a real sense of the decisions being swayed by a very 
forceful character in the position of Chair. There is very little opportunity for 
a decision to be made that is not in the interest of the individual in control… 
(EUR Fieldnotes Day 1, D. Osborn, 2016). 
 
The interview with the head of France DVI, EA, also highlighted that the influence 
of hierarchy played a role in the actions taken by the French DVI teams in the 
aftermath of the Paris Terrorist Attacks in November 2015 (see CE- F). The 
seniority of the Paris Prosecutor meant that any discussion regarding the need to 
accurately identify everyone was over-ruled by a senior individual who favoured 
what seemed a quick and easy approach. As EA stated:  
 
But right from the start we had said, we should work on all the cases even 
the ones that had names on them, we should DVI process them. And we 
were told [by the Prosecutor] that we ‘shouldn't do that because it wasn't 
quick enough, and it was very obvious that people with the name were 
already identified’ (2017). 
 
This decision led to the mistaken identification of Moulin (L’Express, 2016). This 
sort of pronouncement demonstrated a hierarchical difference between 
organisations, in this case the Prosecutor and the Police DVI Teams. However, it 
also exists within organisations themselves where hierarchy and seniority 
influences decision making (Cox et al., 2018).  
 
The culture within clinical practice is also riddled with claims of hierarchical 
influence, as noted in the literature review (Schwappach and Gehring, 2014; 
Braithwaite et al., 2016). This was corroborated in both the fieldwork and 
interviews and was seen particularly in the decision-making and discussions 
between nursing staff and clinicians during Exercise Lock. Although examples of 
camaraderie and team working existed, there were times when seniority and 
position influenced the consultations taking place. For example, deciding whether 
using DVI was considered necessary ‘treatment’ to determine identity highlighted 
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an area of tension, stemming from confusion of the law, as will be discussed 
further in Chapter Nine. 
 
Another issue linked to hierarchy and seniority is that of hubris and a sense of 
entitlement to respect. The expectation that an individual or organisation has a 
sense of supremacy over a situation has in the past created conflict and has 
required judicial involvement, such as the events in the aftermath of the Shoreham 
air-crash, where the police litigated the Air Accident Investigation Branch for 
witness statements and associated test crash data, including blood samples. The 
courts upheld that the AAIB was not compelled to share this data. Both Exercise 
Lock and EUR demonstrated misplaced confidence in what could be achieved, 
their own abilities and responsibilities (over and above another agency), including 
what their organisations could do in the given circumstances. These negative 
hierarchical influences during the response resulted in poorer communication 




7.2.5 Influx of Information Requests  
Personal experience of attending multi-agency meetings as an EPO and 
witnessing the first multi-agency meetings in the initial stages of EUR confirms that 
there is a constant need for information regarding the incident and the 
whereabouts of those affected. The uncertainty of the scene and what has 
happened leads to further questions that need answering. As a result, there is an 
influx of demands for information, which in themselves add to the pressure and 
confusion present in incident response. A small incorrect or missing detail can lead 
to the wrong information being shared countless times, as seen in many of the 
public inquiries.  
 
 
In the interviews with CB staff it was noted that this inundation of requests places 
a significant strain not only on the technical system but also on the teams 
responsible for the reconciliation process. As both the interviews with CB experts 
(MH, 2016 and MD, 2017) corroborated, this is an additional burden placed on CB 
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staff during a stressful, yet vital, stage of the information gathering process. As 
they explained, in many cases, CB staff may have an accurate idea of what has 
happened to the missing individual, but unfortunately are not allowed to divulge it 
over the telephone and are required to pass it to the police identification teams to 
ensure the ‘right’ person within the police informs the relatives. What the findings 
show is that without these teams, the reconciliation process and the ability to find 
the families of the incapacitated patients would be seriously hampered, yet the role 
of gathering information in the wake of a disaster is further restricted by the sheer 
demand to provide it.    
 
Similarly, incorrect information passed between agencies in the wake of the 
Manchester Bombing in 2017 resulted in emergency responders not attending to 
the injured (The Kerslake Report, 2018). It has also been seen in the cases of CE-
C, CE-E and CE-F, where responders have been under pressure to provide 
answers and have made assumptions regarding the significance of a nearby wallet 





7.3 Organisational Exclusivity  
 
7.3.1 Beliefs or Perceptions about what is or is not a Hazard or Issue  
A fundamental issue uncovered as a result of this research is that the 
phenomenon of unidentified and unconscious patients is relatively unheard of by 
responders and the wider public. As a result, plans and policies do not outline the 
actions that individuals should take when confronted by such cases. Scrutiny of 
both the responder documentation provided over the course of this research and 
that found via internet searches revealed that no plans or policies even mention 
the issue (See Appendix XIII). Analysis of hospital emergency response plans 
(n=57, See Appendix XIII) corroborated the perspective that visual identification 
was seen as (and still is in some cases) the solution to the identification issue.  
Where they do refer to the reconciliation process, the plans highlight the use of 





 Figure 14. Page from the Royal Free Major Incident plan outlining  
   actions staff should take to reconcile relatives with patients  
   and referring to the use of photographs to assist identification.  
 
In both the interviews and the fieldwork, it was found that responders had either 
not considered the problem (and its consequences) or had an incorrect perception 
of the harm visual identification methods pose when trying to identify deceased or 
unconscious individuals. As confirmed in the interview with EA, there appears to 
be a rigidity in the belief that a photograph of an uninjured individual would bear a 
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clear resemblance to a critically injured person, or that families would 
automatically recognise their relative who may be seriously wounded and 
disfigured. As she noted, these beliefs are grounded in the assumption that visual 
features remain unchanged, which as discussed in the introductory chapters is 
incorrect. As outlined by DVI experts in the interviews, if front-line medical 
responders rely on photo ID software to identify individuals, mistakes will continue 
to be made (Ritchie et al., 2015). 
 
Furthermore, the interviews with international DVI experts at the 2017 UK DVI 
Conference demonstrated that as a result of numerous identification errors, the 
belief that the visual method was satisfactory for disaster victims is slowly 
changing. Yet, interviews with forensic pathologists (BH, TA, JP) in 2017 
confirmed that this does not extend to the identification of deceased in day to day 
fatal incidents. There is mistaken confidence in visual identification for the 
everyday deceased and this method is correspondingly sanctioned in hospital 
environments as observed during Exercise Lock (2017).  
 
 
7.3.2 Incorrect Assumptions Regarding Significance  
Errors due to assumptions regarding personal effects can have serious 
consequences in terms of determining identity. The INTERPOL DVI standards 
clearly make reference of the requirement to not make assumptions regarding 
personal effects of the deceased (INTERPOL, 2018a, 18). However, as 
corroborated by interviews with forensic pathologists, this protocol has neither 
been shared with nor heeded by other forensic teams who deal with death and 
identification on a daily basis. These warnings are not reflected in hospital plans 
either, with respect to the deceased or the living, as discussed above. This 
therefore leads to responders making incorrect assumptions regarding the 
suitability of visual identification or personal effects to determine identity. This was 
witnessed during EUR as shown in Appendix VI (Patient Stacey) and noted in the 
international cases of mistaken identities, whereby emergency responders made 
the automatic assumption that the accompanying personal effects belonged to the 
patient. Conversely, during Exercise Lock in 2017, there was no concern that the 
patient lacked ID and could not be identified. The assumption in this case was that 
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it would be someone else’s issue to resolve, and no effort was made to highlight 
the problem as a significant threat to the patient’s wellbeing or safety; it appeared 
that patient treatment and care centred only on physical injuries. 
 
There is clearly a lack of awareness of how serious the consequences of 
assuming an individual’s identity is across the spectrum of responders. This 
became readily apparent in the early stages of conversational interviews and the 
more in-depth interviews as the research progressed. However, as will be 
demonstrated over the next two chapters, the findings presented here may assist 
in highlighting the significance of these errors. 
 
 
7.3.3 Decoy Phenomenon 
It was noted that the physical treatment of patients was a clear priority of clinical 
staff and as a result the issues associated with assigning a name to the patient 
were either not considered or downplayed. Turner (1976, 378) used the term 
‘decoy phenomena’ to suggest a lapse in focus. However, in the context of this 
study, the term is misplaced, and it would be remiss to consider physical treatment 
of the individual as a decoy when there is also a need to determine their identity. 
Of course, there were distractions witnessed in all fieldwork settings which 
hindered the response effort, such as the need to fill in paperwork, which divided a 
person’s attention. In some cases, there was an imperative to write a name at the 
top of the triage and response cards, with assumptions being made regarding 
personal effects such as wallets or ID badges, as confirmed in the interview with 
EA when discussing how Moulin was mistakenly identified (CE-E). This was also 
observed  in the handling of Patient Stacey during EUR (Appendix VI). Paramedic 
responders were convinced her name corresponded to the jacket wrapped over 
her and thus named her Stacey, which was incorrect. The mistaken identities of 
Cerak and Van Ryn (CE-B) and the Humboldt Broncos (CE-F) were also as a 
result of being distracted by nearby belongings or photographs of the victims when 
attempting to learn the patient’s names. In other circumstances responders simply 
did not complete the personal details at all, as noted in the paperwork completed 
in Exercise Lock and in the handover notes between police and paramedics during 
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EUR. The focus, as highlighted above, was the need to treat physical injuries and 
worry about identities later. 
 
Similarly, the demand for information created a decoy and a distraction, as 
reflected upon in the interviews with responders and CB staff. During interviews 
with EPOs following the spate of terrorist attacks in London during 2017, it 
emerged that hospital staff were being bombarded by requests for information and 
there was no provision in place in hospitals to fulfil those requests. As EPO 1 
admitted: 
 
 I had to run around looking for the police to assist with all the enquiries 
from families who were searching for their loved ones. The police hadn’t 
sent a Documentation Team… in the end I found a policeman in the carpark 
and dragged him in to help me (Interview EPO 1, 2017). 
 
 
7.3.4 Concerns or Warning from Others Misinterpreted, Dispelled or Ignored  
Another issue which contributes to mistakes being made is that concerns or 
warnings from others are misinterpreted, dispelled or ignored (Toft and Reynolds, 
2005).  EA, in her interview (2017), declared that despite the warnings from herself 
and her fellow DVI practitioners, INTERPOL Standards were ignored following the 
Paris attacks due to the pressure to quickly provide families with identities. Her 
advice and caution based on experience were not heeded and the decision was 
made by the Paris Prosecutor to use any accompanying identification with the 
deceased, resulting in identification errors.  
 
It was also apparent from the fieldwork and interviews that identification mistakes 
were not considered to be serious. Comments such as “It’s not really a problem” 
and “The families would turn up and find them anyway” were frequently cited in 
conversations in both exercises in 2016 and 2017. These types of remarks were 
quite common in the early stages of the research, despite a few cases having 
occurred which should have acted as a warning. Interestingly, after presenting the 
issues surrounding identification of the living at a number of conferences, changes 
in some DVI organisations took place, albeit slowly. In the final stages of the study, 
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those DVI practitioners spoken to were more aware of the need to identify the 
unconscious, yet many were still confused as to who would fulfil the obligation and 
concerns over the legality of the process remained. However, as will be 
demonstrated in the Impact Section in Chapter Twelve (s.12.5), there have been 
improvements within this field resulting in amendments to policies on both a local 




7.4 Handling Violations  
 
7.4.1 Risk Perception  
A key finding of this research was that emergency responders were simply not 
aware of the risk of identification errors or had not perceived it as a concern in light 
of all the other outcomes from mass casualty and fatality incidents. There was 
also, as a result of not knowing of the issue, a lack of awareness of the 
subsequent harms to the individuals, their families and the responders themselves 
if an identification error occurred. Exercise Lock demonstrated the effect of this 
misconception as clinical personnel were unsure of the actions that should be 
taken when confronted with Patient 1, who had no personal effects on her. What 
must be borne in mind is that nowhere in the hospital plan did it mention actions to 
be taken in these circumstances, therefore the risk could be argued to be 
unknown. This is supported by the comments such as, “Wow, I hadn’t thought of 
that!” and “But surely we and their families would be able to tell by looking at 
them?” (Conversational Interviews with responders; 2016, 2017).  
 
 
7.4.2 Ambiguity  
An area where there appears to be ambiguity in terms of managing a mass 
casualty and fatality incident lies with the police’s role in terms of victim 
identification. During the course of this study it became apparent that there is an 
overriding belief internationally that the victim in DVI concerns only the deceased. 
In responder documentation, there is no mention of living victims as the layperson 
would understand the term. When discussions have taken place with DVI teams 
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regarding the potential for them to work in the hospital setting to identify the living, 
there have been protests and a genuine discomfort with this suggestion. Through 
scrutiny of responder documentation and the interview data, it can be deduced 
that the overriding culture within DVI is concerned with the deceased victim and 
the potential requirement to work on a living patient makes DVI practitioners 
uncomfortable. As EA explained: 
 
 …but on the unconscious side of the issue was [she pauses], they were, 
and I will say they are still quite reluctant… I mean it’s hard to have firm 
mentalities change… So, I had to take a post-mortem team and send them 
to hospitals, and they say, I don't know if it’s of interest to you for your work, 
but they say psychologically it was very hard to go from the dead to the 
living. So that is one more lesson learned. So, if I had to deal with the case 
tomorrow, I would dedicate a team to that. I wouldn't mix post-mortem 
strictly and unconscious people (Interview EA, 2017). 
 
 
7.4.3 Conflicting Goals  
There were other areas within the hospital setting that contributed to reluctance or 
avoidance of identifying the individual. This was seen when clinical staff actively 
avoided involving the police. When nursing staff were questioned as to why the 
police were not being used to help with casualty identification, there was a 
misperception that the police would conflict with the overall goal of the ED and 
would “…get in the way because this is not the time or place to question people” 
(Conversational Interview ED Nurse in Charge, Exercise Lock, 2017). Her 
understanding was that the police were simply present in a criminal investigatory 
role, to determine who the criminal suspects might be or to restore peace should 
there be any violent activity.  
 
As reflected in the statement made by EA in the preceding section (s7.4.2) there 
was the reluctance of the DVI experts interviewed to consider the need to 
implement and expand their protocols to include the living victim. There was an 
over-riding sense that this was outside their remit of responsibility. Although there 
were limitations to how many DVI experts could feasibly be consulted, the email 
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from INTERPOL DVI headquarters (see s.9.3.1) demonstrated an apathy for the 
subject, despite clear examples of good practice from France and Belgium. It was 
apparent that despite having the necessary scientific skills and resources to 
identify both the living and the deceased, the focus of DVI teams would remain on 
the deceased. Whilst public inquiries have for many years emphasised the need to 
identify the deceased in a rapid and respectful and, most importantly, accurate 
way, there is clearly a gap in terms of this same respect for living, incapacitated 
and unknown victims.  
 
 
7.4.4 Moral Disengagement  
Despite Bandura (2016) proposing moral disengagement as a potential factor in 
error causation (Chapter Four, 4.2.1.3), there was little evidence in either exercise 
to support this theory when it came to patient care and treatment. In all 
circumstances clinical staff and emergency responders were concerned for 
patients. Where ambiguity and confusion were present, their attitudes and actions 
were focused on what they perceived to be in the best interest of the patients. 
When the potential consequences of errors with regard to misidentification were 
explained, the majority spoken to indicated a change in attitude and an 
acknowledgement that this was an issue that needed resolving. Statements such 
as:  
 
Yes, I can see now why you’re doing this as a topic, this wasn’t something 
I’d come across before but there should be something done about it 
(Conversational Interview HART Clinician 1, EUR, 2016).  
 
Any hesitation or potential avoidance of the identification issue was not due to a 
reluctance or reticence to do the right thing but a difference in priorities, perceived 
or real. 
 
Similarly, as noted by a paramedic’s actions during EUR, there was an almost 
moral imperative to find out who the person was, despite the assumed protocols 
outlining the need to label a patient as ‘Unknown’. Assumed, as no evidence has 
been provided by Paramedic Organisations with regards to established 
 130 
identification protocols, see s.11.2.3. When the paramedic was questioned as to 
whether she was allowed to search a patient’s pockets and go through their mobile 
telephone to determine their identity, she admitted:  
 
Not sure it is, but I’d want to know who they were as they might have 
families who would be desperate to know they were okay after something 




7.5 Minimising Emergent Danger and Sanitising the World of 
Hazards  
 
In the initial stages of this research there was a very clear misunderstanding by 
responders of the issue of patient identification for unconscious and unidentifiable 
patients. As referred to by Turner (1976), individuals make attempts to downplay 
the issue and minimise the problem, for example, a senior clinician dismissed the 
subject stating: 
 
I really don't think this is a significant issue. The identification of 
unconscious patients doesn't cause a problem in routine clinical practice 
(Email Correspondence Clinician JB, 2015).  
 
This implied that, first, there was a suitable method for identifying patients, yet, 
despite a direct request, he failed to elaborate what this method might be or 
provide any documentation used in routine clinical practice to highlight how it was 
conceivably done. Second, mass casualty scenarios are a very different situation 






In extremely rare disaster scenarios there is a societal expectation that 
identification will occur by any means necessary, and in reality, nobody will 
be sued for using the available techniques (Email Correspondence Clinician 
JB, 2015). 
 
This would suggest that a solution would eventually be found that might assist in 
the identification of a patient. However, as this research shows, there are 
numerous factors which would seriously hamper and hinder this effort. His last 
comment effectively dismissed the need for any concern with regard to this issue 
and demonstrated a complacency that society would be content for responders to 
simply ‘wing it’.  
 
Another area where there was an element of avoidance was in terms of the 
remoteness of the issue.  
 
The chances of something happening like that are so remote, and the 
families would find their relatives without it becoming a problem 
(Conversational Interview HEMS Clinician 1, EUR, 2016).  
 
Similar opinions were reflected in conversational interviews during Exercise Lock 
and EUR regarding the identification errors and were commonly experienced when 
working in the field of emergency planning and response. This idea of remoteness 
is linked with the area of risk perception and how individuals do not consider the 
risk identification errors as significant or worthy of attention. However, as noted 
above, once the situation and the consequences of identification errors were 
explained these perceptions and attitudes changed. 
 
The frequency of use of visual techniques also demonstrates a form of 
psychological blindness that prevents responders from considering alternatives. 
Despite numerous examples (as seen in the CE) that have highlighted the 
significant harms associated with the use of visual identification, very little has 
been done to change the status quo. Hospitals and corresponding DVI 
documentation do not consider any alternatives to visual techniques despite the 
potential for error.  
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Similarly, the assumption that the families would be able to identify their critically 
injured loved ones, regardless of the potential impact of injuries, medication and 
swelling, is of concern. As one interviewee stated, “The families would just turn up 
and the situation would sort itself out” (Conversational Interview Clinician 1, 
Exercise Lock , 2017). Whilst there were some responders that did agree that the 
situation was unsatisfactory and a change was needed, there was a reluctance by 
these individuals to raise it to senior members of staff. A conversational interview 
with a DVI expert outlined the issue:  
 
I’m not sure those above my pay cheque would agree to it, I don’t think 
they’d want to spread the resources too thin and take teams away from the 
mortuary side of it… we’re being asked to slice the edges as it is… and I’m 
not sure I’d want to rock the boat (Conversational Interview UK DVI 1, 
2017).  
 
This demonstrated the aspects of organisational silence which, when supported by 
misconceptions of legality, created additional barriers that, it could be argued, 
prevent solutions or changes being investigated. This was the only occasion 






In addressing the research objective (RO1) regarding how individuals can be 
mistakenly identified, these findings demonstrate that there are numerous 
causative factors which can contribute to the Incubation Period in mass casualty 
and fatality incidents. As the more recent examples have demonstrated, 
responders and relatives continue to rely on the use of photographs or visual 
checks to determine a person’s identity. The delusion that visual identification is an 
acceptable method to confirm identity has for years underpinned the causation of 
errors. As evidenced above, these visual identification errors are compounded by 
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numerous other factors. The supremacy of physical treatment to those injured has 
resulted in the emotional wellbeing of the individual being demoted or ignored. 
Furthermore, those who may be in a position to help alongside the clinical 
treatment are being ignored due to organisational exclusivity, conflicting goals and 
hierarchical issues. As discussed, the plans and policies which should provide 
guidance on the issue do not adequately include reference to unidentifiable 
patients, despite international cases highlighting the risks of misidentification, 
resulting in the problem being minimised. This is in part due to the ambiguity 
pertaining to the potential harms and the misconception of the law relating to 
patient consent and assault. Finally, the relatively infrequent nature of mass 
casualty and fatality incidents and, in particular, within these situations the small 
numbers of unidentifiable patients, have meant that responders minimise the risk 
and argue that it “won’t happen”. These findings show that despite being 
infrequent, these cases do occur and there is a need to ascertain whether using 
DVI would resolve the problems identified (RQ).  
 
The following chapter considers the findings that demonstrate the psychosocial 















This next chapter aims to address the research objective (RO2) looking at the 
extent of psychosocial harm as a result of identification errors, particularly the 
impact on responders. Chapter Five outlined the literature relating to psychosocial 
harm and stress. This included an analysis of what is meant by the term 
psychosocial harm (5.2) and who, in terms of victims, could be affected by 
psychological and emotional trauma. However, what has not been addressed in 
previous research is the psychosocial stress and harm to responders as a result of 
the issues arising from determining the identities of critically injured and 
incapacitated patients and the potential emotional impact that can result. Media 
interviews with clinicians in the wake of the Manchester Bombings in 2017 verified 
that there was real discomfort in treating individuals who had no identities, 
compounded by the fact that many of the patients were children (Pidd, 2017). As 
admitted by a clinician following the Manchester bombing: 
 
 I think one of the hardest things was looking after children when we didn't 
 know who they were, we didn't know their name, and we couldn't identify 
 them. I can't imagine what their parents were going through until we did do 
 that, but it was remarkably hard - somehow worse than doing the  
 medication. Not knowing the name of the person you were looking after and 
 not knowing who their parents were so we could talk to them and share with 
 them what was going on. It was a number of hours before we could identify 
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 everyone... and to see what the relatives were going through, along with the 
 patients, was very difficult (Baker, 2017). 
 
Furthermore, there is a level of shame, guilt and embarrassment amongst 
responders when mistakes are made in determining identities as explained in the 
interview with EA (2017) 
 
…and even worse we had to talk to the family that never actually came to 
us in the first place and to explain to them that the person they had been on 
the side of wasn’t their daughter. Which is definitely not a DVI job either 
(Interview EA, 2017).  
 
Similar feelings of remorse and shame were noted in the CE of Van Ryn (CE-B) 
and as expressed in the Saskatchewan’s Coroner’s Offices statement following 
the Humboldt bus crash error (CE-F): 
 
…I can’t even imagine putting myself in those families’ shoes… I can’t 
even fathom, I don’t think enough could ever be said. All I can do is offer 
our sincerest apologies (Bartko, 2018).  
 
The findings presented in this chapter add to the literature on psychosocial risk 
and emotional trauma to responders and present primary data relating to the 
treatment and care of unknown victims, including the risk to and impact on the 
responders when an individual is mistakenly identified. This chapter outlines the 
emotional turmoil associated with a lack of understanding of the legality of their 
actions when using visual identification and demonstrates that there can be stress, 
especially amongst junior clinicians, associated with dealing with unclear or 







8.2 Responder Harms 
 
The data regarding responder harms, whilst growing, remains under researched. 
The findings in this chapter add to the increasing body of literature and present the 
potential psychosocial impact on responders as a result of the stress associated 
with dealing with unidentified victims, both living and deceased, and the 
psychosocial harms resulting from errors made in the identification process. The 
interviews with DVI practitioners who have successfully used DVI to identify 
incapacitated victims present valuable data on the potential impact on responders, 
positive and negative, of using this technique more widely.  
 
The events in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 and Brussels 
and Nice in 2017 highlighted a significant change whereby DVI was applied 
beyond the realm of the deceased and was used to determine and confirm the 
identities of both the living and the deceased. Interviews with senior international 
DVI team members gave a unique opportunity to understand the psychosocial 
consequences of the use of DVI in a hospital setting and the factors affecting staff 
in the process of successfully determining identities and reuniting victims with their 
relatives. These results are critical in determining the overall research question of 
whether DVI procedures are an appropriate method to identify critically injured 
victims of a mass casualty and fatality incident. Without the ability to accurately 
determine identities, DVI responders and clinicians remain at risk of not only 
having to admit that errors have been made, but also of having to inform a family 
who had previously been told their relative is alive that their relative is in fact 
deceased. This, it is argued, and as primary and secondary data demonstrate, can 
lead to potentially significant emotional consequences and is therefore a 







8.3   The Psychosocial Consequences of Identification Errors for 
Responders 
 
This section presents the evidence to support the growing body of literature on 
psychosocial harms and, importantly, adds a new dimension to the research on 
disaster response. As previously explained, the identification of living victims is a 
relatively untried and untested element of mass casualty planning. Historically, the 
impetus has focused on the use of visual identification or assumptions using 
personal effects found on or near the body. The findings presented here 
demonstrate that, in addition to the harms to victims and their relatives, there are 
also substantial psychosocial risks to the responders as a result of identification 
errors. There are also hazards associated with the lack of planning and 
preparation for the care and wellbeing of such individuals. The research report for 
the HSE (Bond, 2006) suggest antecedents of psychosocial harm and stress and 
is utilised as a thematic guide to systematically present these findings. The same 
key areas of the causes of stress in front-line responders were also recently 
highlighted in the extensive investigation carried out by the charity Mind between 




According to Macguire et al. (2018) and Newbury-Birch et al. (2017), the demand 
generated by the emotional environment is a potential cause of psychosocial 
harm. Responders may encounter people in distress or fear, which can exacerbate 
stress and harm to the responder. In addition to the pressure and demand to 
physically care for and treat the patients, there is also the need for information 
from families desperate to know the whereabouts of their loved ones. According to 
EA, relatives were:  
 
 …desperate, they have a strength that could move mountains, so they will 
 get access to hospitals and they will obtain what they want if you don’t do it, 
 for themselves (Interview EA, 2017).  
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The CE consistently reflect that the demand for information regarding their loved 
one’s families leads to staff reconciling relatives with the wrong patient through the 
use of accompanying personal effects as confirmation of identity. As confirmed in 
the interview with EA and outlined in CE-F, the reconciliation of a patient with their 
family meant that the patient’s details were removed from the ‘missing list’. As a 
result, Moulin’s family were led to believe their daughter was deceased as there 
were no longer any unreconciled cases in hospitals. As EA stressed, this was 
incorrect, and Moulin was the patient who was with the wrong family in hospital. 
Unfortunately, Moulin died before the mistake was realised.  
 
These demands on responders to determine the identities of the unknown patient, 
when no protocols or plans exist to support their efforts, add to their emotional 
burden. The pressure from families desperate to find their loved ones only makes 
the situation harder when there is no mechanism to resolve the issue. This 
example reflects the repeated DVI quote “Where there is one, there will be two” 
(UK International DVI Conference notes, 22 February 2017) and consequently 
adds to the ‘vicarious trauma’ (Figley, 1995) for responders. This, EA confirmed, is 
especially compounded by the knowledge that a family is waiting for news and the 




Determining identities on an individual case basis is normally quite simple, as 
reflected by a UK Coroner’s assistant:  
 
Normally with one body, there will be one family searching for their missing 
relative, it is relatively straightforward (Interview mortuary manager JP, 
2017). 
 
However, during a mass casualty and fatality incident, determining identities 
becomes exponentially more complex and difficult due to the increased numbers 
of those involved. The rapidly changing circumstances and the complex 
environment can cause responders to try and implement alterative arrangements 
that are beyond the norm and may be something beyond their control (Lloyd, 
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2018). As the events in the Paris 2015 terrorist attacks demonstrated, the outcome 
of multiple locations and casualties spread across the city created a very 
confusing picture for the responders. As EA explained: 
 
On the first days we realised a lot of people were in hospital and that 
probably a lot of people on the ante mortem side were still alive but they 
were spread over a lot of hospitals and there was not one single way of 
actually getting the big picture of who was in hospital, where and how many 
people in what hospital (Interview EA, 2017). 
 
Although those responsible for the identification process in France tried to request 
the transfer of casualties who had died in hospitals to a single location, this was a 
slow process that hampered the investigation. Furthermore: 
 
…families didn’t have answers from the police in the very few hours after 
the event…and it’s natural, they would go by themselves to hospitals with 
pictures of their family member and ask, ‘Do you have this person in your 
hospital?’ (Interview EA, 2017).  
 
In addition, without a clear understanding of what is going on, responders feel they 
have little control over the event, especially when METHANE reports are not used 
to share details of what is occurring and who is in charge, as observed in both 
EUR (2016) and Exercise Lock (2017).  
 
Similarly, responders who have little control or those who are expected to perform 
outside of the scope of their normal function are at substantial risk of psychosocial 
harm (Lloyd, 2018). EA’s DVI team in France experienced this frustration when 
their normal protocols of fulfilling the INTERPOL DVI requirements were ignored 
by the Paris Prosecutor:  
 
Right from the start we had said, we should work on all the cases even the 
ones that had names on them, we should DVI process them (Interview EA, 
2017).   
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The accountability for identification lay principally with EA’s DVI team, yet it was 
the Prosecutor who had dictated how the dead and their identification should be 
dealt with. This led to heightened levels of stress and anxiety amongst the Paris 
DVI teams. 
 
Another example of where the influence of control, or lack of, was noted was 
during Exercise Lock. The police documentation teams in the hospital were unable 
to function in accordance with either the CCA 2004 (s.3.2) or the hospital’s MI 
plan. They had no input into the decision-making with regards to any of the 
casualties and were effectively ignored. This, as shown in the literature, can cause 




Knowing who is responsible for which element of the plan is an essential 
requirement of fostering good relationships (Berlin and Carlstrom, 2011). First, 
many responders interviewed during the exercises were unaware of identification 
errors and police and hospital documentation corroborated this lack of awareness; 
they either signposted to unrelated identification procedures or referred to visual 
identity. More importantly, the expectation that the police would be involved was 
proven to be inaccurate, certainly within the early stages of a complex mass 
casualty and fatality incident. As disclosed by an EPO following the 2017 London 
attacks, “I had to run around looking for the police” (Interview MW, 2017). The 
insistence by clinicians that the matter should be resolved by police reflects 
inconsistencies which, as outlined in the literature review, adds to psychosocial 
stress. As seen in Exercise Lock, when the police were present in the hospital 
setting, they were not being engaged.  
 
Reflecting on the finding above from Exercise Lock, it was also interesting to note 
that the unfamiliarity with the MI plan meant hospital staff also missed the 
reference to the police CB and were not aware that the plan requires cooperation 
with police team arrangements. The ‘Police Casualty Bureau’ section (shown at 
the bottom of Figure 14) explains what the team does and the corresponding 
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action card (Figure 15) outlines the basic actions to be taken by hospital staff to 





 Figure 15. Image of the Police Liaison action card from the Royal Free  
   Major Incident plan 2017.  
 
 
However, both sections fail to provide clear guidance on how and why the police 
teams would operate in the hospital. This might explain why hospital staff had no 
idea of why the police would be present in the hospital in the initial stages of a 
mass casualty incident and how they could assist in the reconciliation of patients 
and their families. It is unknown whether other training events would have covered 
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these in more detail. As highlighted in the previous chapter, there appeared to be 
confusion regarding the role of other emergency responders. When the senior 
clinical nurse was approached as to why the police were not being involved, the 
nurse very pointedly asked:  
Why should the police be in here?... This is a place for medical treatment 
not witness statements, they can do that later. They just get in the way 
(Conversational Interview Nurse in charge, Exercise Lock, 2017).  
 
This response by a visibly agitated senior clinical nurse was overheard by a 
member of the police documentation team who happened to have been standing 
in a corner waiting to be tasked by the hospital staff. The policeman was in plain 
clothes, which would perhaps explain why the nurse had not noticed there were 
police in the exercise. However, as a result of this statement, the policeman raised 
his eyebrows in amazement and stepped forward to politely but firmly explain that 
his role was to: 
 
…facilitate the flow of casualty information to the Casualty Bureau and to 
help the ‘hospital’ [his emphasis] reunite your [hand pointed at her chest] 
patients with their relatives (Observation of conversation between Police 
Documentation Team and Clinical Staff, Exercise Lock, 2017).  
 
There is naturally a question of whether the comments made in Exercise Lock 
were a result of previous antagonistic incidents or whether it was simply a result of 
the stress the nurse was under. It could have contributed to the frustration felt by 
the police of being seemingly undervalued. Nevertheless, this exchange 
demonstrated how individuals were unable to make full use of their reconciliation 
skills and generated a sense of obstruction and ambiguity in major exercise 
arrangements between partner agencies. It was evident from these exchanges 
that the individuals were emotionally impacted by their strained relationships and 
the inability to perform their roles satisfactorily. This impassioned conversation 
between police and clinical staff displayed a level of animosity between the 
organisations and added to the stress already present. Whilst this was a particular 
incident between two individuals in an acute setting, it was not an isolated moment 
of tension. In an interview with an anaesthetist, the conflicting roles and 
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responsibilities between police and hospital teams during both normal business 
and in MIs proved to be an area of contention. He affirmed:  
 
There is general distrust when it comes to the police in a hospital setting. 
From my experience they are very much viewed with suspicion in a clinical 
setting (Interview Clinician MB, 2017). 
 
These factors all reflect the findings in the literature relating to the psychosocial 
harms created by lack of control, demanding situations, strained relationships and 
so on in the workplace, as identified by the Bond (2006) and Mind (2018) and 




It was established in Chapter Seven that while some ambulance crews believed 
that unidentified individuals should be labelled as ‘unknown’ when handed over to 
hospital admissions teams, others were unsure. It was also observed and 
confirmed in interviews and following real incidents that many first responders in a 
mass casualty situation automatically made assumptions regarding belongings on 
or near victims leading to potential misidentification. The lack of planning for 
incapacitated patients is something reflected on throughout this research and 
substantiates the fact that responders will be unclear about their role in such cases 
during a MI, adding to psychosocial harm (Cox, 1993; Kamarudin et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, a lack of awareness of what actions should be taken in these 
situations can increase the psychosocial risk of role ambiguity and confusion 
(Bond et al., 2006), as described in Chapter Five (s.5.4.4). 
 
EA confessed that a diversion from her normal role made her unhappy. This was 
obvious by her continually repeating how “uncomfortable” the situation was for her 
and her team because: 
 
…obviously we were the ones that had to go and tell them [the families] 
what had happened. Which is definitely not [stressed] a DVI job (Interview 
EA, 2017).  
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Her team were not only made to be the scapegoats for the errors, they were then 
required to acknowledge these errors to two families, one of whom had missed the 




The failure to consider the harms that can occur as a result of identification errors 
can have serious consequences for responder organisations and their staff. 
Responders who are not supported in their actions, especially where the errors 
caused are due to institutional failures, can experience significant stress. For 
example, EA and her team were blamed by the media and others for the error and 
felt extreme frustration and shame, despite it being beyond their control. As the 
literature review in Chapter Five attests, feelings of blame and shame can cause 
trauma (Ehring et al., 2011; Brooks et al., 2016; 2018b). Furthermore, it could be 
argued that this was evidence of institutional betrayal trauma (Bloom and 
Farragher, 2010; Smith and Freyd, 2014; Brooks et al., 2016), where the trust 




As the data relating to the identification errors following the Paris terrorist attacks 
in 2015 show, the DVI teams were made accountable for the mistakes. This led to 
an emboldened desire to change perception, not only of DVI as a whole, but more 
importantly the errors associated with visual techniques and a need to ensure that 
scientifically accurate approaches formed part of the solution. As EA 
acknowledged, the outcome of that anger and frustration of being incriminated for 
the error:  
 
…gave us the strength to lobby and fight a lot afterwards to explain why we 




The psychosocial consequence of being blamed for something that was not their 
fault provided the impetus for a major reform in the DVI process across the entirety 
of France. Previously, EA (2017) admitted:  
 
DVI awareness was very low in France at the time. It was more a specialist 
issue, so we were doing our job on our side, but people didn't know what 
we were doing.  
 
Significantly, other responders did not realise the inherent dangers associated with 
visual identification.  
 
Again, the new DVI protocol established was to ensure the victims could be 
reunited with their families quickly, and crucially, she wanted the process to be 
carried out in a more measured and calm manner, especially as the events in 
Paris created so much turmoil amongst her teams. She stated:  
 
… we insist [stressed] … that people are not identified on the scene 
because you don’t know what happens afterward and you really want the 
right person to be in the right coffin. So, it’s important to identify people in a 
calm atmosphere afterwards (Interview EA, 2017). 
 
Yet, the mechanism of identification, specifically ensuring visual identification of 
the deceased was avoided, was only part of the solution. The other factor was 
ascertaining the correct identity of critically injured, incapacitated individuals. This, 
she admitted, was not a simple process, nor without stress for her staff:  
 
So, one thing I wanted to underline was that I had the full support of my 
team as far as not putting a name on the paper was concerned but on the 
unconscious side of the issue was they were - and I will say, they are - still 
quite reluctant (Interview EA, 2017). 
 
This hesitation, she explained, was due to DVI specialists from the post-mortem 
teams (normally used to working with the deceased) being sent to work with the 
living, as noted in the quote by EA (2017) (s.7.4.2). In addressing this point, some 
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of the issues highlighted in the observations of both Exercise Lock and EUR, 
including interviews with clinicians and DVI teams, suggest why this might have 
been an issue. As an example, families are not normally present in mortuaries, 
whereas in hospital wards relatives are frequently visiting patients. DVI staff do not 
normally have to encounter the victim’s families in these circumstances. This 
additional pressure and unfamiliarity with the environment and other responders 
can add to psychosocial stress, as noted in the literature review.  
 
Another potential reason for the reluctance EA and her team had could have been 
purely from the knowledge that the techniques, when strictly applied in the cases 
of the living, normally concern criminal investigations and not identification. This 
was described in the literature as conflicting goals or could be considered a ‘decoy 
phenomenon’ (Turner, 1976) (s.7.3.3). Yet, “The idea was to do everything they 
could do, from the prints, DNA and dental” (Interview EA, 2017). Nevertheless, 
there was an apprehension by the DVI team that they would be treated negatively 
by clinical staff. They worried that they would be considered outsiders who were 
interfering in the best interests of ‘their’ (the hospital’s) patients or that the 
techniques applied could invade the rights and privacy of the casualty. In fact, 
these fears were unfounded. EA explained: “I would have thought that there could 
be some issues around that, but there were not.” That she had a preconceived 
idea of how her staff would have been received reflects the findings that there are 
occasions when there is animosity between clinical staff and police, including DVI 
teams. However, EA noted that in the aftermath of the Nice attacks there was a 
different spirit of engagement between responders:  
 
I think it is really because in those situations they just don’t want any 
identification mistakes. They are so happy that someone is actually doing it 
for them…. everyone had heard about November (the Paris attacks) and 
what had happened, so it helped a lot and you know they don’t want the 
burden of a mistake (Interview EA, 2017). 
 
Another interesting outcome from the application of the process was the 
realisation that her team needed to be deployed rapidly. She recognised that there 
was an unsatisfactory time delay in her teams response that needed improving:  
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The other thing I would do differently if I had it again is that it was very new, 
when you’re applying lessons learned it did take us 24 hours to act 
(Interview EA, 2017).  
 
The Nice attacks made her, and her team realise the importance of fast and 
accurate response. There was an acknowledged realisation that waiting for the 
critically injured to recover was not an option they could afford to rely on. She 
stressed:  
 
It’s sad to say that persons who are dead, will remain dead, so they can be 
processed afterward… (Interview, 2017). 
 
The stress and apprehension suffered by EA and her team were the impetus for 
positive change of policy and protocol in the use of DVI. There was a clear 
rationale for amendment and, as a result, significant improvements have been 
made in this arena in France and Belgium. In the presentations to the DVI 
conference in early 2017 from non-UK DVI team leaders, including EA, CD, and 
IVW amongst others, there was an obvious satisfaction and genuine pride in their 
ability to adapt the protocol used to identify the deceased to the living. The 
knowledge that families and victims had been spared the psychosocial harms 






This chapter presents the data demonstrating the potential harm and psychosocial 
risk to responders, specifically the issues arising from determining the identities of 
critically injured and incapacitated patients and the potential emotional impact that 
can result. In addition to the primary data presented here, the CE and reports in 
the media following events such as the Manchester Bombings in 2017 verified that 
there can be real discomfort in treating individuals who had no identities.  Any 
proposed methods that aim to alter an aspect of an operational role (such as 
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expecting DVI teams to work with critically injured patients) need to take into 
account and adequately consider the potential psychosocial impact of such 
changes. Whilst the findings present the psychosocial consequences associated 
with errors made in the identification process, there is also evidence to show that 
there can be emotional implications when responders are expected to work with 
unidentified patients (Pidd, 2017; Baker, 2017) and in unfamiliar settings, with no 
clear protocols or established processes to follow, such as when using DVI 
techniques on living individuals who have not consented (Interview EA, 2017; 
Interview HW, 2017). 
 
Based on the secondary data in the CE and supported by the evidence from 
interviews with EA, there is a level of shame, guilt and embarrassment amongst 
responders when mistakes are made in determining identities (Van Ryn et al., 
2008; Moon et al., 2018). The findings presented in this chapter add to these 
sources of secondary data to support the conclusion that responders are affected 
by misidentification. Plans and protocols are needed, not only to provide guidance 
on this specific issue, but also to ensure that staff are not left floundering and 
uncertain of who needs to be involved and at what stage. Furthermore, it is 
essential that training and exercise events are held frequently to test and audit the 
plans and the knowledge of the plans. Failure in this respect leads to frustration 
and confusion which, as previously highlighted, further compounds the response 





CHAPTER NINE  
 
Findings 
Research Objective 3 – Barriers to the Accurate 





RO3 considers the barriers from the responder’s perspective in accurately 
determining identity, including the perception of the implications in relation to the 
legality of using DVI to identify the living. This was an area which caused obvious 
concern, and in some respects, psychosocial distress, as outlined in the previous 
chapter. DVI experts and some junior clinicians believed that without consent a 
patient’s rights would be infringed, resulting in charges of assault or in civil claims 
for negligence and infringement of privacy.  
 
The first half of this chapter presents the findings regarding the barriers to 
implementing an alternative to visual identification. Chapter Six presented the 
literature in relation to the barriers to learning from incidents and accidents. It 
noted that public inquiry and governmental and organisational reports in the wake 
of mass fatalities and casualty incidents offered an opportunity to identify 
organisational failures, ascertain facts and learn from these events. However, as 
noted by academics and subject-matter experts, despite failures being identified, 
unless legislation is changed and the recommendations and guidelines are agreed 
(and importantly applied by the offending body), few changes occur (Hill, 2010; 
Coles, 2014; Norris and Shephard, 2017; Pollock, 2017; Wright and Gibbens, 
2018). This, it is inferred, could be because the implementation of these 
recommendations is not (as yet) enforceable and there is little impetus for an 
organisation to change.  
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The second half of the chapter will consider whether criminal and medical law 
within the UK does act as a barrier to the implementation of DVI to identify 
incapacitated and unknown patients in the wake of a mass casualty and fatality 
incident. Where legal cases are referred to, Appendix XIV provides a brief 
synopsis of each for background and interest. The statements and views of the 
relevant subject-matter experts are provided to demonstrate how their perceptions 
of the laws influence their behaviours and actions. This chapter will also present 
the findings on how organisational policies, protocols and guidance (and where 
applicable their interpretation of the law) may hinder the adoption of DVI with the 
living. Lastly, it will examine how the responder’s organisational cultures and 




9.2  Failure to Learn 
 
This research has found that a significant barrier to the accurate identification of 
incapacitated and unknown patients stemmed from the failure to learn from 
previous incidents and disasters. As Coles attests in her 2014 literature review into 
learning lessons from MIs, lessons identified do not correlate with lessons learned 
and this is a “‘thorny’ issue that is not restricted to the UK” (Coles, 2014, 4). During 
the critical analysis stage, eight sub-themes on why organisations failed to learn 
became apparent, some more prevalent than others. Observations of hot debriefs 
and examinations of evaluation reports and incident reports coupled with 
interviews, triangulated the data to determine if these barriers to learning were 
present within this niche area of response. Whilst some themes such as hindsight 
bias, blame and time presented a plethora of data, others were more tenuous 
areas and the fieldwork and questions initially posed did not offer as much 
evidence. For example, it is very difficult without being an ‘insider’ in an 
organisation to determine all the political and organisational characteristics and 
nuances which present potential barriers to learning. While it is possible to make 
assumptions based on the actions of staff, without an in-depth and protracted 
ethnographic study of each of the organisations, these nuances can be difficult to 
extract. Nevertheless, it is not necessary for all these barriers to be present to 
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restrict the implementation of lessons. The presence of any one of them can be 
enough to inhibit positive changes within an organisation.  
 
 
9.2.1 Unreported Incidents 
In the aftermath of the Manchester Bombings in 2017, clinicians were interviewed 
by the media to provide their perspective on the response. A significant issue was 
the discomfort felt when treating unidentified minors and individuals without their 
consent. Yet, there is no mention of the issue in The Kerslake Report (2018) into 
the Manchester response. Interviews with hospital EPO colleagues in 2017 and 
2018 confirmed that they had not received any debrief reports other than specific 
clinical feedback and they remain concerned about how they should be improving 
their own response in this area (Interview EPO SG, 2017; EPO MB 2018). 
Whether reports were raised and have not been shared across the EPO 
community remains unclear. Regardless, this demonstrates why there is a lack of 
awareness regarding identification issues and a general argument as to why 
lessons are not being learned more widely in the incident aftermath. 
 
In addition to the identification issues seen in the wake of the Manchester 
Bombing, there were numerous occasions in 2017 and 2018 reported in the media 
regarding individuals who have been unconscious and unknown. However, in 
terms of how these individuals were identified in the hours following the event, no 
information or warnings have been shared amongst responder organisations, 







 Figure 16. Screen shot of media headline of unidentified man being  
   identified by his personal effects (Vonow, 2017). 
 
 
Although each case has been reported in the news, these have not been flagged 
on any NHS reporting database. Furthermore, observing Exercise Lock, no one 
thought it was worth highlighting to Silver Command that an individual had no 
identity. The motivation was the medical treatment of the patients. The NHS have 
a form for recording serious or ‘never events’. A ‘never event’ is an incident that 
should never occur, such as the surgical removal of the wrong limb and so on 
(NHS Improvements, 2018b). Yet no individuals interviewed considered the issue 
of identification of the living incapacitated worthy of being recorded. This may 
mean that there is an underlying issue with regards to whether this is considered a 
problem or, as some clinicians have mentioned, they “do not see it as an issue at 
all” (Interview Clinician JB, 2016). Or simply, they do not feel there is a need to 
report it. This suggests that they are unaware of the latent issues inherent with 
misidentification and non-identification, which is in itself a barrier to making 
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improvements in the identification process. It should also be noted that these 
cases of unidentified victims are not isolated to the UK and there are numerous 
examples internationally. Based on the evidence from the media reports, and as 
supported by INTERPOL’s acknowledgement that there has been no agreed 
consensus, this issue requires addressing internationally. 
 
 
9.2.2 Information Difficulties and Inability to Identify Latent Conditions 
As noted above, there are a number of reasons why and how an identification 
error remains unreported. Similarly, there are a number of ways identification 
problems can occur beyond the simple visual identification error. As seen in the 
data relating to the Incubation Period discussed in Chapter Seven, there are a 
number of conditions that can hamper the identification process, or similarly the 
ability to learn from an identification failure, even if DVI were to be used. First, the 
lack of a coherent plan relating to the identification process (as noted in the 
hospital plans scrutinised (see Appendix XIII); second, the lack of awareness of 
what partner agencies’ responsibilities and roles are (as observed in both EUR 
(2016) Exercise Lock (2017); and third, the cultural differences between the police 
and clinical staff and how the animosity between them could therefore hamper 
shared learning (again as witnessed in the fieldwork and highlighted in the 
interviews with DVI experts and clinicians). In addition to the above, capturing the 
relevant information to be shared between organisations was observed to be in 
issue in both EUR, 2016 and Exercise Lock (2017)(see s.7.3.3). Individuals did not 
complete the documentation correctly and therefore information was not compiled 
accurately, nor was it able to be shared appropriately. These factors would all 
contribute to creating a barrier to learning from an incident, especially the last 
where there is potential animosity between organisations which could inhibit co-
operation and information sharing. 
 
 
9.2.3 Political and Organisational Decision Process  
Individual healthcare trusts in the UK are responsible for their own development of 
MI plans. Despite an annual audit of plans by NHS England, the audit does not 
scrutinise the plans and expects individual trusts to confirm their preparedness to 
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be able to respond. Therefore, until an incident occurs there can be no audit of the 
organisation’s success or failure. Unless the organisation has decided to apply for 
the Business Continuity Standard BS25999, there is no understanding of the 
actual quality of the plans. Furthermore, there is little organisational or political 
impetus to ensure the organisations are fully compliant and well versed in their 
responses across the organisation. A three-yearly MI live exercise will only test a 
small proportion of a hospital trust’s personnel. It will give an indication of how the 
generic response arrangements would operate, but it will not provide an insight 
into the latent issues present or how well prepared an organisation actually is in 
advance of an incident. Arguably, a plan is simply a collection of paperwork that 
offers no clear indications as to how well an organisation is equipped to handle a 
real incident.  
 
The mistakes following the Paris attacks in 2015 provided the stimuli for France 
DVI to drive change and implement double loop learning to address the lessons 
identified. As the UK has fortunately not had such a publicly humiliating error in the 
identification process, there has been, perhaps, little political or organisational 
impetus within the area of patient identification. After the 2017 terror attacks and 
disasters such as Grenfell, the numbers of incident exercises increased 
dramatically across the UK. As noted in the interviews with EPO experts, panic set 
in amongst senior management who had, it was claimed, become too complacent 
since the 2005 London Bombings (Interview EPO MB, 2017; Interview EPO SG, 
2017; Interview LE, 2018). Furthermore, without senior management support, the 
overall culture of the organisation will remain unchanged. This is especially true if 
the senior management do not take the opportunity to enhance their own learning. 
This was particularly the case following one of the incidents in 2017, as attested by 
a Hospital EPO: 
 
I was in a very difficult situation in the debrief with managing the ongoing 
politics with my director and not feeling able to say that the very senior 
director didn’t have a clue what she was doing (Interview EPO MB, 2017).  
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This naturally means that, despite some teams wishing to embed new processes, 
without senior management engagement, little change will be forthcoming, as the 
resources and finances to support those changes will be lacking. 
 
 
9.2.4  Hindsight Bias 
Dhaliwhal (2016) argues that it is human nature to judge the quality of a decision-
making process by the result as opposed to the logic that was used. The outcome 
presented in this thesis is that identification errors are not just the product of 
avoiding scientific methods. There are other subversive or latent issues such as 
poor preparedness and interagency communication errors. However, looking at 
the cases where the failures have occurred in reality poses the question whether 
those decisions (to not use scientific methods) were both reasonable and rational 
at the time of the incident. This was an aspect reflected on in the Public Inquiry 
following the Dunblane Massacre in 1996: 
 
 In retrospect, had we known what we now know in hindsight, that there was 
 going to be great difficulty in communications -- had we known then, we 
 would definitely have done that and taken any responsibility for the 
 insensitivity; because in the end of the day we would have been able to 
 inform the parents much more quickly (Tribunals of Inquiry Dunblane, 1996, 
 Second day, 137).  
 
Whilst it is admirable to reflect on such sentiment in a public inquiry, the reality is 
that without active amendment to incorporate this learning very little will change. 
Despite this assertion that the police would improve their communication issues in 
terms of CB and communication between hospitals, there remains to this day an 
inconsistency with this area of the response. As confirmed in a conversational 
interview with a hospital EPO following the Westminster Bridge Attacks, normal 
protocols as outlined in national and local plans did not occur: 
 
The police documentation teams didn’t come in. We had to try and do what 
we could on our own. There was no one from the police to do that job 
(Interview Hospital EPO 6, 2017).  
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Pragmatically, DVI techniques and science were not available in some of the 
earlier cases of identification errors and applying current expectations to past 
cases is a clear example of hindsight bias. However, since there is an 
acknowledgement of the inherent issues with visual identification with the 
deceased and growing awareness of the pitfalls with visual identification of living 
patients, there is little argument justifying the lack of its use in more recent 
incidents. Despite comments such as “…supposed experts [who] express their 
views without the necessary information…” made when discussing the media 
attention following incidents (Interview Paramedic JB, 2016) and, “The media like 
to hear from the armchair experts particularly if it’s different to what was done” 
(Interview Clinician DW, 2016), the fact is what is being done at present in terms of 
the identification of living incapacitated patients, certainly within the UK, is wrong. 
This thesis argues that there is now little excuse for ignorance where identification 
errors are concerned. Comments such as “This is not a problem” (Interview 
Clinician JB, 2016) when discussing how clinicians would have done it at the time 
demonstrate an element of ‘20/20’ hindsight or “We’d just do it anyway” (Interview 
Clinician NT, 2017). This fails to consider the nuances and complexities of both 
the legal system (where you cannot just “do it anyway” there are necessary 
protocols relating to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 that need to be taken into 
account) and the difficulties encountered in the immediate aftermath of a disaster 
(where resources, time and numerous pressures may overwhelm a service).  
 
 
9.2.5  Failure of Foresight 
 
But the more worrying group is those that do not think they need the 
training as they think they know what to do. It is a complete waste of my 
time and effort. But also means I live in fear that an incident will occur when 
those people are on duty. Of course, when there is an incident, you then get 
the comments that there has not been enough training (Interview EPO MW, 
2017).  
 
Comments such as those above highlight ignorance and complacency and signal 
a failure of foresight (Toft and Reynolds, 2005). Comments such as “isolated 
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attacks” (Conversational Interview HEMs Paramedic, EUR, 2016) and “never 
going to happen to us, these attacks only happen in London or major cities” 
(Conversational Interview Clinician, Exercise Lock, 2017) are the rationalisation as 
to why clinicians and managers feel there is no need to attend training and 
exercises. For others it is not necessarily a failure of foresight, but perhaps the 
opposite, as proposed by an interviewee:  
 
Some do not come as they think this is all too scary and want to stick their 
head in the sand hoping it is never them when it happens (Hospital EPO 
MW, 2017).  
 
Whilst there are examples of those who do not wish to attend training due to a 
failure of foresight or a complacent attitude to the risk of such incidents, there are 
opposing examples, as personally experienced by the Author in her previous roles 
as an EPO in both Local Government and Addenbrookes Hospital, of those who 
relish emergency response training. This was reflected by another EPO: 
 
The other side of this is that I have a group who come to all the training and 
all the exercises, they can’t get enough. Luckily the main role on the day of 
Grenfell was filled by one of those people and it scared some of the others 
into action (Hospital EPO 2, 2018). 
 
 
9.2.6 Organisational Memory Loss (or Outdated Memories) 
Organisational memory loss poses another threat to the ability to respond 
effectively. The turnover of staff within an organisation, coupled with the small 
numbers of the more experienced staff that do turn up to training, means that 
recollection of past events and any training subsequently given is lost over time. 
During Exercise Lock the recollection of events during the 2005 London terrorist 
attacks triggered one individual’s memories about why casualty information and 
the Friends and Family Reception Centres were so vital to the hospital’s response 
arrangements. His ability to learn and recall from his active involvement in the 
original incident enabled his learning to be shared amongst his fellow clinicians. 
Furthermore, this enabled a better appreciation of why the issues presented in this 
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scenario were so important and why they should be considered alongside the 
medical treatment of the patient’s physical wounds. Yet, ‘corporate amnesia’ 
(Tinline, 2016) is something that has affected both the UK DVI and NHS response 
staff. As Coles (2014, 3) points out, these services should all be making provisions 
to “capture and retain ‘organisational memory’ and the memory of knowledge 
within systems that are interoperable”. However, this cooperate amnesia is not 
only due to individuals moving away from the organisation or even forgetting prior 
events, it is also a failure of the organisations to have a mechanism for reflection 
on past experiences and adaptation of new ideas and examples of best practice. 
In some cases, mistakes are a result of a complacency based on old memories or, 
even worse, outdated plans. As an EPO reflected:  
 
I am always coming across teams who still have the old action cards or an 
ancient copy of the plan in a dusty folder on the top shelf and that is despite 
regular communication going out about new plans (Interview, London EPO 
5, 2018).  
 
Their reliance on memory or out of date training leaves them vulnerable to not 
being cognisant of the current rules and procedures. This is particularly an issue if 
these individuals are expected to work with outside agencies. 
 
 
9.2.7 Time  
The lack of time was a key finding in terms of organisations being unable to make 
the most of learning from past events and incidents. Furthermore, the pressure on 
some clinicians and hospital management meant they had no time to attend 
training courses or exercises. Implementing lessons requires a significant 
dedication on the part of the organisation to not only capture the lessons 
appropriately, but also to disseminate those findings and to dedicate the hours 
needed to ensure they are absorbed in the establishment, whether it is through 
active or passive means. This was particularly the case following EUR; over 200 
hours of video footage was taken by the London Ambulance Service and, 
according to the interviews, “nothing has been done with it as there has not been 
the time or the people to study it” (Interview Clinician NT, 2017). In a clinical 
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establishment where the pace of work is often unrelenting, this time taken away 
from the busy day job is “a luxury we can’t afford” (Conversational Interview 
Exercise Lock Clinician, 2017) and was considered a burden on their stressful 
work life balance, with statements such as:  
 
I do not have the time to go to my own managerial meetings, never mind 
attend a major training session for a random terrorist attack that’s not likely 
to happen here (comment overheard in EUR between clinicians discussing 
attendance at annual training, 2016).  
 
In an interview with a clinician it was simply a case of pragmatism and realism 
from their point of view: “The default is the patient in front of them and not some 
hypothetical disaster in the future” (Interview Clinician DM, 2016).  As seen above, 
active learning involves a hands-on approach and determination to engage in the 
process. An annual table-top or ‘live’ exercise every three years is the UK national 
minimum standard to ensure an organisation tests its response. Thus, there can 
be a significant period of time between opportunities to learn, especially if the live 
exercise or incident only manages to capture a small element of the organisation 
every three years.  
 
These attitudes, captured in advance of the terrorist attacks in 2017, reflected a 
common approach amongst clinical teams where normal business was seen as far 
more important than an hour spent in a MI control room rehearsing the MI plan. 
According to a hospital EPO, this unwillingness or inability due to time constraints 
to attend training and exercise sessions “is really common and drives me mad. 
Some people are that bad that I know when they book a place, they will not turn 








9.3 Does UK Law Act as a Barrier to Implementing DVI? 
 
Currently, no precedent exists for establishing the identity of the living using 
scientific means such as those used in DVI. The next section briefly considers and 
summarises the relevant criminal and medical laws and protocols which should be 
taken into account when considering any application of care and treatment to 
patients in the UK, especially where that person remains incapacitated. These are 
assessed in terms of their relevance to acting as either a barrier or, conversely, a 
positive obligation to act in favour of identifying a critically injured unknown patient. 
 
 
9.3.1 The Mental Capacity Act 2005 
The MCA 2005 establishes the fundamental principles that are necessary when 
treating patients in the UK and specifically those who lack capacity. In respect to 
any treatment provided, the Act states that consent is required. According to the 
Reference Guide to Consent for Examination or Treatment: 
 
 For consent to be valid, it must be given voluntarily by an appropriately 
 informed person who has the capacity to consent to the intervention in 
 question … (Department of Health, 2009b, 9).  
 
The MCA 2005 defines a person who lacks capacity as someone who is unable to 
make decisions for themselves because of an impairment or disturbance in the 
functioning of their mind or brain (NHS England, 2018b). The disturbance means 
they are unable to make specific decisions at the time they need to be made. This 
disorder is not time dependent or limited and it could therefore be a temporary 
impairment caused by drugs or alcohol or more long term due to a traumatic 
incident or due to medication. The MCA sets out five statutory principles and a 
number of legal obligations which underpin the requirements regarding decision 




 Figure 17. Extract from the Mental Capacity Act 2005 establishing the  
   statutory principles. 
 
 
What these principles propose in respect of an incapacitated individual is that, 
primarily, the treatment and care must be in their best interests, as stipulated in 
s.1(4) above. 
 
9.3.1.1 Acting in the Patient’s Best Interests 
Throughout the interviews with clinicians, the patient’s best interests were 
continually referred to with regard to their capacity (or lack thereof), especially if 
DVI were to be used to identify an incapacitated patient. A patient who is able to 
consent to treatment would be considered to be communicating their own best 
interests, whether the decision was deemed wise or not (see s.1(3) above). This is 
regarded as having capacity. The MCA 2005 does not specifically outline what is 
defined as a person’s best interest, it merely establishes a checklist to act in those 
best interests (Keene et al., 2015). The reason for this is explained in the Mental 
Capacity Act: Code of Practice: 
 
The term ‘best interests’ is not actually defined in the Act. This is because 
so many different types of decisions and actions are covered by the Act, 
s.1(1) A person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established that 
they lack capacity. 
s.1(2) A person must not be treated as unable to make a decision unless all 
practical steps to help them to do so have been taken without success. 
s.1(3) A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision because they 
make an unwise decision.  
s.1(4) An act done, or decision made, under this Act for or on behalf of a person 
who lacks capacity must be done, or made, in his best interests. 
s.1(5) Before the act is done, or decision is made, regard must be had to 
whether the purpose for which it is needed can be effectively achieved in a way 
that is less restrictive of the person’s rights and freedom of action. 
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and so many different people and circumstances are affected by it 
(Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2007, 68)  
 
According to English law, to determine best interests, the Supreme Court case of 
Aintree University NHS Hospital Trust v James4 emphasised that “the purpose of 
the best interest test is to consider matters from the patient’s point of view” (para 
45).  Specifically, in terms of those who lack capacity, the case of F v West 
Berkshire Health Authority5 established the foundation of necessity and best 
interests for the treatment of an incapacitated adult. Lord Brandon stated:  
 
 The operation or other treatment will be in their best interests if, but only if, 
 it is carried out to save their lives or to ensure improvement or prevent 
 deterioration in their physical or mental health (Ibid, 5).  
 
This became the basis for the statutory duty as set out in the MCA in terms of 
treatment of incapacitated adults. The Act asks decision-makers to consider any 
factors the person who lacks capacity would consider if they were able to, 
including decisions or obligations which affect other relatives or the duties of a 
responsible citizen. Specifically, it refers to the argument, “If it is likely that the 
person who lacks capacity would have considered these factors themselves, they 
can be seen as part of the person’s best interests” (Department for Constitutional 
Affairs, 2007, S 5.47-8, 85). Determining what an incapacitated person might have 
wished in the absence of those who have known the individual is an extremely 
difficult thing to achieve. It has also been the case historically that experienced 
clinicians were considered best placed to decide a patient’s best interest. This was 
the basis for the Bolam Test decided in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management 
Committee6. Yet, the case of Montgomery v Lanarkshire7 altered this perspective 
in terms of a patient’s best interest and as a result any decision regarding 
treatment needs to consider what a reasonable person or citizen (see above) 
might expect in such circumstances. A reasonable person is not necessarily a 
 
4 [2013] UKSC 67 
5 [1989] 2 All ER 545 
6 [1957] 1 WLR 582 
7 [2015] UKSC 11  
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typical or an average person, they are a representation of the community’s 
judgment as to how a typical person should or would behave in the given situation 
(Hylton, 2016, 102-121).  
 
Senior clinicians in Exercise Lock and EUR had little or no hesitation about using 
DVI techniques on unconscious individuals in principle. There was an 
overwhelming view that a patient’s need to have their relatives and friends located 
quickly was wholly justifiable, a necessity and in the patient’s best interest. This 
was stressed by NT: 
 
Absolutely. I would make an assumption that a reasonable [stressed] 
patient, the average patient would want to be identified. And would want 
their family to know who they were and where they were. I think that is a 
reasonable assumption that you could make… I would defend that... as 
reasonable [stressed] practice, to identify someone (ED Consultant 
Interview, 2017). 
 
The MCA 2005 and corresponding Code of Practice (Department for Constitutional 
Affairs, 2007) gives the responder the option to wait for the person to recover, if 
this is deemed to be in their best interest. The interviews with clinicians highlight 
that, despite the more experienced individuals being certain that the identification 
of an individual is in their best interest and a necessity, less experienced doctors 
felt uncomfortable and unclear as to the required actions. This reveals an 
ambiguity in respect to patient identification and patient’s rights and needs when 
incapacitated and demonstrates a lack of awareness which could act as a barrier 
to the use of DVI in these circumstances. This was demonstrated when the junior 
doctors discussed the treatment of the unknown patient during Exercise Lock. As 
no action to determine the patient’s identity was being taken, the Author asked, 
“What could be done to determine their identity?” The junior clinicians’ responses 
varied from “wait for them to recover”, to “involve the police” or to “wait for their 
families to turn up” (Observations Exercise Lock, 2017).  
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Clinicians generally supported the view that incapacitated and unknown patients 
should be identified using any means necessary including using DVI in an effort to 
determine their names.  
 
 If it were one of my family members in that situation, I’d expect emergency 
 professionals to do everything they could to find me (Conversational 
 Interview Casualty, Exercise Lock, 2017).   
 
In fact, some responders felt that it was their moral duty to determine the patient’s 
name. In interviews it was evident that some senior clinicians felt it justifiable that 
“everything possible to determine patient’s identity” was done (Interview Clinician 
DM, 2016). A clinician with over 20 years front-line experience was questioned 
about his perspective on the potential legal ramifications of using DVI techniques 
to determine a patient’s identity. He asserted that he would “stand up in court and 
defend my colleagues’ actions” (Interview NT Clinician, 2016). Another senior 
clinician’s perspective was that society would support their (the clinicians and 
responders) actions: “…in reality, nobody will be sued for using the available 
techniques” (Interview JB Clinician, 2016). 
 
It was noted that the junior or less experienced clinicians were more cautious 
when it came to using a process that went beyond initial emergency treatment 
(which the MCA allows) or that did not have explicit protocols aligned with it. It was 
apparent that these individuals were unaware of whether identifying an individual 
would fall within the category of emergency treatment under the Act. In an email 
discussion in early 2016 with a senior NHS clinical advisor it was made clear that 
he personally did not consider the lack of protocols or ambiguity as an issue: 
 
The idea of not trying to identify an incapacitated individual because they 
have not given prior consent is not one that is seriously entertained (Email 
Correspondence JB, 2016). 
 
Whilst discussing the potential use of DVI to investigate Patient 1’s identity, during 
Exercise Lock, the conversation between clinical staff clearly demonstrated that a 
dichotomy existed between what was ultimately in the patient’s best interest and 
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how they would need to respect the patient’s right to privacy. The nurse in the 
treatment room reflected on his experience of 7/7 and the desperation shown by 
families to try and get access to their loved ones and how this became a stressor 
in itself for his colleagues and himself. The nurse raised the point that it was a 
legitimate desire to use any means necessary to find a victim’s relatives. This 
resulted in a definite consensus that there would be a real demand for family to be 
by the bedside of a critically ill individual, yet, they were unsure as to how that 
could be achieved, and it was not something they had come across in their 
professional capacity. Whilst the hospital MI plan clearly expected visual 
techniques to be used to determine identity, there was no awareness amongst the 
clinical staff that, first, this existed as an option in their plan and, second, that 
visual identity could be problematic or have negative consequences for the patient 
or their family.   
 
There is a need to establish whether a clinician who chooses not to assist in 
determining a patient’s identity is considered reasonable by their professional 
peers in the given circumstances. This is reflected in the General Medical 
Council’s policy documentation on Consent (2008) and Confidentiality (2017), 
which explains that in exceptional circumstances it may be justified to make 
confidential patient information known without consent, if it is in the public interest 
or the patient’s interest. If gaining the consent of the patient is not practical (which 
in this case it would not be), the responder is expected to seek advice from an 
appropriate source, such as their professional organisation, prior to the release of 
the information. If a responder is seen to have acted reasonably, then they will not 
have breached their duty of care.  
 
Discussing the legal position of best interest with a UK retired judge, he stated,  
 
There is a blanket policy of best interest and that finding a family would be 
reasonable in these circumstances… what would a reasonable person 
expect? … If the patient hopefully recovers then that person would want 




His view mirrored those of the more experienced medical professionals and the 
opinion of many participants in the EUR and over the course of the study.  
 
 
9.3.2 Do DVI Techniques Constitute Trespass to the Person and/or Assault? 
The judge’s position regarding harm to the patient highlighted that the law was not 
always clear and certainly did not always sit clearly alongside the moral wish to do 
the right thing. He explained:  
 
In this scenario anyone would say it’s reasonable that we do it. It’s not 
physically harming… well technically it is. But it’s not permanent harm 
(Interview Judge, 2016).  
 
Similarly, when the question of potential assault as a result of using DVI to identity 
a patient was raised, the response by a senior clinician was:  
 
Technically, it may well be defined as assault, but, to a non-legal person, 
it’s only an issue if the patient chooses [stressed] that it is an issue  
(Interview NT, Clinician, 2017). 
 
Conversely, DVI teams believed there was a potential civil act of trespass to the 
person and a criminal act of assault and battery if DVI techniques were used on a 
living person. The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (OAPA) and the Criminal 
Justice Act 1988 both govern the offences of battery, common assault, actual 
bodily harm and grievous bodily harm. Following the case of Fagan v Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner8, assault was described as an act, “…committed when a 
person intentionally or recklessly causes another to apprehend the immediate 
infliction of unlawful force”. Assault need not cause injury, it could simply be 
implied, such as threatening a person with a fist or suggestively drawing a finger 
across a person’s neck (Halsbury’s Laws of England; 2016; Crown Prosecution 
Service (CPS), 2018a). Actual bodily harm is classed as an assault that results in 
injury. In the event that the injury is serious enough to cause more than a trifling 
 
8 [1969] 1 QB 439 
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injury or where there may be more lasting damage, the charge may be that of 
grievous bodily harm. Battery, however, is the act of intentionally applying a force 
to another. Although there have been cases that have argued that the force was 
inflicted with hostile intention, in Re F9, Lord Goff stated,  
 
 The suggested qualification [contact sufficient to amount to trespass] is 
 difficult to reconcile with the principle that any touching of another's body is, 
 in the absence of lawful excuse, capable of amounting to a battery and a 
 trespass.  
 
Therefore, it becomes clear that touching another person’s body in the absence of 
consent is acceptable in circumstances where there is a lawful excuse, including in 
their best interests and a medical necessity, as outlined above. 
 
As yet, there is no case law which establishes precedent regarding the use of 
DNA, fingerprints or dental records to determine an incapacitated individual’s 
identity. However, referring back to the techniques used in DVI (s.3.4), it is 
debatable whether any of the procedures would constitute serious harm or cause 
lasting damage. Taking fingerprints from an unconscious individual would not 
inflict any harm that is more than trifling and it is debatable whether a buccal swab 
would cause a serious injury or that there would be lasting damage. However, the 
act of carrying out a thorough odontology assessment to examine the detailed 
dental arrangement of the patient could be considered physically manipulative and 
result in bruising which may be considered more than trifling. Therefore, this 
procedure should be considered carefully. It is conceivable that a charge of 
assault could be brought if DVI were used without their consent, for an action 
which is not in the pursuit of their identity for medical reasons and not in their best 
interests, such as the case in the USA where a nurse refused to allow the police to 
collect blood samples without consent (Mensick, 2017; Ortiz and Siemaszko, 
2017).  Yet the police in these circumstances, incorrectly, believed that it was 
justified in the pursuit of a criminal investigation. Similarly, in the UK, any use of 
DVI techniques on an unconscious individual without their consent would be 
 
9 [1990] 2 AC1 
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classed as a crime under the OAPA or be considered trespass to the person, if it 
were not in the best interest of the patient and considered a medical necessity. If 
DVI were used to identify the patient for any reason other than medical necessity, 
healthcare professionals and the police teams could be accused of negligence and 
assault. It would therefore be of the utmost importance to ensure that the process 
was fully documented and clear reasons for such investigations explained. 
 
 
9.3.3 Does the Human Rights Act 2005 Prevent the Use of DVI with the 
Incapacitated?  
For the living patient, under the requirement to protect life and prevent persons 
from degrading and inhumane treatment in Article 2 of the Human Rights Act 
(HRA) 1998 and in line with the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), 
the police have a duty to investigate a person missing or reported as missing 
(College of Policing, 2018a). This duty includes the requirement to record the 
incident and ensure positive action is taken to risk assess and consider the 
safeguarding considerations for the missing individual. Therefore, there is a legal 
remit for the police to investigate the circumstances of an individual who is 
reported missing, or those who are found with no identity, to ascertain whether 
they are a/the missing individual.  
 
 
9.3.3.1 Do the Techniques Constitute Invasion of Privacy? 
A further concern relating to the use of DVI techniques and therefore a perceived 
barrier was the potential invasion of privacy. Apprehension centred on the use and 
storage of DNA and fingerprints. The law in the UK which relates specifically to 
privacy of information comes under Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998. In 
such a case the courts would scrutinise the particular circumstances to determine 
whether any infringement of a patient’s privacy was justified. If a public authority 
such as an NHS organisation or the police were alleged to have infringed an 
individual’s right to privacy, a claim could be brought under the HRA 1998 directly 
(HRA, S.7). These claims could subsequently be taken to the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR), but the applicant must have exhausted all domestic 
remedies (i.e. tried to claim under UK laws) and have suffered a significant 
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disadvantage as a result of the infringement. Cases such as Mosely v United 
Kingdom10 and Peck v United Kingdom11 provide examples of such claims.  In 
addition, how the data were stored and shared would be considered. In civil 
courts, an action for tort of misuse of private information could be claimed and held 
only if the information was used for purposes other than medical necessity for the 
patient’s mental and physical wellbeing, as seen in the cases of Campbell v MGN 
Ltd12 and Vidal-Hall v Google13. It is worth noting that the sharing of photographs 
without an individual’s consent is also classed as an invasion of privacy and can 
therefore be argued to be as harmful as the use of the evidence extracted through 
the application of DVI. However, as highlighted above, the patient’s best interests 
and whether the use of such data was considered a medical necessity would be 
considered in light of such claims. This is supported by the explicit statement in the 
EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2018 which says, “An 
unconscious person’s data can be obtained to determine their identity” (European 
Patients Forum, 2018, 9). This implies that an individual’s identity is considered a 
medical necessity and in the best interest of the patient. However, any use beyond 
identification would again be considered an infringement of this legislation. 
 
The apprehension of using scientific techniques which were considered by junior 
clinicians to be an invasion of privacy made them uncomfortable, as noted in 
interviews and in both exercises. In practice, the actions taken to determine an 
incapacitated patient’s identity varied between clinical staff. There is obvious 
confusion regarding the application of the MCA 2005 and the actions to be taken 
when an individual lacks capacity and has no proxy to make decisions on their 
behalf. This raised the issue of how it is known whether the family present is the 
correct match and what could be used to accurately determine the patient’s 
identity. “DNA could be used, but I’m not sure we’d be able to use it as it would be 
an invasion of their privacy” was the response by one junior clinician, as recorded 
in the Exercise Lock fieldnotes. It was at this point that a senior doctor who had 
overheard the discussion simply dismissed the statement and replied, “No, it 
 
10 [2011] 53 EHRR 30 
11 [2003] 36 EHRR 719 
12 [2004] UKHL 22 
13 [2015] EWCA Civ 
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would be in their best interest and we’d just get on with it”. The manner in which it 
was said closed the discussion and left no room for further debate or questioning. 
Neither the junior clinicians nor the Author were given the opportunity to explore 
the point further.   
 
While the junior clinicians displayed levels of unease with potentially invading the 
privacy or committing an offence against the person if they were to assist in 
determining the identity of the patient, this study found that the more senior or 
experienced a clinician, the more pragmatic and flexible the approach to using any 
means necessary.  
 
 
9.3.4 Human Tissue Act 2004  
Another aspect concerning the use of DVI relates to the use and storage of any 
personal forensic data. The Human Tissue Authority explicitly requires that where 
adults lack capacity, practitioners should consider the MCA 2005 and Code of 
Practice and “all decisions must be made in the person’s best interests” (Human 
Tissue Authority, 2017, 25). If the retrieval, analysis and disposal of human tissue 
is carried out under the same conditions as when conducted with the deceased, 
there should be no issue. This is because the Human Tissue Act and all 
associated requirements apply equally to the living and the deceased and the 
protocols for the sharing, storage and use of such data would remain unchanged. 
 
The Human Tissue Act 2004 (HTA) (persons who lack Capacity to Consent and 
Transplants) Regulations 2006 part 2 establishes that DNA may be analysed 
without consent under S5(2)(a) for “any purpose which the person carrying out the 
analysis reasonably believes to be in P’s best interests”. Therefore, the HTA 2004 








9.3.5 In the Public Interest? 
Ultimately, any criminal case that is brought before the courts would need to be 
judged on whether it is in the public’s interest to proceed with a prosecution. The 
decision as to whether those using DVI to establish a patient’s identity were acting 
unlawfully, in an unjust manner or abusing their power would need to be 
determined. In the UK, the Code for Crown Prosecutions would expect those 
bringing the case forward to have cleared the two stages of the Full Code Test 
(CPS, 2018b). First, whether there is enough evidence against the defendant 
(taking into account all the points raised above regarding best interest and 
necessity). Second, and regardless of the evidence, the prosecution would need to 
decide whether it is in the public interest. This would include taking into account 
the level of seriousness, the level of culpability of the offender(s), the 
circumstances and level of harm to the victim, the impact to the community and 
whether prosecution is a proportionate response (CPS, 2018b, 9-11). As 
confirmed by a retired Judge, a case of emergency responders acting out of 
necessity, and in the patient’s best interest, to reunite them with their family would 
be:  
 
…something the majority of us want, so this sort of case would be unlikely 





9.4 Do Organisational Policies and Protocols Prevent the 
Adoption of DVI to Identify the Living? 
 
 
9.4.1 DVI Organisations 
As previously mentioned, the use of DNA, fingerprints or dental records for deaths 
that occur on a daily basis is not considered usual and the doctrine surrounding 
DVI centres on victims being deceased. This essentially results in the identification 
of the living being seen as a minor issue in comparison to the significant risk 
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associated with incorrect identification of the deceased. It may be the case that 
there could be a significant number of deceased in comparison to the relatively 
few numbers of unconscious and unidentified living victims, however, there is an 
argument which says that the identification of the living should take priority. This 
sentiment was supported by EA when discussing why she felt it necessary for her 
DVI teams to identify the living: 
 
They have a high risk of dying, so you do need to get access to the family 
as soon as possible. It’s their ultimate right, to actually have access as soon 
as possible to their next of kin… (Interview EA, 2017).  
  
One of the concerns that EA raised in her interview was the length of time to 
accurately and scientifically match families with their missing relatives. Whilst time 
is not a barrier to accurate identification, the desire for responders to meet the 
needs of those families desperately seeking their missing, can result in errors 
being made. As reflected by Johnson and Rieman, “When less information is 
gathered prior to vetting an identification, the greater the chance that something 
may not add up at the end, or a quality measure is missed” (2019, 11). 
Yet at present, the INTERPOL DVI process expects relatives to complete a 
lengthy twelve-page document which details all possible matching characteristics. 
The complexity of the form and the sheer amount of detailed information required 
is considered by some DVI experts to be far too elaborate in the immediate 
aftermath of a disaster (Email Correspondence Netherlands DVI, 2017; Interview 
HW, 2017; Interview EA, 2017). The Dutch DVI teams have created what they 
refer to as a ‘Quick-Form’ to help speed up the preliminary match before asking 
families to complete the more extensive INTERPOL form. This, the Belgian DVI 
Leader explained, was to speed up the identification process, however the 
Belgium authorities did not use it themselves in the aftermath of the Brussels 
terrorist attacks (Email Correspondence Netherlands DVI, CB, 2017). 
 
The lack of policy and guidance in relation to identifying the incapacitated 
unknown patient makes the use of DVI (used for identifying the deceased) an 
uncomfortable alternative to the current arrangements. When the question was 
raised with UK DVI experts in interviews regarding the use of DVI in circumstances 
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with living patients, there was an acknowledgement of apprehension regarding the 
potential legal implications. One DVI expert admitted:  
 
My view is that it would be what the man on the street or the average man 
would expect”, but he added, “… but there are civil liberties issues… the 
challenge is not how we do it. It’s the legal challenge which will allow us to 
do it (Interview HW, 2016).  
 
This highlights that it is not the physical application of DVI that is a barrier but the 
perception of the legality of its use with the living. For the UK DVI teams, this 
response justified the avoidance of any action in terms of investigating potential 
solutions to the issue. 
 
Despite the excellent examples of where DVI protocols have been used and 
embedded in mass casualty arrangements (for the living) in both France and 
Belgium, there is still a fundamental lack of progress and therefore a barrier 
towards the implementation of DVI nationally in the UK and internationally. 
Notwithstanding the lessons and findings presented at the UK DVI National 
Conference on 22 February 2017, UK DVI has still not created a protocol to 
implement the use of DVI with the living as standard practice. On an international 
scale, INTERPOL has also not made any progress to incorporate the lessons 
learned from Nice or Belgium:  
 
 Please be informed that there is still no INTERPOL recommendation on 
 how to proceed with unconscious victims as the Working Group on DVI did 
 not agree on a joint standard (Email Correspondence INTERPOL HQ DVI, 
 July 2018).  
 
As explained in Chapter Three, there is an online DVI computer application (Plass 
data) which, in addition to its standard DVI forms has a specific form for Person 
Unable to Self-Identify, but as yet neither the UK nor INTERPOL have developed a 
corresponding recommended protocol for its use with DVI teams. Nor have they 
implemented suggestions from the Dutch DVI teams with respect to a simplified 
DVI Missing ‘Quick-Form’. Furthermore, despite the meeting with NHS England in 
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the summer of 2017 to discuss the issue of the identification of incapacitated 
patients and safeguarding of children, no UK national guidance has been provided 
to Acute Trusts or EPOs to update plans. Nor has any guidance requesting that 
individual hospital trusts remove any reference to the use of visual identification 
been given (see Chapter Three). In addition, no response has been received from 
NHS England Emergency Preparedness Response and Recovery (EPRR) 




9.4.2 Medical Responders  
 
In terms of the responsibility for identifying an incapacitated patient, it was clear 
that at least some clinicians were aware that this is a police remit, as confirmed by 
one clinician:  
 
This is a police [stressed] responsibility. This is not primarily a health 
responsibility… During a major incident and indeed day to day things, 
identifying and tracing people is very much a police responsibility. We 
would work with them, we would support them to do that… I would have no 
issues with that [using DVI to identify individuals] … I can’t comment on 
Trust policy, but I would have no issue (Interview Clinician NT, 2017).  
 
 
Another senior clinician agreed: 
 
…exactly as we do now with the unidentified patients. We tell the police. 
They look at the clothing, personal effects and description and look for 
missing persons list and conduct a police investigation. We get unknown 
people collapsing on station platforms, on buses at regular intervals. Law 
enforcement’s job is difficult in the wider sense, but they have dedicated 
police officers whose job it is to determine the identity, and have it fed into 
the process. Do what you do in a day to day basis but during a disaster you 
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just take some short cuts…. It would have to be adjusted as the police are 
busy but it’s normal business (Interview Clinician DAMD, 2016).  
 
Similarly, the viewpoint of a paramedic was:  
 
Being brutally honest, it wouldn’t be our area of concern. If they were that 
seriously injured and unidentified, we wouldn’t waste time going through 
their pockets to identity them, it would be something that would be done in 
hospital. It will nearly always be done through the casualty clearing bureau 
to find out who people are. It certainly wouldn’t be one of my priorities in 
pre-hospital care (Interview Paramedic JB, 2016). 
 
Relatedly, as noted in previous chapters, medical teams did not inform the police 
when an unknown patient was being treated despite hospital policies (see Figure 
14) stating the requirement for cooperation between the two services. It could be 
argued that while both policy and protocol exist for medical teams there is a clear 
gap in the training and exercising which enforces this engagement across 
organisations and therefore is a barrier to the identification of an incapacitated 
person. As outlined in the previous chapters, it is not necessarily that the policies 
are wrong, there are also examples where the police and clinical teams similarly 
failed to follow the legal requirements in terms of cooperation and partnership 
working as outlined in the CCA 2004 (s.3.2). 
 
An analysis of hospital policies found that hospitals generally signposted to the 
MCA Code of Practice (Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2007) or their own 
Codes of Conduct regarding consent (see Appendix XIII). These policies state that 
if there was doubt as to whether an individual cannot consent and clinicians and/or 
families (where present) cannot reach agreement on their treatment and care, the 
matter should be referred to a Court Appointed Deputy and the Court of Protection 
(CoP) will decide. Where the MI plan referred to the identification of victims (as 





9.4.3 The Courts 
The MCA 2005 sets out the expectation that others are consulted to take into 
account their views as to what the incapacitated person’s best interests might be. 
These individuals may be a person chosen by the individual lacking capacity, e.g. 
an appointed Attorney acting as a Lasting Power of Attorney; someone who has 
been engaged with their care and welfare (such as a parent or care home); or any 
Court Appointed Deputy chosen by the Court of Protection (CoP) to make 
decisions on their behalf (DoH, 2009b). 
 
The cases of SSHD v Sergei Skripal and SSHD v Yulia Skripal14, demonstrate 
how the CoP can guide responders in terms of an incapacitated patient’s best 
interests in the absence of consent or proxies. The Skripals were incapacitated 
and incapable of consenting to further blood samples being taken. Although this 
procedure was not considered a medical necessity, it was considered to be in their 
best interest and was what the CoP decided a reasonable person in their position 
would expect. The judge in this case made the decision based on what a 
reasonable citizen might wish. However, he still consulted the clinicians in terms of 
the treatment and prognosis and what the outcome of any decision taken might 
have on the patient.  
 
To establish how the CoP might be able to assist specifically in relation to an 
incapacitated and unknown individual, the local Court Appointed Deputies were 
contacted by telephone to gather their views on a hypothetical case. The question 
was referred to senior members of their team in the South West. However, from 
the responses it was apparent that there was little understanding of how they 
might help or what their role might be in these specific circumstances. 
Furthermore, the protracted nature of gathering a response led the Author to 
question whether this delay might prove to be a significant barrier in the event of 









The findings presented in this chapter may come as no great revelation to many 
emergency responders. The barriers to learning demonstrated above help to 
explain why even the most obvious of errors repeatedly occur, such as 
miscommunication between organisations. As highlighted by Toft and Reynolds 
(2005), alongside other academics and subject-matter experts (Coles, 2014; 
Norris and Shephard, 2017; Wright and Gibbens, 2018), if an inquiry panel or 
organisation fails to scrutinise the systemic failures and does not attempt to 
identify the latent defects within a system, the same errors will keep recurring. 
 
Ambiguous plans, policies and misinterpretations of the law can lead to mistakes 
being made in determining an incapacitated person’s identity. The belief that the 
police would be committing an act of battery under the OAPA or invading a 
patient’s privacy under the HRA could be argued to be due to a lack of clarity in 
the law and misinterpretation of the law by the individuals themselves. Observing 
DVI teams during EUR demonstrated a perceived barrier that the process they use 
to identify the deceased cannot legally be used for the living. In addition, during 
correspondence with DVI experts, it became clear that there is a reluctance to 
consider that DVI teams are lawfully able to resolve this issue in the disaster 
aftermath (Interview HW DVI, 2016; Interview EA DVI, 2017; Email 
correspondence INTERPOL HQ, 2017). Yet, despite the lacuna in the laws 
relating to consent and assault and the specifics of determining an unconscious 
patient’s identity, the law would not hinder a process which is considered a 
medical necessity and is done in the best interest of the patient. This was a 
fundamental component to this thesis and the research objective (RO3) relating to 
the medico-legal barriers to the implementation of DVI. It could be argued that the 
use of DVI to determine an individual’s identity might be considered a positive right 
in terms of aiming to achieve a higher standard of health under Article 2 of the 
HRA, the right to life. As Laurie et al. (2016) argue, by doing so there would be a 
greater likelihood of achieving respect (in terms of this right) than of the potential 
negative right of invading privacy. The process would be in the patient’s best 
interest and a necessity for their mental wellbeing and, importantly, determining a 
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patient’s identity is essential for gaining access to the patient’s own medical 
records. Furthermore, the judgement in the case of Montgomery v Lanarkshire15  
highlights the need for decisions to be made in light of what a reasonable person 
would expect and what a civil society would require in the given circumstances.  
 
This chapter has presented the empirical data highlighting the perceived and real 
barriers to the implementation of DVI. Yet none of these barriers suggests a 
significant blockage and therefore the already established DVI protocol could be 
used as a suitable method to identify a critically injured unknown patient. The next 
chapter presents the findings regarding organisational learning, specifically if and 
how lessons have been identified in regard to patient identification.  
  
 












An important finding that emerged as an outcome of analysing the Incubation 
Period concerned the ability to, first, identify errors and second, learn from those 
errors. Chapter Six looked at the literature surrounding organisational learning, 
particularly learning from incidents and accidents. This chapter presents the data 
relating to whether lessons have been identified in regard to patient identification 
and looks at how the lessons and any changes have been instigated. It 
establishes whether UK responders are learning from other responder 
organisations (where failures have been identified) and what changes, guidelines 
or processes are being actioned as a result. There is already a growing number of 
articles looking at how organisations learn and how they attempt to learn, including 
a plethora of articles looking at why organisations fail to learn (Reason, 1997; Toft 
and Reynolds, 2005; Coles, 2014; Pollock, 2017). This section adds to the growing 
literature and draws on the positive implementation of changes seen in France and 
Belgium. It also offers recommendations to the emergency response domain, and 
in particular DVI teams internationally, relating to the novel use of DVI in a hospital 
setting. This is an area of response, which although discussed in meetings and 
conferences, such as the UK DVI Conference February 2017 and the Cabinet 
Office Mass Casualty Training event in June 2017, was until recently untried and 
untested in the UK. Despite the infrequency of mass casualty events, and more 
specifically instances of misidentification, there is a need recognise that a problem 
exists within this area and that steps need to be taken across the organisational 
response to improve current practice. In addition, there needs to be constant 
reflection, or double loop learning (see s.6.2.2), as to how the law can be applied 
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in practice, specifically in the areas of consent and privacy and with it an 
improvement in the practice and use of DVI in hospital settings, where the issue of 
consent creates a barrier to its use. The findings presented here need to be 
shared nationally and internationally and incorporated into active and double loop 
learning and not simply restricted to presentations, emails and what is classed as 




10.2 Passive and Active Learning 
 
10.2.1 Passive Learning 
Although there have been exceptional cases of police using DNA sampling in 
hospital settings to identify criminals (personal correspondence with police officers, 
2016-2018), according to the police interviewed (UK Police Interviews 2016, 2017) 
the use of DVI as a holistic identification procedure in a hospital environment with 
living patients was, until 2017, an untested area of disaster response. The events 
in Paris (2015), Brussels (2017) and Nice (2017) highlighted a gap in the planning 
for and response to mass casualty and fatality procedures that needed (and 
arguably still needs) filling. From a UK perspective, these lessons, identified by 
European counterparts, were shared via emails and telephone conversations and 
presented to UK DVI team members at the National DVI Annual Conference held 
in London, UK in February 2017. This conference enabled international DVI team 
members to share their experiences, both positive and negative, from a range of 
events over the course of the year. Incidents such as the Shoreham Air Disaster 
and the Tunisian Terrorist Attacks were presented by subject-matter experts and 
their experiences of being deployed to implement DVI procedures, to identify the 
deceased, shared. It was at this event that the lessons learned from terrorist 
attacks in Belgium, Paris and Nice helped to build on the relatively rare 
phenomenon of DVI being used in a hospital setting. This method of information 
sharing and opportunity for learning from international agencies offers a passive 
style of learning and, as reflected in the literature review (s.6.2.1.1), does not 
afford the best technique to ensure learning is absorbed and assimilated. More 
importantly, passive learning does little to develop remedial action to rectify the 
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identified lessons. However, it did result in the opportunity to present the Author’s 
initial findings on misidentification and to witness other presentations to the 
responder network and build relationships with those with first-hand experience, 
thereby enabling opportunities for active learning in future events. 
 
The terrorist attacks in the UK in 2017 highlighted a need for this learning to be 
more actively embedded in both hospitals and police units across the country. This 
stemmed from a concern raised by clinicians after the Manchester bombings. The 
media reports and personal correspondence with clinicians in the wake of these 
attacks demonstrated a discomfort in treating patients without identification. 
Furthermore, the treatment of minors without consent highlighted a serious failure 
to safeguard children. As such, the issue was raised by the Author at national level 
to NHS England to flag this as an area of concern. This was followed by a meeting 
to discuss the current position with respect to the lack of guidance relating to 
unidentified individuals and to inform the UK National Emergency Preparedness, 
Resilience and Response (EPRR) team of the lessons identified internationally 
and to share learning. To establish the underlying concerns with respect to 
unidentified casualties, a thorough breakdown of the problem and 
recommendations for implementation into national policy were presented by the 
Author (see s.11.6). In response, the meeting organiser simply wrote:  
 
Many thanks to Dani for meeting with us yesterday, a useful meeting with 
lots of food for thought. As discussed, we will reflect on this and issues from 
the other pieces of work ongoing and then look at next steps (Email 
Correspondence with Head of NHS EPRR, 2017). 
Despite not being contacted again to take this subject further, the EPRR held a 
training exercise, titled Exercise Little Problem (NHS England, 2017a), with a 
group of NHS acute care teams in November 2017. The only reference to 
identification issues related to children:  
Identification of casualties will be problematic for unaccompanied minors 
and procedures must adhere to safeguarding and police protocols including 
management of consent (NHS England, 2017a, 9).  
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The report nominated acute trusts and ambulance personnel as those responsible 
for addressing this issue. There was no mention of what the police protocols might 
be in these circumstances and no reference to or guidance on how consent would 
be gained for unidentified persons and unaccompanied minors. These points 
mirrored the issues seen by medical staff in the wake of the Manchester bombing. 
However, despite the lack of supplementary information and guidance, this does 
demonstrate that the issue is receiving some acknowledgment and raising 
awareness, albeit passively, across some UK regions. 
Remarkably, in the same month as Exercise Little Problem, NHS England 
released the Concept of Operations for Managing Mass Casualties (NHS England, 
2017b). Despite aiming to provide a more detailed level of guidance to first 
responders, there was no mention in the document of the identification of 
incapacitated patients or to the matters pertaining to treatment without consent. 
Whether Exercise Little Problem was a prelude to a more detailed piece of work 
relating to identification issues is unclear, as nothing has been published. 
Nevertheless, under the title of ‘Provision of Services’, the NHS Concept of 
Operations document states: 
During an incident that results in mass casualties the normal arrangements 
that the organisation has to ensure that those that are difficult to 
communicate with or have specialist needs may increase due to the range 
of casualties. Plans developed should take this into account and allow for 
support services, e.g. for disabilities and language issues to be overcome. 
Organisations should adhere to their own arrangements for reducing 
inequalities in the access to treatment and healthcare in the immediate 
response and long-term care needs (NHS England, 2017b, 12).  
This paragraph demonstrates that little has been done to address the legal or 
ethical issues relating to incapacitated and unidentified individuals. It appears that 
this particular category of patient is not considered. For example, the line referring 
to patients that “are difficult to communicate with” could be simply referring to 
language barriers or speech impediments. It does not provide helpful guidance for 
hospital staff and responders to enable them to resolve what is arguably a more 
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challenging aspect of the response, in terms of disaster management and 
preparedness for all casualties and their families.  
These passive forms of learning or sharing learning are not, it is argued, enabling 
organisations to understand and test the inherent issues with casualty 
identification; these are classic examples of single loop learning. The 
organisations are not questioning the underlying values, beliefs and initial 
assumptions (Agrys, 1999), they are merely repeating a formulaic process of 
incident management exercising. However, these possibly constitute a significant 
step towards introducing a plan based on a finding within the exercise itself (such 
as patient reconciliation) which can be implemented and could therefore lead to 
important opportunities for active learning. Furthermore, a potential benefit of 
passive learning mechanisms could be that they enable a double loop learning 
whereby the thoughts and processes are developed in advance of applying the 
scenario in an active learning format. From personal experience in the emergency 
planning domain, this is often an approach taken by EPOs who wish to ensure 
that, first, the plan is read and second, the plan is then discussed in a less 
pressurised table-top exercise before, third, being applied in a live exercise, which 
is generally a more public and potentially humiliating experience to get wrong. A 
review conducted into pre-hospital responses determined that the ability for 
hospitals to train regularly alongside other emergency services was an essential 
requirement for preparation in advance of a real incident (Cooke et al., 2017).  
 
 
10.2.2 Active Learning 
As emphasised in Section 6.1.1.2, active learning is a far more effective method of 
ensuring lessons are retained in organisations. Both EUR and Exercise Lock 
provided excellent opportunities to practise and test first responder arrangements. 
Being actively involved in determining identities and discussing how an individual’s 
identity might be established was made all the more real by using actors to 
represent the casualties and to situate the context of the issue within a realistic 
scenario. This hands-on approach, in a realistic environment, offered an excellent 
opportunity for responders to practise and test the processes and protocols 
established in their MI plans. However, in terms of the incapacitated individual, it 
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highlighted that there was no plan in place and made the lack of a protocol stand 
out as a clear learning concern. The benefit of a ‘live’ incident over that of a table-
top exercise is that it offers an opportunity to operate in a simulated environment 
which adds levels of complexity and chaos not seen in a desk-top environment. 
This was demonstrated in EUR, where participants had to wear full PPE and carry 
out their functions in very low temperatures and restricted spaces. This contrasted 
with sitting around a table in a warm and comfortable environment and making 
decisions on how an individual should be treated and cared for.  
 
Likewise, in Exercise Lock, if an individual needed to pass information to and from 
Silver Command (s.3.2.1), it would require the physical effort of moving to the 
telephone, finding the correct number and then attempting to speak to the right 
person. The use of mobile telephones in hospitals by staff is not considered 
normal protocol, especially as reception within old buildings tends to be sporadic 
at best. This was vastly different to asking an individual across a table and 
authenticated a more protracted process which cannot be rushed. This in turn has 
knock-on effects for patient management and clinical care and welfare, which from 
past experience can often be overlooked in table-top and passive learning 




10.3 Levels of Learning 
 
10.3.1 Isomorphic Learning 
As established in Chapter Six, there are four proposed ways in which an 
organisation may learn from disasters or accidents; event isomorphism, cross 
organisational isomorphism, common mode isomorphism and self-isomorphism 
(Toft and Reynolds, 2005; Kim, 2016). To ensure isomorphic learning has taken 
place, organisations need to demonstrate that learning has occurred beyond that 
of its own organisation. 
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The exercises and real incidents in 2016 and 2017 provided opportunities for all 
types of isomorphic learning. Exercise Lock was an excellent example of cross-
organisational isomorphism and demonstrated how active learning can be 
implemented and achieved. Feedback from the exercise was shared by the 
Hospital EPO with the London Resilience Forum, a part of the national strategic 
mechanism for sharing information about the National Risk Register and 
emergency planning and management. Each region has a Resilience Forum 
attended by all Category 1 responders, as discussed in Chapter Three. This 
provided an opportunity for them to reflect on their own arrangements. This in turn 
led to the Hospital EPO being asked to present at the National NHS England 
Conference to share the lessons learned, not only from Exercise Lock but also the 
hospital’s responses to Grenfell and the other incidents that took place in the 
previous months in London. Whilst this demonstrated passive learning, as 





10.3.1.1 Event Isomorphism 
Errors in identification can occur in numerous ways, yet the successes and failures 
identified in each provide opportunities for learning despite the differences in the 
events themselves. A road traffic accident, such as the one that occurred in the 
Cerak and Van Ryn (CE-B) example can result in the same errors as those seen 
in a larger scale mass casualty and  fatality event, such as the failures identified 
following the Paris attacks in 2015 (CE-E).  
 
The events in 2017, despite the heavy price to pay, have resulted in some 
constructive changes in a few hospitals. As reflected by one Hospital EPO, in the 
aftermath of the 2017 terrorist attacks:  
 
One of my brave Directors has asked that we start doing some no notice 
live activation exercises on one of my sites, as she wants us to improve the 
first hour, as she said, once we get into the swing of things it is good, but 
that first stage is crazy. So, they might send me crazy, but [it] will be a really 
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good way to keep embedding the changes to the initial process we have 
made (Email Correspondence Hospital EPO MW, 2018).  
 
It can therefore be seen that, in some cases, these iconic events force 
organisations to make time to actively test and exercise their plans as a way of 
preventing failures in the future. This demonstrates that for some there is an 
element of foresight, double loop learning and a preparedness that occurs and that 
some lessons are in fact identified and acted on. 
 
 
10.3.1.2 Common Mode Isomorphism 
EUR demonstrated a larger scale example of common mode isomorphic learning. 
International European emergency response agencies were invited to test not only 
their own MI plans, but also the international disaster working arrangements in a 
non-terrorist related incident. This latter aspect plays an important role in that the 
suspected involvement of a terrorist creates a different level of response, with 
differing legal remits of the police and counter-terrorism branches.  
 
Establishing an incident which was a man-made disaster without terrorist 
implications enabled ‘normal’ response protocols to be tried and tested. Terrorist 
incidents, although man-made, vary significantly in terms of the response. The 
premise of terrorist incident management concentrates initially on the terrorism 
aspect of prevention of further attacks and criminal investigations. Furthermore, 
specialist police and military units are generally involved with firearms, which adds 
further dimensions of risks and hazards not normally associated with fires and 
technical disasters and so on. The findings from this exercise demonstrated that 
the same issues, communication and information sharing difficulties, are reflected 
on a wider scale and therefore offer an opportunity for learning and input from a 
larger community of responders. This was highlighted as a major advantage in the 
‘EUR Evaluation Conference’ in October 2016 and the corresponding 
documentation. 
 
The head of Belgium’s DVI team, CD, admitted that the response by his DVI 
teams in the wake of the Brussels terrorist attacks was greatly enhanced due to 
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the learning that took place in EUR the week before the attack in Brussels 
(personal discussion at the UK DVI National Conference on the 22 February 
2017). Although the circumstances were different to those presented in the 
exercise, the ability to refresh their response protocols during EUR, including 
testing equipment and working in sub-optimal disaster arrangements (which are 
not very often tested), allowed the Belgium DVI team to feel more comfortable and 
confident in their approach. Furthermore, the sharing of lessons that took place 
during EUR helped to ensure that the unconscious and unidentified patients in the 
Brussels attacks were correctly identified using DVI. CB was then able to share his 
lessons learned with the international DVI community at the annual DVI 
conference and at INTERPOL meetings in the months following. This 
demonstrates the power of isomorphic learning and its essential use in training 
and exercising staff for these types of incidents. 
 
 
10.3.1.3 Self Isomorphism 
Exercise Lock was specifically designed to test the organisation’s own MI plan. 
The hospital EPO and Medical Director spent a considerable amount of time 
developing the exercise for their own staff. In an interview with the hospital EPO 
following Exercise Lock, it was discovered that training is offered throughout the 
year to all staff, both clinical and managerial. However, this exercise was an 
opportunity to test the MI plan and the protocols established concerning mass 
casualty events specifically focused around marauding terrorism. As noted in 
Chapter Two, the exercise would also test a newly refurbished and unopened area 
of the hospital, thereby allowing normal business to continue.  
 
The terrorist attack on Westminster Bridge in the preceding month (March 2017) 
had provided the additional impetus to do a live hospital-based exercise as 
opposed to a smaller scale table-top. This allowed a more active and double loop 
learning approach to test an area of MI response which was unfamiliar to staff. 
Outside organisations were invited to participate as a means to ensure hospital 
staff knew how to engage with those critical responders and how their roles fitted 
within the plan. Although the participating organisations (Metropolitan Police 
(including UK DVI) and London Ambulance Service) could use the opportunity to 
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reflect on their individual plans, the purpose was to test the hospital’s own plans 
concerning those partner organisations. For example, where the plan refers to 
police documentation teams, it would be expected, first, that staff should know that 
an individual from the ED had been given the specific role of police liaison with an 
associated action card (see Figure 15). This individual should be aware of the 
police team’s function within the hospital MI response. Second, staff should know 
how the police documentation team can be notified and called to attend, hence 
this is not specified within the action card. Third, there should be clear protocols on 
how the documentation team and staff should operate in a MI. The action card 
provided to hospital staff may give a general overview of their role, yet it does not 
provide the necessary detail regarding the role of the attending police and their 
associated tasks. This may explain why there was ambiguity and confusion as to 
why the police may be located within an ED. Furthermore, it is possible that this 
information is provided in training, however, as demonstrated in the exercise, there 
was no awareness of this aspect at all. By testing the plan, these issues can be 
identified, rectified and avoided in future. 
 
The outcome of Exercise Lock demonstrated that no staff member was allocated 
this police liaison role, or at least the role was not fulfilled in any obvious manner. 
Therefore, the rest of the responding staff did not know why the police should be 
there and the automatic assumption was that they were waiting for the criminal 
element of the exercise to be played out – in this case the potential arrest of the 
marauding terrorist. This could imply that staff were unfamiliar with their MI plan. 
This active learning approach would therefore need to highlight lessons for future 
change. Despite the negative outcome on the day, this finding enabled an element 
of active learning through failure. This could have the benefit of providing a 
learning outcome for those staff involved and could mean that these staff were 
less likely to repeat the error in the future. The incidents in the UK in 2017 
confirmed this finding in that the police officers who did attend the hospitals:  
 
…did not do a lot because, not only did hospital staff not know their reason 
for being in A&E, but their own police training on the fell short 
(Conversational Interview UK DVI, 2017). [A&E or Accident and Emergency 
Departments were all ‘rebranded’ in 2003 to be called Emergency 
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Departments to reduce the numbers of minor injuries and non-emergency 
ailments (Revill, 2003). However, the term A&E is still commonly used by 
responders.] 
 
This reflects the findings regarding the lack of attendance at training and exercises 
and demonstrates a need for this to be considered by organisations (Sinclair et al., 
2012). 
 
It was also noted that the undercurrent of terrorism and the need for security 
meant that “they [the police] were armed and there for a very different reason” 
(Hospital EPO 6, 2018). Patient identification and tracking during these events 
were notably absent, and this would imply that there is more that needs to be done 
to improve this specific element of casualty tracking and identification. 
 
Reflecting on EA’s experiences in the Paris attacks initiated a wider process of 
change and a desire by EA to raise awareness amongst those not only at 
ministerial level but also at grassroots, emergency responder level both nationally 
and internationally. EA shared her experience with international colleagues at 
meetings. That shared learning resulted in the Prosecutor Office in Belgium and 
the Belgium DVI Team adopting a stance which used DVI in the identification of 
four unconscious individuals following the Brussels terrorist attacks in 2016. IVW 
stated in her presentation to the DVI community:  
 
One family were sitting next to a family member who they weren’t sure was 
in fact family and I was not prepared to have the same mistakes made in 
Paris repeated here (IVW presenting at the DVI Conference, 2017).  
 
Again, these experiences were shared with the UK DVI Conference in February 
2017, which also had DVI representatives from other countries. IVW and CB 
explained that, despite the chaos of the events, which were similar to Paris in 
terms of multiple locations, their teams successfully implemented the DVI process 
in hospitals. They had been adamant that there would be no errors in the 
identification process and ultimately that their staff would not be affected or 
blamed in the aftermath. 
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The marauding terrorist attack which took place in July 2016 in Nice, France, gave 
the opportunity for the French DVI team to correct the misperceptions created 
during the 2015 Paris attacks. It became, as EA described it, “an obsession”. 
Referring to the forms and process: 
 
 We simplified it [the DVI process] because our obsession was for first 
responders not [stressed] to put names on the victims. Be it a dead victim 
or unconscious victim… there is absolutely no space for identity wherever 
and on the other side of the sheet we also say very clearly that they 
shouldn’t put any identity (Interview EA, 2017).  
 
First responders in the hot zone had no opportunity to add an assumed identity 
based on personal effects to the form. Therefore, DVI teams used scientifically 
accurate methods to determine identities and did not rely on assumptions made in 
what would have been a complex and challenging environment. However, EA 
hastened to add that there needed to be an element of reasonableness despite 
the desire for change, stating, “but we shouldn’t go too far the other way round...” 
(Interview EA, 2017). This was an interesting point to make, especially given the 
negative media scrutiny on getting identification wrong and despite the clear 
psychosocial harm she and her team suffered as a result of being blamed. There 
was no fanatical demand for all aspects of visual identification to be discounted. 
She explained her reasoning for taking a pragmatic approach as a way of 
prioritising the victims with the greatest probabilities of being resolved: 
  
…if you have an identity card, and if you have a next of kin saying this is my 
brother and his name is X, it allows you to Fast Track. Because then when 
the body arrives at the Medico Legal Institute you see the paper on the 
body bag, you see that it is noticed that this person had an identity card and 
the name on the card was blah blah blah, so you can process him first and 
you can enter into contact with the member of the family first… so the family 
won’t wait for too long (Interview EA, 2017). 
 
This, she explained, was not an automatic assumption that the name equated to 
the body, it merely enabled a prioritisation which would allow the teams to rule out 
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those with a greater likelihood of being a match early on. These occasions 
demonstrated a clear example of common mode isomorphic learning and a 
reflection on the failures and successes of the organisations.  
 
Nevertheless, despite the changes suggested by France and Belgium, there have 
been numerous cases of unidentified unconscious victims being admitted to 
hospitals in 2018 (see Appendix I). In each of these cases visual identification in 
the form of photographs to the media have been used to attempt to find family 







Simply identifying errors and recommending changes does little to provide the 
impetus to enforce change within an establishment. The event itself may spark a 
type of event isomorphism that is repeated after the publication of a high-profile 
government report and the media frenzy that follows a mass casualty and fatality 
event. These often enable some of the lessons identified to be acted on, as seen 
in France and Belgium. However, as noted in this thesis, the lessons are not 
shared widely, and the risks are considered too remote for local organisations to 
embed, despite the initial flurry of concern.  
 
Whether the changes to DVI in France and Belgium continue to be used remains 
to be seen. However, as yet, there has been no such impetus in the UK to drive 
change, other than a few presentations and emails between a handful of 
responders. Both the police and those responsible for the care and treatment of 
the living incapacitated need to take a much more proactive stance. By being 
reminded of and understanding the numerous factors identified in the Incubation 
Period, as outlined in Chapters Four and Seven, these responders can help share 
the responsibility for implementing change in this niche response area and enable 
an isomorphic, multi-agency learning programme that incorporates both passive 
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and active learning. This would then enable organisational learning, or specifically 
the:  
 
…cumulative, reflective, saturating process through which all personnel 
within organisations learn to understand and continually reinterpret the 
world in which they work by means of the organisational experiences to 
which they are exposed (Toft and Reynolds, 2005, 29). 
 
The following chapter draws upon the themes presented in the last four chapters 
and critically analyses the evidence. The findings accumulated as a result of 
qualitative ethnographic work combining interviews, observations and doctrinal 
analysis have all contributed to a thorough understanding of the feasibility of using 
DVI with living patients. An understanding of how the errors occur and the 
consequences of such failures are discussed. Importantly, this thesis has sought 
to understand the barriers to implementing DVI as an expanded protocol and why 












11.1 Introduction  
 
The research question of this thesis was to establish whether the challenges 
presented by the identification of incapacitated patients in mass casualty and 
fatality events can be resolved by using the scientifically accurate and 
internationally recognised protocols of DVI (RQ). Four key objectives were outlined 
which guided the research. First, to understand how the identification errors 
occurred (RO1); second, the implications of these errors with specific emphasis on 
the psychosocial harms to responders (RO2); third, what the barriers to 
implementing DVI from the responders’ perspective are, including any legal issues 
(RO3); and, finally, to scrutinise how the lessons relating to patient identification 
errors and the use of DVI have been instigated by UK responders (RO4). Chapter 
Three explained the practicalities of using DVI techniques with the living as well as 
the deceased. The research question and objectives guided the qualitative 
research process in the field, interviews and document review. This Chapter draws 
on the evidence associated with each of the objectives outlined above to discuss 
the solutions, challenges and barriers to identifying critically injured unknown 
patients and whether these can be resolved using DVI.  
 
The applications within the DVI process, including DNA, fingerprinting and 
odontology, are the proposed technical solutions to ensure critically injured 
unknown patients are accurately identified. There are three reasons as to why DVI 
should be used. First, the individual DVI techniques are already utilised and 
established in the UK, albeit solely for the identification of the deceased in mass 
fatality disasters.  Second, the DVI process ensures accuracy of identification 
through the Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation and Validation (ACE-V) of the 
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individual primary identifiers. Third, the accurate identification of patients will 
minimise harm to patients, their families and responders. 
 
However, the technical application of DVI on its own will not guarantee that 
critically injured patients are accurately identified. As this thesis has demonstrated, 
there are a number of important factors which establish that it is how the DVI 
process is embedded in the overall mass casualty and fatality response phase that 
will determine the successful identification of an unknown patient. To improve the 
accurate identification and management of critically injured and unidentified 
patients, four key requirements are suggested.  Each of the requirements outlined 
below are incumbent on the other to ensure that a comprehensive improvement to 
the identification of critically injured persons is achieved.  
 
This chapter looks at each requirement in turn to discuss and critique the 
challenges to implementing DVI into the mass casualty and fatality response 
arrangements. The first section discusses how the issue of misidentification and 
identification errors can be shared and acknowledged. It includes a need to 
capture and report data and learning regarding unknown individuals admitted to 
hospitals. The second challenge concerns the implementation of or amendment to 
plans, policies and protocols regarding the unknown patient and how such an 
individual can be accurately identified. The third section conducts an analysis of 
the application of the plans above, including the importance of training, exercising 
and testing the plans across the multi-agency arena. The penultimate section 
discusses the importance of senior management engagement and the implications 





11.2  Awareness and Reporting 
 
Chapter Seven looked at how individuals can be mistakenly identified and the 
findings demonstrated that there are numerous causative factors which can 
 195 
contribute to the Incubation Period in a mass casualty and fatality incident. It is 
evident that visual identification methods and personal effects continue to be used 
in current practice. Furthermore, the misconception that visual identification is an 
acceptable method to confirm identity has for years underpinned the causation of 
errors. These visual identification failures are compounded by numerous other 
factors, as evidenced in Chapter Seven. These include the variable disjunction of 
information between responders and those desperately searching for relatives, 
which adds to the complexity of the scene. In addition, the emphasis on physical 
treatment to those injured, it is argued, results in the emotional wellbeing of the 
individual being demoted or ignored. Those who may be in a position to help 
alongside the clinical treatment are being unheeded due to organisational 
exclusivity and conflicting goals and hierarchical issues.  
 
 
11.2.1 Awareness of Visual Identification and Personal Effects 
As demonstrated in Chapters Six and Ten, the awareness of the errors which can 
lead to mistaken identification and the consequences of misidentification of 
critically injured patients is lacking. Before a plan and accompanying policy can be 
developed comprehensively, it is important that a basic understanding of the issue 
of misidentification, its causes and consequences are shared, discussed and 
solutions considered. Once organisations have an idea of the problem, they will be 
better equipped to identify and report the issue, leading to improved response 
arrangements and ultimately a better outcome for the patient, their family and the 
responders.  
 
The first problem regarding the issue of awareness relates to the actions taken at 
the incident or hot zone. This is where frontline paramedics and those responsible 
for entering the incident scene encounter casualties who need to be rapidly 
extracted from the hazardous area. This initial phase where there is a “gradually 
increasing, (and yet unrecognised), risk” of errors occurring (Dekker and Pruchniki, 
2013, 534) is referred to as the ‘Incubation Period’ (Turner, 1976; Toft and 
Reynolds, 2005). It is in this area where the hazards of the incident itself, the 
pressure the crews are under and the need to act quickly result in assumptions 
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regarding the individual and any personal effects on or near the person (see 
Appendix VI). If the incident is complex and demanding (as in the case of mass 
casualty and fatality incidents) the probabilities of making identification errors 
increase exponentially.  
 
To ensure the chances of identification errors are minimised, it is essential that a 
policy explicitly outlines that casualties found unaccompanied by a relative or 
friend, and who is unconscious, is labelled as “Unknown” on all documentation. 
This protocol was implemented by EA’s French DVI teams as a result of the errors 
encountered in Paris in 2015. As stated above, there may be an assumption that 
any personal effects, such as a wallet or handbag, are believed to belong to the 
individual (such as in the cases of Van Ryn and Cerak in 2006 (CE-B) and 
Campbell and Rand following the Boston Marathon attack in 2013 (CE-D)). It is 
essential that they are not used as confirmation of the patient’s identity, discussed 
in more detail in s.11.3.  
 
This thesis has demonstrated that identification errors can also still occur in the 
hospital setting at a later stage despite a patient being admitted as ‘Unknown’. The 
CE of Moulin (CE-E) and the Humboldt Broncos (CE-F) have demonstrated that 
hospital staff have assigned photographs of missing patients to the incapacitated 
patient in their care. As explained in Chapter Three, a patient who is incapacitated 
is very unlikely to look the same as they did prior to the incident. Differences will 
occur, not just because of the trauma sustained in the incident itself, but because 
the medical treatment of the patient, including fluids, bandages and drugs which 
help to relax the body and features, will alter their appearance (CE-A, CE-B). 
Therefore, a strict policy outlining that visual identification of any kind, including 
photographs or the insistence by relatives searching for missing family members, 
is to be avoided will help to prevent errors of this nature occurring.   
 
As demonstrated in Exercise Lock and stated in interviews with clinicians, there is 
also a lack of awareness of the significance of identification errors. The concern is 
for the immediate situation and not the medium or longer-term issues. The 
motivation is the urgent need to save life and provide medical treatment, factors 
that responders perceive are more significant. Furthermore, in some 
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circumstances, clinicians made attempts to minimise the emergent threat or, as 
Turner referred to it, tried to ‘sanitise their world of hazards’ (1976). The 
prioritisation of physical treatment effectively downgraded the need to assign 
identities and the lack thereof was not considered a risk of harm to their patient. In 
addition, the misconception and ambiguity about the accuracy and use of visual 
techniques contributes to how the threat is minimised. Awareness of the 
consequences of harm to the patient as a result of being unidentified needs to be 
shared across ED and critical care settings. Furthermore, there needs to be an 
acceptance of the organisation’s responsibility, in terms of notifying the agencies 
who can help reconcile the patient with their identity, and ultimately their family. In 
addition, as discussed later in s.11.3, clear protocols need to be developed 
outlining the importance of reporting cases of unknown patients. This should be 
coupled with a plan of action which is embedded into daily working arrangements, 
resulting in these events not being downplayed and instead becoming ‘business 
as normal’.  
 
 
11.2.2 Awareness of the Legality of Accurate Identification using DVI  
The legal uncertainty was the principal concern raised by DVI teams and junior 
clinicians as to why DVI is not adopted beyond the disaster mortuary. The police 
have believed that aspects of criminal and medical law prevent the use of DVI with 
living persons who cannot consent. However, the MCA 2005 explicitly states that 
in the case of an incapacitated patient, if a procedure is considered a medical 
necessity and, in the patient’s best interest, then consent is not required (s.9.3.1). 
Despite the initial ambivalence regarding the lack of identity of patients, as 
discussed above, once the consequences of mistaken identification were 
explained, there was general agreement that any and all action should be taken to 
help accurately assign an identity (s.9.4.2). 
 
There is clearly a need to explain that the application of DVI techniques, by those 
trained to use them, to determine identity will not constitute an assault under the 
OAPA 1861. As outlined in s.3.5.3.2, taking a DNA sample would involve a swab 
of the internal cheek of a patient. The assault would need to be considered as 
more than ‘trifling’ to be deemed assault, as outlined in an interview with a judge, 
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or considered unreasonable. It should be noted, however, that the underlying 
principle for requiring a technique such as a DNA test to be conducted by the 
police needs to be clearly communicated and as such be in the patient’s best 
interest in the circumstances. Misguided complacency regarding presumed 
consent needs to be carefully considered. This was especially true in 2016 and 
2017, which saw a number of challenges arising from police requests for samples 
in medical settings. However, in these circumstances, as agreed by clinicians, 
determining the identity of a patient for the purposes of reuniting them with their 
identity and ultimately their family, would not be seen as an unreasonable course 
of action. Similarly, fingerprints would be unlikely to be considered as an assault 
on the body, especially compared to the use of intrusive medical procedures such 
as blood samples and catheters in the course of medical treatment. The only 
aspect of DVI that would need careful consideration before its application would be 
the use of odontology. As described in s.3.5.3.3, the manipulation of the jaw to 
ascertain clear dental records, suitable for a qualified odontologist to use, would 
require some force and would be considered more than trifling. It is therefore 
suggested that the use of odontology is only used if absolutely necessary. 
 
It was also clear from the findings that there was a misapprehension, by both the 
police and the clinicians, regarding the application of DVI and the patient’s privacy. 
Concerns centred on the use of DNA and fingerprints, including how the data 
would be used, shared and stored. The laws underpinning this requirement include 
the Right to Privacy Article 8 under the HRA 1998 and the GDPR (2018). 
Responders will need to be aware that the GDPR guidance (European Patients 
Forum, 2018, 9) explicitly affirms that data can be used in this way and should 
offer credibility to the underlying principles of a patient’s best interest and the 
necessity to determine their identity. The retrieval of any data would be with the 
sole intention of determining identity and reuniting the individual with their 
relatives. There is an obligation to ensure that the parameters of the search using 
personal data are restricted, and that the information is only shared with those who 
require it to determine identity. To establish whether there is a match with a family, 
point to point comparison with data provided by the family, with their consent, 
would be necessary. The only caveat to this situation would be where the primary 
victim does not wish to be reunited with their relatives for whatever reason. This 
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argument would only be known if the person were conscious and able to raise the 
concern themselves, which negates the necessity for the process in the first place.  
 
In addition to the above, the HTA 2004 outlines the ways in which human tissue 
and organs can be stored. If the retrieval, analysis and disposal of remains are 
under the supervision and authority of the specialist DVI teams then the 
associated human tissue protocols would be the same for both the living and the 
deceased. In support of the arguments above, the HTA explicitly states that where 
adults lack capacity, practitioners should consider the MCA 2005 and the Code of 
Practice (Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2007) and “all decisions must be 
made in the person’s best interests as laid out in Chapter Five of the MCA Code of 
Practice” (HTA, 2017, 25). 
Misplaced ideas of the application of law coupled with the argument that no legal 
precedent has previously been established specifically for determining a patient’s 
identity have proven to be a barrier (Chapter Nine). However, criminal and medical 
law does in fact side with the patient’s best interests and what clinicians would 
determine as a necessity. Furthermore, the findings in Montgomery v Lanarkshire 
[2015]16 clearly support the justification from a reasonable person’s point of view, 
as determined by a judge. Therefore, this information would need to be shared 




11.2.3 Reporting Cases of Unknown Patients 
Throughout the course of this research (circa six years) not one individual 
interviewed has disputed the need to have their identity determined and, equally 
importantly, their family informed. However, there is a need to have clear statistical 
evidence of the true numbers of unidentified incapacitated patients and the 
associated errors in the identification process. As previously mentioned, it was 
evident that clinicians and other responders were unaware that individuals were 
being incorrectly identified, which highlights that these failings are not being 
reported and the learning not shared both nationally and internationally. Despite 
 
16 [2015] UKSC 11 
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the knowledge among DVI organisations and among members of INTERPOL that 
visual identification methods are inherently inaccurate with the deceased, this 
information is not widely shared beyond the realm of the identification of the 
deceased following mass fatality incidents. Without accurate reporting of unknown 
patient cases, responders will continue to make assumptions regarding personal 
effects or will continue to value the use of visual identification or the use of 
photographs to match unconscious individuals with relatives. Furthermore, the 
underlying, or seemingly unimportant, intangible errors in the Incubation Period 
may be missed, left unresolved and therefore re-occur as seen repeatedly in the 
contextual examples.  
 
Based on the empirical evidence and analysis of the findings, it is clear that 
hospitals will be best placed to capture instances of ‘unknown patient’ cases. To 
gather an accurate reflection of cases, it is suggested that any ‘unknown’ patient 
admitted for treatment is reported to a central database. Understanding the 
prevalence of cases will aid in the understanding of the phenomenon, contribute to 
the development of suitable protocols that can be interlinked with current hospital 
policies and ultimately assist in a successful outcome to quickly identity critically 
injured and unknown patients. In the event of a mass casualty and fatality incident, 
these cases should also be passed to the CB so that they may assist in the 
reconciliation process in line with the standard process of DVI used for the 
deceased. However, the reporting of such cases should not be restricted to major 
incidents and mass casualty events. As discussed in the findings and seen in the 
CE, smaller incidents can result in mistaken identification. A protocol that is widely 
used and accepted on a frequent basis will perform better in circumstances where 
the pressure and complexity of a mass casualty and fatality incident may make 
decision making more difficult, as discussed in Chapter Seven and Nine.  
 
A final recommendation regarding the reporting of individuals who are unknown or 
unidentified is that the same recommendation is implemented by mortuaries when 
a deceased individual without an identity is admitted (s.7.3.1; s.7.3.2). This 
information should be gathered centrally, and the details should be shared 
amongst those responsible for the management and care of the deceased on a 
daily basis. This will assist in building a better understanding of the phenomenon 
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regarding the identification of deceased beyond the mass fatality incident. 
Furthermore, it will potentially prevent identification errors where smaller incidents 
involving both the critically injured and the deceased may occur, such as in the 
Cerak and Van Ryn case (CE-B) or where there are two deceased of similar 
appearance such as the Northern Ireland case (CE-C). 
 
Developing an awareness of the problems associated with identification errors 
(RO1), as well as building an understanding of what can and cannot be achieved 
with regard to the laws which are relevant in these situations (RO3), is of utmost 
importance to ensuring the successful application of DVI to the living unknown 
patient (RQ). Furthermore, educating responders (RO4) about the consequences 
to not only the victim and their family, but importantly their own and their 
colleagues mental health and wellbeing (RO3), will result in less resistance to the 




11.3 Plans, Policies and Protocols 
 
Throughout the course of this study it has been noted that there remain 
inconsistencies in terms of planning and protocols surrounding the issue of 
identification. The research demonstrates that the plans and policies which should 
provide guidance on the issue do not adequately include reference to 
unidentifiable patients, despite international cases highlighting the risk, thereby 
minimising the problem. This is in part due to the ambiguity regarding the potential 
harms and the misconception of the law. Chapter Nine examined the barriers that 
prevented or inhibited the use of the DVI process being used to identify living 
unknown patients. It highlighted a misguided belief among responders that the use 
of DVI on the living would constitute an invasion of the patient’s privacy and 
commit assault or battery if the patients were unable to consent. Furthermore, the 
lack of organisational policy and clear legal guidance, certainly in the case of UK 
DVI, makes the use of DVI on living patients an uncomfortable alternative. 
However, analysis of UK criminal law and aspects of medical law relating to the 
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application of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, coupled with discussions with legal 
representatives and confirmed via senior clinical experts, has shown that the use 
of scientific means to determine a patient’s identity (to support the reconciliation 
process) is in fact a justifiable use, as summarised above. Finally, the relatively 
infrequent nature of mass casualty and fatality incidents and, in particular within 
these situations, the small numbers of unidentifiable patients, have meant that 
responders minimise the risk and downplay the potential for future events, 
effectively ignoring the need for prudence. Without implementing sound plans, the 
successful identification of living unknown persons would be beset with the errors 
and latent issues as reflected on throughout this thesis. First, there are cases 
where no plans exist because responders are unaware of the problem (s.7.4.2). 
This was observed in Exercise Lock when staff were unsure of the actions to be 
taken when a patient was admitted with no accompanying identity. Not having a 
plan will leave staff feeling unsure of their role, and may give a sense that the 
situation is out of their control and badly managed. This can result in psychosocial 
stress and harm, as noted in Chapter Eight. Secondly, a plan may exist but not be 
carried out correctly or at all, resulting in violations (s.7.4). Examples include the 
failure to adhere to a METHANE reporting mechanism or as demonstrated during 
Exercise Lock when ED staff failed to work with police documentation teams, as 
directed by the hospital major incident plan (Figure 15). This can result in 
relationships being damaged with consequences such as conflicting goals due to 
inadequate or incorrect information being shared (s.7.4.3). Lastly, it was noted that 
in some cases the plans in place were incorrect and resulted in errors occurring, 
such as the hospital plan signposting staff to use visual identification to determine 
a patient’s identity (Figure 14). 
 
The following section discusses the implementation of plans and policies which 
may help to address the lack of protocol regarding the successful identification of 
incapacitated unknown patients. 
 
 
11.3.1 Bronze Level Responders at the Scene 
As discussed in s.11.2 above and noted in the empirical evidence in s.7.4.4 and 
s.10.3.1.3, there is a fundamental lack of awareness of the issue surrounding 
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personal effects and their assumption as confirmation of identity. Similarly, the 
failure to correctly hand over patient details can result in mistakes occurring later 
on, as noted in s.7.2.3. Following analysis of the data, it is recommended that 
frontline responders amend their casualty handling procedure protocols to ensure 
that all unaccompanied and incapacitated patients are labelled ‘Unknown’ with an 
estimated age and sex of the patient until such point as they are handed over to 
hospital ED staff, who will assign the rest of the details on a temporary 
identification criteria (TIC) in line with the NHS Improvements guidance (2018a). 
Using Patient Stacey as an example, the paramedics would use the label 
“Unknown- 1 January 1977- FEMALE”. Stipulating this as a requirement will 
remove the ambiguity regarding these patients and will provide certainty in the 
responder’s role, thereby eliminating identification mistakes made at the scene. An 
alternative solution would be to follow the policy developed by EA and her DVI 
colleagues whereby the section regarding name and identity is removed entirely 
from the frontline responder documentation. Although this would ensure that 
frontline responders had no opportunity to add an assumed identity, it would 
require all frontline responder organisations to revise their documentation and may 
add an additional burden on responders away from the scene. However, there 
may be merit in the fact that frontline responders are then able to focus on the 
rapid triage and treatment (where necessary) without the need to capture patient 
history under rushed and complex circumstances. This administrative task may be 
better suited for non-clinical staff once the immediate treatment and care are 
completed by the medical professionals. This is likely to have short-term financial 
implications across the frontline responder domain with a programme of re-
education for frontline responders.  
 
Another recommendation made by EA was that any personal effects 
accompanying the individual were to be used to help Fast-Track the identification 
process. If this recommendation were to be implemented, then any personal 
effects accompanying the individual should be labelled, as an example, “Tentative 
Personal effects of ‘UNKNOWN -1 January 1978 - Female’. This is discussed in 




11.3.2 Hospital Protocols 
Based on the findings (s.7.3.1), hospitals need to amend their Major Incident plans 
to reflect the evidence within this study relating to visual identification. 
Furthermore, there is a need for a new protocol which provides clear guidance on 
the actions to be taken when unknown or unidentified patients are admitted. This 
should incorporate the actions of the Patient Safety Alert released in December 
2018 (NHS Improvements 2018a). According to the Alert, unknown or unidentified 
patients should be admitted with a randomly generated TIC code consisting of a 
name generated by the phonetic alphabet, such as Tango-Bravo, followed by a 
randomly generated seven-digit number. As outlined in s.11.3.1, the code requires 
an estimated age and the sex of the patient. These latter two should remain the 
same as the estimated age and sex provided by the initial responder crews. 
Failure to align the two TIC may result in duplication and errors regarding casualty 
numbers between the scene and the hospital. Furthermore, it could result in the 
generation of additional searches for relatives if the information is communicated 
on separate occasions, such as via documentation teams in casualty clearing and 
by hospital administration teams. Once the TIC has been generated, all 
corresponding documentation should be noted as such until the patient’s identity 
has been accurately confirmed.  Once this has been achieved the records should 
be linked and annotated until the patient is discharged.  
 
In addition to correctly labelling an unknown patient, the information needs to be 
escalated and shared with multi-agency partners. The ED Bronze Nurse in Charge 
should ensure that the information that an unknown or unidentified patient has 
been admitted is passed to Silver command with their corresponding TIC code 
(s.3.4 and s.9.2.1). This should then immediately be passed to the Casualty 
Bureau (CB) to generate a corresponding ‘Unknown Person Form’ or equivalent. 
Any accompanying personal effects (see above for suggested labelling) should 
also be communicated to the CB (this is discussed below in s.11.2.3). The hospital 
will need to make a request for a police hospital documentation team to be 
deployed to the hospital (if one is not already on site) to assist in determining the 
identity of the unknown patient as per current Hospital Major Incident protocols 
(see s.3.6.2). As stated above in s.11.2.1, medical teams must not use 
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The empirical evidence gathered suggests that the police, in particular the DVI 
Teams, have exhibited an organisational rigidity (s.4.2.1) to the term ‘victim’ and 
its presumed ambiguous (s.7.4.2) association with the deceased. Up until recently 
they have solely focused their attention on the deceased and not considered the 
living unidentified victim in part of their plans, as discussed in s.7.4.2. There is a 
need to ensure that their plans and protocols are amended to ensure that a) the 
identification of the living is clearly reiterated as a police responsibility in mass 
casualty and fatality response plans and that b) following the advice from both 
France and Belgium DVI Team Leads, the priority in the immediate aftermath is 
the identification of the living over and above the identification of the deceased 
(s.7.1; s.8.3.6; s.9.3.1.1; s.9.4.1; s.9.4.2.1; s.9.4.3). To fulfil their obligation in 
accordance with the HRA 2004, it is proposed that UK Police DVI teams 
implement a sub-cell within the DVI cadre of officers who will specialise in the 
identification of critically injured unidentified victims who present to hospitals. For 
the purposes of this study they shall be referred to as Fast-ID Teams. The Fast-ID 
team, responsible to the Senior Investigations Manager, would be deployed once 
notified by the CB that an ‘unknown’ and unidentified patient has been admitted to 
the hospital. Having a specialist sub cell within DVI teams, as opposed to training 
all DVI staff, would require smaller numbers trained to work in hospitals 
environments, a point which EA confirmed caused anxiety amongst her teams 
(s.7.4.2). Furthermore, this would minimise the potential impact to resourcing, 
budgets and time needed to implement, exercise and test the new arrangements. 
Taking full responsibility for the identification process will result in clearer definition 
in their role in the hospital environment and will result in fewer mistakes being 
made due to conflicting goals (s.7.4.3). As it is likely that frontline medical 
responders and clinicians have limited experience in forensic evidence collection 
and processing, it is suggested that any DVI procedures should be used with 
police officers who understand the need for rigorous and accurate methods to 
ensure the evidence chain is adhered to (s.3.7). Doing so will ensure the 
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established Identification Commission are satisfied that the ACE-V has been 
achieved in respect of each individual (s.3.5.3). If these plans and procedures are 
thoroughly trained, exercised and tested there will be less ambiguity (s.7.4.2) and 
issues regarding control (s.7.4.3) and ownership of the problem when the police 
are asked to work in the hospital environment.  
 
In addition to the above and in accordance with current arrangements following a 
mass casualty and fatality incident, police documentation teams will need to be 
deployed to Family and Friends Reception Centres established in hospitals or near 
the scene. The documentation teams would gather and pass information regarding 
missing persons from those searching to the CB. In line with recommendations 
made by European DVI experts over the course of this research, there is a need to 
implement a simplified and succinct version, or ‘Quick-form’ of the Yellow 
INTERPOL DVI Ante Mortem (AM) form (s.9. 4.1). This, as confirmed in the 
interview with EA (s.10.3.1.3), will assist in a much-needed rapid response to allow 
tentative familial matches by the CB. However, documentation team managers 
need to be aware of the scope for error if individuals have not been trained in the 
use of such forms (s.9.2.2). The reason for this proposal is based on what the 
Author suggested was the impact of ‘Disaster Information Aftermath’ on relatives 
and friends searching for their missing relatives (s.5.4.1). It is suggested that there 
is little point in expecting all families searching for their missing to complete 
extensive documents detailing extremely personal information about the missing 
person unless it clear that there is a potential or tentative match with a victim or 
patient. Once the field has been narrowed to those with greater potential of 
likelihood, then the Yellow AM form and the associated collection of samples can 
be completed with the support of a Family Liaison Officer (s.3.6.1). A 
documentation team will also be deployed to the hospital ED to capture the 
corresponding details of patients to enable families to be reunited quickly (s3.6.2). 
If an unknown or unidentified patient is admitted, the documentation team will 
need to work with the responsible medical team to compile as much information as 
possible regarding their visual appearance and gather any personal effects 
associated with the individual and pass the information along with their TIC to the 
CB. This information, it has been suggested by EA (s.10.3.1.3), will help fast-track 
the matching process prior to a more detailed and accurate identification being 
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made. If the CB database highlights a potential match, a Fast ID team should be 
deployed to the corresponding hospital to begin the process of accurately 
confirming the identity of the unknown patient. 
 
In line with normal protocols for the collection of AM data for the deceased, a FLO 
should be assigned to the corresponding potential relatives of the unknown patient 
to initiate collection of DNA, fingerprint samples and details of dental records. In 
the hospital, the Fast-ID team would need to work with hospital staff to take 
fingerprints at the earliest opportunity, which would need to be cross matched 
using the either UK CB database (HOLMES) or the INTERPOL approved Plass 
data system which UK DVI uses (s.3.5.2). In the event of fingerprints not being 
viable (i.e. burns victims, trauma to the hands, limbs missing etc) other options 
should be considered, such as DNA and dental records. A DNA sample should, in 
the first instance, be a point to point comparison with the casualty’s personal 
belongings for a direct match (s.3.5.3.2). If a corresponding sample was not 
available, maternal DNA confirmation should be used, as recommended by 
INTEPROL standards (INTERPOL, 2018).  
 
Once the patient has been identified using a combination of primary identifiers, 
their details can be removed from the CB Missing Persons List (s.3.5.3). It is 
essential that no assumptions are made of a match until it is confirmed using the 
correct scientific processes (s.7.3; s.8.3.6; s.10.3.13; s.11.3.3) and the ACE-V has 
been established.  
 
In the event that family do not come forward, or a match is not made, 
consideration must be given to a national and if necessary international appeal for 
assistance and a media campaign (See Figure 18). Furthermore, any data relating 
to the individual are to be retained in accordance with the GDPR 2018 and the 
HTA 2005 (s.9.3.3.1; s.9.3.4). 
 
The successful application of DVI to identify a living critically injured and unknown 
patient (RQ) will, as outlined above, need a cohesive plan to ensure staff are 
prepared and understand their responsibility and the role they are expected to 
perform in these circumstances. The proposed protocol above would require DVI 
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teams to operate alongside hospital responders using the suggested plan 
alongside already established processes as discussed. The processes outlined 
above take into account the legal remit to investigate the missing and fulfil the 
requirement to act in a patient’s best interest despite the fact the patient is unable 
to consent (Chapter Nine). A summarised version of the DVI protocols and their 
potential benefits and challenges is presented in Appendix XV. It is essential that a 
coherent multi-agency plan for the identification of unknown patients is developed 
alongside the technical implementation of DVI techniques to identify unknown or 
unidentified patients (s.9.2.2). Failure to create a clear strategy that is trained and 
tested can have serious consequences for the victim, their relatives and the staff 




11.4 Training, Exercising, Testing, Repeat  
 
Chapter Ten presented the data relating to whether lessons have been identified 
in regard to patient identification and looked at how the lessons and any changes 
have been instigated, adding to the growing literature in the field of organisational 
learning. It established whether UK responders have been learning from other 
responder organisations (where failures have been identified) and what changes, 
guidelines or processes are being actioned as a result. How the implementation of 
DVI in hospital settings was achieved in France and Belgium was explained, 
including how they identified, reflected and acted upon the lessons. Although 
these lessons were discussed in meetings and conferences, they were not 
implemented in the UK. The infrequency of mass casualty events, and more 
specifically instances of misidentification, will require a more considered approach 
as to how these rare events can be resolved appropriately. 
  
Once a plan has been formulated there will need to be a period of time where the 
plan is promogulated, read and understood by those expected to use it. This will 
form part of the awareness process outlined in s.11.1 above. Furthermore, as 
already mentioned it is essential to communicate the benefits of implementing a 
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strategy to deal with the unknown and incapacitated patient but also to discuss the 
consequences if it is not used. Although awareness raising and training staff to 
use the plan often come in the form of a passive learning environment, there are 
multiple ways of adding active learning where the fundamental skills are imparted, 
not just the knowledge of the problem (Pollock, 2017). These may include smaller 
group work sessions where scenarios are discussed and solutions specific to the 
individual teams are examined. Developing training sessions will also allow staff to 
gain a better appreciation of their role (and their required skills) in these specific 
events to minimise confusion or fear about what is expected (s.5.5.4). This is 
especially important as mass casualty and fatality incidents are infrequent and 
actions that are undertaken irregularly are more likely to result in unprepared staff 
who do not feel confident to deal with these complex and fast paced events 
(Chapter Five and Chapter Eight). As discussed, pre-disaster training is an 
essential component of preparedness (Brooke et al, 2016; Brookes et al 2018b) 
and, as reflected on throughout this thesis, the exercises and the incidents 
themselves are not the point to dust off the plan and finally read it. 
 
Once staff are educated on the specifics of the plan it is important that they have 
the opportunity to exercise and practice its application. This might be in the format 
of a tabletop exercise or possibly a walkthrough or live exercise. These are 
extremely valuable opportunities to engage in active learning and allow staff to 
understand the more latent issues where mistakes may occur, such as multi-
agency communication issues, problems with hierarchy and responsibility and so 
on. The observation of EUR and Exercise Lock and the associated feedback from 
the hot and cold debriefs highlighted these important aspects of the exercise event 
itself (Chapter 10). Furthermore, these training events provide an opportunity for 
double loop learning where previous issue associated with failures in the response 
can be incorporated and acted upon prior to a real event. As both EUR and 
Exercise Lock demonstrated, inviting multi-agency partners to partake in 
exercising the plan is extremely beneficial. Furthermore, developing good working 
relationships in advance will ensure that staff are not floundering in the event of a 
real incident wondering who may be able to assist them (s.8.3.3).  
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A potential barrier to staff attending the training and exercising regime could be the 
reluctance to attend due to time pressures (s.9.2.7). It may also be because they 
do not believe the risk to be significant or rationalise their lack of needing training 
due to a misplaced confidence in their abilities (s.9.2.5). There are two approaches 
to take in these circumstances, the first is senior management engagement and 
directives from above (discussed below) and the second is to spread the 
awareness regarding the consequences of failure. As this thesis has 
demonstrated, the majority of people who initially did not see identification issues 
as a problem generally all agreed that a change to the identification process was 
necessary after learning about the broad consequences associated with mistaken 
identification (s.7.4.4; Chapter Eight). Another potential obstacle to training, testing 
and exercising the plan is the cost involved. The organisation and its senior 
management will need to dedicate a significant amount of money to ensure that 
any plan that staff are expected to apply is appropriately trained and tested. This 
includes ensuring they have the skills, knowledge and equipment necessary to 
perform their roles adequately. This is discussed in more detail below.  
 
The penultimate consideration with regard to understanding the plan is whether 
the organisation chooses to test the plan. In the majority of cases encountered in 
the Author’s career, organisations have been satisfied with simply exercising the 
plan. Both EUR and Exercise Lock were examples of this. However, it is 
suggested that some tests are conducted to ensure DVI can be fully implemented 
with the living. The first would be to test the communication arrangements 
between responders, especially how the CB is contacted via Silver Command. 
This should confirm that the lines of communication clear and unambiguous and 
that staff understand who to call and how to get hold of them. Exercise Lock 
demonstrated the importance of testing this arrangement. This defined pass or fail 
test would critically impact the ability to notify partnership agencies and assist in 
identifying the unknown individual. The second would be to ensure that any 
equipment necessary to determine the identity of a patient is tested in the hospital 
sites themselves. This might include the police CASWEB computers and their link 
to the CB HOLMES unit, or the fingerprint PLASSDATA equipment. Without these 
IT devices working, the cross matching of patients with their relatives will be 
severely hampered. Similarly, The CB telephony system is another area that, as 
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demonstrated in the aftermath of the Manchester Arena Bombing, requires 
comprehensive and repeated testing.  
 
The final aspect to training, exercising and testing plans is the importance of 
reflecting on the lessons learned from these training events themselves and 
implementing changes as a result. As discussed in Chapter Ten, organisations 
need to share the outcomes of these events across the isomorphic spectrum. 
Working with other hospitals and responder organisations to train the plan is 
considered an important form of cross-organisational and common mode 
isomorphic learning (Kim, 2016). Another reason to ensure the plans are 
repeatedly reviewed, rewritten and re-exercised is because the infrequency of 
mass casualty and fatality incidents can lead to what Tinline (2016) describes as 
‘corporate amnesia’. This can occur as memories of such events are lost over time 
and the learning is not refreshed as individuals change employment or position. 
‘Corporate amnesia’, as both an outcome of time elapsed since the last incident 
and as a result of employee turnover, is something which impacts the ability to 
understand why plans and policies exist in their current format, but also why there 
is a need to continually update them. However, as reflected in the findings, some 
individuals do not keep up to date with current procedures and as such hold on to 
their old policies and plans and are therefore not cognisant of changes (s.9.2.6). 
Organisations need to use all forms of isomorphic learning to be keep up to date 
with changes, and to modernise and implement better standards, especially in 
terms of casualty management. These updates need to explain why the previous 
standard was unacceptable to avoid individuals ‘reinventing the wheel’ because 
the previous mechanism (such as visual identification) appear easier. 
 
 
   
11.5 Organisational Leadership and Buy-In from Senior 
Management 
 
This chapter has suggested that the biggest limitation to embedding DVI is not in 
fact a legal barrier, but more that responder organisations are failing to identify 
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latent conditions present in the incident response. Perhaps more importantly, that 
organisations do little to learn from incidents or incorporate the findings from 
incident reviews, both positive and negative, is a significant barrier to 
amendments. It may be, as Macrae and Steward (2019) suggest, the complexity of 
introducing a change, or that they simply cannot accept that it will happen to them. 
It may simply be a hubristic superiority over other’s failures that prevents a form of 
double loop, retrospective learning. To become informed, organisations need to 
actively learn from the disasters within their own organisations and from those 
beyond their known environments. By overcoming the barriers to organisational 
learning, institutions can accumulate vast amounts of knowledge which can be 
utilised in the creation of contingency and business continuity plans. Expansion of 
this knowledge will enable an organisation to protect itself from a wide range of 
latent errors and by working alongside other organisations foresight of potential 
issues can be developed. 
According to Lotich (2017), “Organizational leaders have the responsibility to 
manage change efforts to minimize the negative impact on employees.” With this 
in mind, the following section outlines the various responsibilities and actions it is 
suggested that organisations and their senior management take to ensure the 
accurate identification, incorporating DVI, of critically injured unknown patients.  
 
 
11.5.1 Supporting the Plan and Driving the Implementation from the Top 
Down 
Unless there is senior management support and a political will to see 
improvements in the field of emergency response, very little change can occur at 
grassroots levels. MI exercises, as highlighted previously, carry a significant cost 
in terms of time, resources and money. This is also true in terms of general policy 
and plan amendments. As previously stressed, the focus will be on what are 
considered to be the most significant issues or what have been referred to 
previously as decoy events. The organisational hierarchies within both the police 
and the healthcare settings dictate the decision-making in the aftermath of an 
incident. It is abundantly clear that the financial appetite to support changes and 
improvements in emergency planning occurs in the immediate aftermath of a 
disaster (Coles, 2014; Pollock, 2017) and unless there has been an incident, the 
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pool of money dedicated to staffing and supporting emergency response and 
organisational resilience slowly dries up. If there is little political appetite to 
address issues associated with the CCA arrangements and DVI, funding and 
resourcing for improvements in the emergency response arena will decline 
(Pollock, 2017). It is essential therefore that in advance of a mass casualty or 
fatality incident senior management and the organisation need to ensure that 
complacency in their response arrangements does not have the opportunity to set 
in (s.9.2.3). The impetus for improving the organisation’s response to incidents 
need to be driven from senior management, with a regular schedule of training and 
exercising events and the funding and resources to achieve these. Furthermore, 
without senior management support, the overall culture of the organisation will 
remain unchanged. This is especially true if senior managers do not take the 
opportunity to enhance their own learning (s.9.2.3).  
 
 
11.5.2 Dedicating the Time and Resources 
From experience, updating plans and implementing changes through training and 
exercises takes a substantial portion of time. So too does analysing incident 
reports and feedback. This was another finding of this research; that is, the lack of 
time to address all the failings and implement the positive changes that came out 
of reports and events and the lack of resources to dedicate to these time-
consuming issues (s.9.2.7). For both the police and the clinicians, the day to day 
role was already stressful and many of those observed and interviewed reflected 
that they simply did not have the capacity to take on more work. Unless, as 
highlighted above, an iconic disaster occurs to provide the impetus for senior 
management to supply additional resources and finances, little change will occur 
(s.10.3.1.1). Clinicians and hospital staff will continue to concentrate on medical 
necessity in terms of physical injuries, and issues which affect psychosocial 
emotional well-being will be relegated to the MI three yearly exercise. However, as 
confirmed by EPOs at the 2018 Emergency Planning Society Conference, the 
chances that the hospital MI exercise will focus on the casualty information 
process or the Friends and Family Reception Centre aspect of disaster response 
are remote. It is an unfortunate fact that there simply is not enough time to cover 
all eventualities of a MI response and the emphasis will be on initial patient triaging 
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and emergency care and not necessarily the emotional wellbeing of patients. 
Similarly, for DVI teams, their effort and time is spent on the deceased. Although 
this thesis has demonstrated that responders acknowledge that something needs 
to be done to identify hospital patients, senior management will need to provide 
the additional resources and time needed to dedicate to the training and response 
in this area of work.   
 
 
11.5.3 Enforcing the Reporting Mechanism and Being Part of the Awareness 
Campaign 
Senior management will need to make a consistent effort to ensure the problems 
regarding identification failures and that the wider issues prevalent in the 
Incubation Period are communicated across the organisation. An important aspect 
to this is acknowledging and accepting responsibility for the organisation’s specific 
role within the wider emergency response plan. For this to occur, police will need 
to acknowledge their legal requirement and responsibility beyond that of the 
deceased victims, specifically in terms of reconciling an unknown critically injured 
patient’s identity and assisting in the reunification with their relatives via the CB. 
For hospitals, the organisation will have to acknowledge their responsibility to 
report cases of unknown patients to the police and the CB and their assistance in 
any forensic procedure which may need medical input, such as obtaining blood 
samples or carrying out x-rays. In addition, stakeholders will need to be informed 
of the problem and the changes being made to address the matter.  
 
Driving engagement in the process across the organisation will build a better 
understanding of the risks to the patients and staff associated with identification 
errors. This includes during the process of implementing and exercising the plan, 
but also in terms of understanding the potential harms that may occur to patients, 
relatives and responders in responding to mass casualties and fatality events. 
Furthermore, if management enforce a reporting mechanism which captures the 
occurrences of identification cases, both on a day to day basis and during major 
incidents, the phenomenon will be better understood, and useful learning will take 
place. The message will be reinforced by a demonstration of their engagement if 
they also make the effort to attend training events and exercises. This was 
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observed following the positive engagement of senior management in partaking in 
both Exercise Lock and EUR.  
 
 
11.5.4 Understanding the Organisations Legal Remit to Identify Patients 
This section briefly explores the legal implications to the relevant responder 
organisations of both the failure to identity an individual and the possible results of 
making a mistake concerning an individual’s identity. This is an important 
component of the awareness of identification issues and am important component 
in providing senior management in particular with the impetus to drive change from 
the top down.  
 
Ultimately, in a case of mistaken identification, the judiciary would be seeking the 
views of experienced medical professionals to aid their decision-making and each 
case would be examined on its own merit, with a multitude of factors influencing 
the verdict. Furthermore, for public prosecutions to go ahead under English 
criminal law, the case would need to be deemed in the public interest, as 
discussed in Chapter Nine (s.9.3.5), which would be unlikely. However, there may 
be merit in those who are affected pursuing a civil law claim to achieve justice. 
Organisations would need to ensure that their staff and the organisation have 
fulfilled their duty of care to the patient. Furthermore, the organisations will need to 
satisfy any obligations expected of them in terms of their responsibility to their 
staff. This includes equipping staff with the knowledge and skills, and the training 
to fulfil both to carry out their role in all potential circumstances. This highlights the 
importance of the organisation training their staff appropriately in terms of their 
obligations to act and doing so they would not only avoid potential misidentification 
error but also prosecution. If responders have not received adequate training in 
regard to their responsibilities and not giving the right equipment, the fault will lie 
with the organisation.  
 
From the wider perspective of mass casualty and fatality incident preparedness, 
Category 1 Responders are obliged to fulfil their obligations to prepare, train and 
respond to all emergencies under the CCA 2004. However, as has been noted 
throughout this thesis, there are clear shortfalls in meeting these legal 
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requirements. Examples noted throughout this thesis include, the failure of 
organisations to assess the risk of emergencies occurring specifically in relation to 
identification failures, despite the warnings being shared at multi-agency meetings. 
Despite communication, by the Author, with UK DVI teams and NHS EPRR, 
relevant plans for dealing with incapacitated and unidentified patients have not 
been made. Furthermore, there were clear examples during both EUR and 
Exercise Lock of the failure to share information and cooperate with other 
responders. All of these are legal requirements outlined in the CCA 2004, yet the 
failure to comply with them fully suggests they may reflect a form of ‘fantasy 
document’ (Birkland, 2009) as organisations pay lip service to the requirements of 
the law. However, as the Act itself is considered permissive in nature (Cabinet 
Office, 2011), there is little scope for seeing any significant punitive effect, 
especially as it would appear that accountability based on passed failings as noted 
in public inquiries has remained scant (Pollock, 2017; Wright and Gibbens, 2018). 
Yet, as discussed in Chapter three, significant implication for organisations could 
be reputational damage as a result of any future errors.  
 
Following the Grenfell Tower Disaster, a review of the UK response framework 
and legislation was carried out. Whilst it concluded that the law in this field was 
sound – “there is no evidence that the law in this area needs to change” (House of 
Commons, 2017, 6) –  it did argue that there was a need to reflect on how 
government and responders were interpreting the CCA and its regulatory and 
statutory guidance. However, what the report failed to address is the need for a 
better auditing process for emergency response and recovery, to ensure that first, 
rigorous standards are established and not just suggested and second, 
government and responder agencies are audited annually to ensure they are 
meeting those standards and not just allowed to cherry pick the simplest parts of 
the Act and regulatory and statutory guidance. 
 
 
11.5.5  Supporting Metal Health and Wellbeing of Staff 
This thesis has highlighted the risk of harm to responders as a result of 
identification errors. It has also highlighted the numerous consequences poor 
leadership, inadequate planning and insufficient training have for the mental health 
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of staff (Chapter Five and Chapter Eight). As outlined above, in order to counter 
these issues, organisations need to ensure they are providing clear direction in 
what is expected of their staff through sound planning. Senior managers need to 
implement a no-blame culture to ensure that staff do not feel they are betrayed or 
unsupported when mistakes or errors occur. This is especially important if 
responders feel that management have not invested in the resources and training 
events needed to practice the plans. Furthermore, offering pre-disaster training will 
not only better prepare staff in their response, it will also allow employees to 
recognise the signs of distress and understand how the organisation might be 
vulnerable in a real event. This was a clear learning outcome of Exercise Lock and 




This study concurs with Pollock’s (2017) assessment of Local Interoperability, 
which noted that engagement at a strategic organisational level lacks focus 
outside the sphere of event isomorphism. What this means is that organisational 
commitment in the preparation and response to major incidents, and specifically 
with respect to the identification of unknown patients, loses momentum when there 
have not been recent examples to spur and encourage improvements. There 
needs to be a continuous impetus driven from senior management if any change 
in the identification process is to be achieved. Establishing a culture of change 
impelled by senior management to understand the risk and assess its impact on 
patients, their families and the responding staff is the first part of successfully 
implementing DVI into the mass casualty response effort. The next stage is to 
address the inconsistencies reflected in planning for and responding to the 
identification of patients. This plan needs to take into account not just the issues 
associated with visual identification errors and mistakes with personal effects, but 
also the more latent issues which inhibit any practical solution being applied 
(RO1), including any perceived barriers relating to laws pertaining to consent and 
privacy (RO3). These include interoperability between organisations, poor 
information and communication sharing, misplaced ideas of risk and inaccurate 
application of wider emergency response arrangements. Once the policy has been 
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formulated and shared amongst multi-agency partners who play a role in the plan, 
it should be trained, exercised and if necessary tested. This should be conducted 
in a manner that does not simply reiterate the awareness of the issue and its 
solution but implements and trains the skills and application of said knowledge. 
This will build emotional resilience in those expected to execute the plan, as they 
will be mentally and physically equipped and able to respond, therefore minimising 
psychosocial harm (RO2). Furthermore, any lessons learned (both positive and 
negative) and improvements identified through the exercising and testing process 
(incorporating isomorphic learning through events and multi-agency engagement) 
need to be applied to the plan (double loop learning) (RO4).  
 
Ultimately, the application of DVI on its own to resolve identification issues is 
insufficient to correct identification errors. This thesis and its empirical evidence 
captured through observations, interviews and documentation analysis has found 
that successful implementation of DVI requires better awareness of the issue, 
including the latent failures present in the Incubation Period and an awareness of 
the consequences of harm to the responders themselves. Perceived barriers to 
unknown patient identification, including the legal viability of DVI, will need to be 
overcome. This can be achieved through awareness, planning and training and 
ultimately steered by effective strategic leadership with a desire to improve the 
culture of emergency response across the organisation. If organisations fail in their 
duty to plan for and respond to mass casualty incidents involving unidentified and 
unknown incapacitated patients, the responders themselves will become victims of 












This final chapter concludes the thesis and presents the main arguments and 
justifications for the adoption of DVI to determine the identity of the unidentified 
incapacitated individual in mass casualty and fatality incidents (RQ). This 
comprises of the significance of this research, including the changes taking place 
as a direct result of the work done with multi-agency partners and its contribution 
to academia, particularly the fields of psychosocial harm, organisational learning 
and causes of error in front-line emergency response. Areas for further 
consideration and research are presented and the potential for future exploration 
within these themes is discussed, particularly given the changes that are occurring 
in the field of patient identification and reconciliation. Finally, this chapter reflects 
on the research journey as a whole and offers some thoughts to fellow PhD 
candidates, academics and emergency responders entering the academic 




12.2 Summary of Thesis 
      
This thesis sought to understand the challenges presented by the identification of 
incapacitated patients in mass casualty and fatality events and whether they can 
be resolved using the scientifically accurate and internationally recognised 
protocols of DVI (RQ). The following research objectives were proposed to help 
answer the research question: 
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• RO1   Examine how and why identification errors occur.  
• RO2   Determine the psychosocial implications of identification 
errors. 
• RO3   Examine the barriers from the responder’s perspective in 
accurately determining the identity of an incapacitated unknown 
patient, specifically the medico-legal challenges relating to DVI. 
• RO4   Scrutinise how the lessons relating to patient identification 
errors and the use of DVI have been instigated by UK responders. 
 
This research incorporated the observation of two major incident exercises, 
Exercise Lock (2017) and Exercise Unified Response (2016). Furthermore, semi-
structured interviews with 29 subject-matter experts were conducted, as well as 
conversational interviews with responders during both exercises. To supplement 
and triangulate these findings responder documentation was critically appraised to 
gain an understanding of the policies and protocols that underpin the role of the 
responder in mass casualty and fatality incidents. These methods were 
accompanied by constant referral to and reflection on contextual examples where 
identification errors have occurred.  
 
As this research confirms, identification errors continue to occur. There is clear 
justification for the reconsideration of the protocols surrounding incapacitated 
individuals with no identity. The accurate identification of the deceased and the 
living is an essential component of the response and recovery phase of mass 
casualty and mass fatality incidents. Furthermore, families and friends desperately 
searching for their missing relatives require authorities to have clear procedures 
for accurately determining identities. 
 
It has been established through this thesis, and corroborated by France and 
Belgium’s authorities, that the DVI protocols using DNA, fingerprints and dental X-
rays (as a last resort) can provide accurate scientific solutions to this problem. 
Although there are suggestions that the legality of such methods is unclear, the 
principles established through interviews and analysis of the legal precedents in 
the UK make it certain that the identification of these vulnerable patients is both a 
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necessity and in the patient’s best interests. Furthermore, there is a legal 
imperative that the identities of the missing are investigated appropriately. It is also 
argued that there is a moral and ethical need to reunite these patients with their 
families quickly and that the information that is provided should be accurate, timely 
and not based on visual identification assumptions, such as those highlighted 
throughout this thesis. 
 
The failure to correctly identify victims results in unnecessary distress and 
potentially leads to safeguarding issues and the denial of the patient’s rights to 
appropriate treatment and care, which could be lifesaving. There is also the 
additional factor that a complicated identification process places a significant 
burden on responder services, potentially resulting in psychosocial harms. The 
media scrutiny along with any potential investigation into these errors can further 
compound the emotional damage.  
 
There is a need for responder organisations to capture and report cases of 
unknown or unidentified individuals. This will build a greater awareness of the 
problem and its causes and consequences, allowing solutions to be developed. 
Secondly, plans, protocols and policies regarding the care, treatment and, 
ultimately, successful identification (incorporating DVI techniques) need to be 
established, trained and tested appropriately. This needs to occur not only in the 
immediate responder organisation itself but across the multi-agency response 
domain. Lastly, senior management need to drive the changes suggested above. 
It is imperative that resources and support are provided to reduce the potential 
implications associated with identification errors and, subsequently, the 
psychosocial harms to the victims, their families and the responders themselves. 
 
Under normal circumstances, the news of a relative caught up in a disaster would 
cause anguish; the failure to correctly identify them when the appropriate 





12.3 Study Significance  
 
This research contributes to the existing body of knowledge in several ways. First, 
it contributes to the literature on MI response and in particular the field of victim 
reconciliation. The disaster and hot zones are generally difficult areas in which to 
carry out research such as observations and interviews, as discussed in s.2.3.1. 
This research adds to this field by demonstrating the approaches and highlighting 
some of the difficulties encountered by navigating such terrains. Second, although 
there has been an extensive amount of research conducted into the psychosocial 
harms suffered by victims and their families, the study of harm to the responder 
has, until very recently, not had the same level of scrutiny. The findings presented 
in this study contribute to this body of research and argue that responders are at 
risk of serious psychosocial harm as a direct result of the impact of families being 
denied access to their critically ill family members. In addition, the data gathered 
through interviews with DVI experts who have successfully used DVI to determine 
identities has demonstrated the psychosocial implications surrounding the 
identification process and this research has highlighted the potential conflict in 
expanding the responder’s role. Similarly, traumatic experiences of having to 
inform relatives of mistakes made in the process add to the literature on victim 
identification and reconciliation in the wake of mass casualty and fatality incidents.  
 
Third, the use of a qualitative methodology has enabled a more in-depth analysis 
of the underlying factors within the disaster response field and has contributed to 
the academic theory of the Incubation Period. Previous studies using Turner’s 
theory have converged on high-risk industries, such as aviation and nuclear. The 
application of this theory to disaster response has broadened its applicability and 
has allowed the nuances and latent errors to be teased out of the decision-making 
processes in victim identification to assess why there are issues and where and 
how they have manifested themselves. 
 
The fourth area of contribution is around the legality of the use of DVI with living 
patients. Perceptions of the risk of charges of assault and/or battery and the 
potential invasion of the individual’s privacy were argued to be the most important 
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barrier to implementation of DVI on the living in a disaster aftermath. The 
reluctance of DVI teams to broaden victim identification to the living is being 
fuelled by the misconception that the DVI process is legally incompatible with the 
living and is therefore acting as a barrier to its adaptation for use with 
incapacitated patients. It was established through this study that although there is 
an absence of legal cases establishing precedent for the importance of 
identification of living victims, the principles of best interest, necessity and 
reasonableness provide solid grounding for its use with the living. The use of DVI 
techniques beyond the scope of identification purposes would be an invasion of 
privacy and/or considered an assault. However, the current legislation and 
guidance justifies and allows those responsible for patient care and treatment to 
do what is necessary for the individual given the circumstances. There could of 
course be improvements in terms of patient reconciliation and better explanation of 
the legal processes, but the principles established in the MCA 2005 and cases 
such as Montgomery v Lanarkshire [2015] clearly recognise the need for a 
perspective from a ‘reasonable’ patient’s point of view.     
 
Lastly, this research contributes to the disaster response domain and the 
development of organisational learning within this realm. It makes clear 
recommendations for front line responders to implement identification policies 
beyond the alpha numeric protocol to ensure that unknown and unidentified 
patients are accurately identified and, crucially, reunited with their relatives. This 
thesis outlines four key steps to introducing new plans and policies relating to the 
implementation of DVI to accurately determine identities of living incapacitated 
unknown patients. These include building awareness of the problem, specifically 
around visual identification and the inaccuracies of presumptions regarding 
personal effects. It suggests that plans and policies incorporating DVI are 
subsequently developed to direct and guide staff appropriately. It is essential that 
any new protocols introduced are trained and exercised on a regular basis and 
that any findings help improve the response. Finally, this study recommends that 




12.4 Research Considerations 
 
There were a number of logistical and resource limitations to the research. First, 
the study was self-funded, thereby necessitating careful consideration of what 
could be realistically achieved within the constraints of budget, travel and timings. 
Similarly, as noted in Chapter Two, the study of disasters tends to be restricted not 
only due to the inability to get to the scene quickly, but more importantly the ethical 
issues of observing those affected and those responding to the incident. However, 
as explained, previous experience within the field and the opportunity afforded 
during this research to observe two MI exercises provided a valid mechanism to 
study this unique phenomenon. Ideally, to avoid certain selective biases, this 
research would have benefited from a longer time period to attend more mass 
casualty and fatality exercises. However, as a caveat, experience as an EPO has 
meant that these exercises were not novel. Many of the findings elicited were not 
surprising and reflected the evidence presented in the literature reviews.  
 
Access to subject-matter experts also created a challenge. Scepticism of the value 
of the subject meant that, initially at least, gaining the attention of busy front-line 
responders was difficult. However, the ability to be an observer of a large-scale 
disaster exercise, coupled with contacts with colleagues in the front-line responder 
domain, meant that doors, or at least telephones, were eventually answered. 
 
The opportunity offered by UK DVI, in particular by Howard Way (UK DVI Lead), to 
observe DVI teams and responder organisations in the hot zone during EUR was 
enormously beneficial. Having designed and executed a survivor reception centre 
exercise (Exercise Acterione, 2010) alongside the CB and Metropolitan Police 
Service, the Author was already familiar with the reconciliation process for the 
living. However, the reconciliation of relatives with the deceased was something 
the Author had only briefly encountered during a week-long Mortuary Operations 
training event held by INFORCE (a private organisation who specialise in 
humanitarian assistance and the detection, recovery and identification of mass 
fatality and atrocity incidents (INFORCE, 2018)). Therefore, the ability to observe 
and interview team members of UK DVI, who are internationally renowned for their 
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expertise in the field of DVI, was immensely important to this research. These 
interviews and meetings led to further introductions to international DVI experts, 
including Elvire Arrighi (EA) (France DVI Lead), Christian Debouquec (CB) 
(Belgium DVI Lead) and Ine Van Wymersche (IVW) (Belgium Prosecutor), 
amongst others. While it would have been extremely useful to be able to gather 
every DVI lead’s viewpoint, contact with INTERPOL DVI Headquarters in Lyon 







Clearly change within this area is not something that can occur overnight as there 
are a host of barriers that will need to be overcome, as is made clear in Chapters 
Seven and Ten. Yet that does not mean these changes should not or cannot take 
place. 
 
Over the course of this research a number of conferences were attended, and 
numerous presentations given to a wide range of audiences. In addition, in 2018 a 
paper, co-authored with Professor Lucy Easthope, was published in an 
international journal: Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness. As a 
result, in mid-2018, Police Service Northern Ireland (PSNI) contacted the Author, 
stating they:  
 
…would be very keen to look at how we can use your experience and 
research to ensure we get the best possible protocols that are both resilient 
and sustainable…[and] how we can deliver a victim focused approach to 
the documentation and reconciliation process which (in no particular order): 
meets the investigative need; enables the mass fatality Identification 
process; and enables the mass casualty processes (Email Correspondence 
Roberts, June 2018). 
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This email set in motion a progression of meetings and events which culminated in 
a Reconciliation Conference and Workshop in Northern Ireland Police 
headquarters attended by over 120 responders from every area of Northern 
Ireland MI response, including counterterrorism. The most prevalent cases were 
explained, and a summary of the Author’s findings presented. A significant effort 
was put into the thought process by PSNI EPOs looking at identification and 




Figure 18. Image of the handout to the PSNI conference and workshop   
  designed by EPOs,  demonstrating the interlinking factors to be  
  considered in casualty and deceased management in the   
  aftermath of a mass casualty and fatality incident. 
 
Roberts stated there was an emphasis on it being ‘victim focused’ and whether 





 Figure 19. Image of the corner of the PSNI Reconciliation Conference  
   and Workshop handout focusing on the actions and   
   considerations within the hospital environment. 
 
This demonstrated that there are lessons being identified and, critically, 
improvements made. At the end of the Author’s session a question was posed to 
the audience by the Head of Emergency Planning, Inspector Roberts: 
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Based on what you have seen and heard today, is there anyone in this 
audience that does not agree with Dani’s research that DVI should be used 
to identify patients in critical care? (Reconciliation Conference, September 
2018).  
 
No one in the audience objected to the process. Whilst there may have been 
individuals who may not have been comfortable ‘raising their head above the 
parapet’, in the written feedback there were no significant obstacles that have not 
been raised in this thesis and many of the barriers centred around organisational 
learning issues and inability to highlight the importance preventing identification 
errors. Furthermore, there was a concern that change to front-line clinical staff 
roles would be challenging. 
 
PSNI developed local protocols for their police service and partners in the 
reconciliation process to follow. As a result, following the Derry Rioting events in 
Northern Ireland in early 2019, the use of DVI was again successfully used in a 
hospital setting (Personal Correspondence with Roberts, May 2019). 
 
In addition to PSNI’s positive engagement with the expansion of the DVI process,  
NHS England invited the Author to present her paper to the EPRR Clinical 
Reference Group meeting in December 2018. The Author was told that her paper 
would be of benefit to the discussion of a Patient Safety Alert regarding the 
temporary identification criteria for unidentified patients (2018). This resulted in an 
invitation to collaborate on the development of national guidance to be included in 
the UK Mass Casualty Plan being developed by the Cabinet Office.  
 
Furthermore, after attendance at a media training event, a television production 
company has enquired whether they could run a documentary on the subject, as it 
was felt to be in the public interest and something that would be worthwhile filming. 
Discussions are ongoing with Screenhouse Productions Ltd. 
 
Avoiding “misidentification multiplicity” (Black and Bikker, 2016, 2) is an essential 
component of this thesis. The scrutiny of causative factors and the implications of 
these failures demonstrate that there are fundamental issues in organisational 
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learning across mass casualty and fatality response. Barriers to implementing a 
solution are being justified by a misunderstanding of the law and an inability and 
unwillingness to adopt positive examples of best practice. There is an influential 
mindset amongst many DVI practitioners and front-line responders that the 
identification of the deceased is a priority in a mass casualty and fatality event. 
However, as EA pointed out, the death of an individual cannot be undone. Whilst 
the numbers of deceased may be greater, the identification of the deceased 
should not take priority over the living. Ultimately, this research heralds the 
necessity for the adoption of a scientifically based protocol for the identification of 
incapacitated living individuals and, crucially, a demand to embed these practices 




12.6 Recommendations for Further Research 
 
As has been reflected upon throughout this thesis, there are several ways in which 
further research on the issues raised could be followed up. Beyond the 
recommendations made in Chapter Eleven, the following provide several 
suggestions for future projects: 
 
Owing to ethical concerns, this research did not conduct interviews with survivors 
or relatives affected by identification errors. There is scope for suitably qualified 
practitioners and academics to gather primary data relating to the emotional 
impact of these errors and suggestions for best practice in the reconciliation phase 
for survivors and their relatives. 
 
There is great potential in the application of biometric data to improve medical 
treatment and the identification of individuals. Although there has been criticism 
levelled at the use of facial recognition technologies for use in the detection of 
criminals (Robertson et al., 2016; White et al., 2015), it is suggested that they do 
have a place in the reconciliation phase. In the aftermath of a disaster, families 
and friends will turn to social media to upload images of their missing in the hope 
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that they will be found. The use of facial recognition software could potentially 
assist responders in matching victims, alongside the use of DVI techniques if a 
successful match is made. This is certainly an area of disaster response that 
warrants further research, especially as responders cannot reconcile a victim with 
a family that has not come forward. 
 
This research relied on the scrutiny of media reports, autobiographical accounts 
and anecdotal evidence from those interviewed regarding identification errors. 
There is potential for this research to be expanded to include quantitative data 
through Freedom of Information requests to hospitals throughout the UK to gather 
a better indication of the scale of the numbers of unidentified and incapacitated 
individuals. However, as highlighted, there is a need for improved reporting 
mechanisms for cases of unknown patients. If hospitals are not recording these 
occurrences, then there is a risk that the data provided will be skewed. 
 
As noted above in s.12.5, there has recently been action by the Cabinet Office and 
the NHS to improve the mechanism for the temporary identification of patients. 
Scrutiny of the documentation produced so far has raised the issue that the 
solution is in the form of an alpha-numerical numbering system to ensure the 
patient and their respective treatment is appropriately tracked through hospitals. 
The policy documentation does not incorporate the need to determine the actual 
identity of the individual, as it focuses on the correct medical treatment of the 
physical injuries and the safety of the patient. Therefore, as this research attests, 
there is a need to develop protocols for hospitals to ensure that, alongside the 
medical treatment of the physical injuries, hospitals develop and test a policy that 
takes into account not only the patient’s safety but also considers their mental and 
emotional wellbeing and the accurate determination of their real identity. There 
have been criticisms levelled at responders for the use of alpha-numerics in 
previous disasters (Kavanagh, 2005; Scraton, 2016), therefore there is a need to 
reflect on such examples and ensure solutions exist. 
 
Finally, this research identified that there was a misconception of the application of 
the law relating to the treatment of incapacitated and unknown patients. Confusion 
regarding whether the use of DVI techniques would amount to charges of assault 
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when consent was lacking was a primary concern. It is obvious that the lack of 
clarity has led to a reluctance to offer appropriate care to those affected in the 
wake of disasters. There remain issues around information sharing between 
agencies in the aftermath of incidents due to confusion about the legality of such 
disclosure, as noted from interviews with EPOs and personal experience in the 
field of emergency planning. Therefore, there is a need to research how the 
knowledge of these laws, which are used in everyday practice in clinical and police 






12.7 Reflections on Undertaking a PhD: How Do You Eat an 
Elephant? 
 
As stated in Chapter One, the field of emergency response is one that the Author 
is very familiar with. Therefore, the opportunity to study the nuances and 
undercurrents within this field, from the point of view of an academic, was 
extremely insightful. Throughout the course of this research the knowledge that 
this work might in some way positively influence responder reactions in terms of 
victim support was immensely encouraging.  
 
Despite the disheartening apathy at the outset from some responders with regards 
to the need for this research, there were glimmers of positivity from those who, 
after taking the time to digest the implications, realised the necessity for change 
from their own experience of real-life disaster response.  
 
Similarly, the Author found the process of compiling this thesis frustrating, in terms 
of not knowing what was expected or the eventual conclusion, particularly as the 
Author was remote from the university and fellow academics. It was a constant 
challenge to remain focused and plan a convergent path to a compelling message, 
which has now satisfactorily been achieved. 
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Balancing the need to conduct research alongside parenting and running a 
business was extremely challenging, but the need for a change in this area of 
patient reconciliation was a significant and personally motivating incentive. At one 
point where it seemed insurmountable, a very wise woman (my mother) asked, 
“How do you eat an elephant?” To the Author’s look of confusion, she answered, 
“In small chunks, of course.” This was essential and timely advice and was crucial 
to helping with the completion of this tome. Small ‘chunks’, a few hundred words 
every day, even if they were to be revised later, helped with the progression of this 
journey.   
 
Lastly, as Chapter Five demonstrated, our sense of identity and essentially what 
embodies us is the nature, nurture, cognition and time spent in the company of 
others. The Author’s family and friends are vital to her sense of self. The 
knowledge that any one of us could be that unidentified victim spurs the pursuit of 
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